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Amanpour
Interview With LSE Director Of Syria Conflict Research Programme Rim Turkmani; Interview With China Power Project Director And CSIS Senior Adviser Bonny Lin; Interview With Eurasia Group President And Founder Ian Bremmer. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired May 20, 2025 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
BIANNA GOLODRYGA, CNN INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
Israel pushes farther into Gaza, as aid officials warn more children could die soon of starvation. We bring you the latest.
Then, Syria celebrates a fresh start, but what challenges lie ahead? I ask expert Rim Turkmani.
And tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Political Scientist Bonny Lin tells me why she thinks the risk of war is high and getting higher.
Plus --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
IAN BREMMER, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, EURASIA GROUP: I do think that the United States is at its best when it brings its best to its friends around
the world.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: -- unpacking the Trump trip. Ian Bremmer talks to Walter Isaacson about the president's visit to the Gulf and what it tells us about
the new world order.
Welcome to the program everyone. I'm Bianna Golodryga in New York, sitting in for Christiane Amanpour.
The United Kingdom is making its frustration with its ally Israel known today, summoning its ambassador, pausing trade negotiations, and
sanctioning West Bank settlers. The British Foreign Office says it can't advance talks on trade while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to
pursue, quote, "egregious policies" in Gaza and the West Bank. Here's foreign minister David Lammy.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DAVID LAMMY, BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER: Netanyahu's government's actions have made this necessary, Madan Deputy Speaker. Today, my honorable friend,
the minister for the Middle East, is summoning the Israeli ambassadors for foreign office to convey this message.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: France and Canada also threatened to take concrete action as Israel continues its push into Gaza. Netanyahu Monday said that his
military plans to take control of the entire Gaza Strip. Well, Israel now says that it will allow a basic amount of food into the besiege enclave
after two and a half months of blockade. But humanitarian officials say that it's not enough. The U.N. relief chief warns 14,000 babies could die
in Gaza in the next 48 hours without aid.
Let's go now to Jeremy Diamond in Tel Aviv with the latest. So, these concrete steps that these three Israel allies have threatened to take,
include what exactly, Jeremy? What more are we learning?
JEREMY DIAMOND, CNN JERUSALEM CORRESPONDENT: Well, so far what we know is what is -- are the steps that the United Kingdom has taken in terms of
pausing those trade negotiations, summoning the ambassador and those sanctions on some Israeli settlers. It's not clear yet what the
consequences will be coming from France and Canada, nor is it clear that these will necessarily have the desired effect on the Israeli prime
minister.
Certainly, Israel has been facing mounting international pressure, including from some of these very same allies. At the end of the day
though, I think it will depend on whether these countries are willing to go further in terms of those concrete actions to pressure the Israeli prime
minister and also whether the United States follow suit.
At the end of the day, that is going to be Benjamin Netanyahu's North Star in terms of determining, you know, how much pressure he is truly under, how
much it is going to affect his ability to continue to carry out this war in Gaza, which is something that he hinted at just yesterday when he tried to
justify to his right-wing allies and governments why he was allowing a basic amount of humanitarian aid. He pointed to the pressure, including
from the United States, that these images of starvation and Gaza simply were not something that the U.S. could stand any longer.
And therefore, he said, in order to ensure that Israel can continue to carry out this war with, you know, U.S. weapons and other arms support that
they provide, that is why he was taking that step.
So, I think at the end of the day, it comes down to how much pressure is President Trump going to bring to bear on Netanyahu to get to a ceasefire
agreement? And that much at this stage still seems unclear.
GOLODRYGA: Yes. And Axios is reporting that President Trump, to that point, is also expressing some exasperation and pushing for Netanyahu to wrap
things up in Gaza as well. And you mentioned the pressure that the prime minister is feeling externally, obviously, internally from his far-right
coalition members, but also from the majority of Israelis that would like to see a deal in which all of these hostages come home and a ceasefire is
put into place, including the family members of the 58 hostages that remain in Gaza.
[13:05:00]
We know that talks are ongoing still in Doha. What do we know about where they stand?
DIAMOND: Yes, that's right. We know that the Israeli negotiating team is still in Doha, despite some reports in Israeli media today indicating that
the prime minister was considering calling that team back. What we have less of a clear sense about is whether they're actually making any real
progress.
The only advancements that we've seen over the course of the last weeks since Edan Alexander was released, remember that was supposed to be the
move to kind of unlock a bigger deal to free the remaining 58 hostages and lead to some kind of a ceasefire here, but all we have really seen is that
the Israelis have at least agreed to discuss multiple avenues, meaning not just a short-term ceasefire for the release of about half of the living
hostages, but rather they did put on the table as well, discussions about an end of the war in Gaza and the release of all of the hostages.
As you rightly point out, a majority of Israelis want to see that, they want to see a deal that ends the war entirely and frees all of the 58
remaining hostages held in Gaza. The Israeli government is only willing to make that deal if Hamas also agrees to fully surrender and disarm and for
the Gaza Strip to be entirely demilitarized. That is where the sticking point currently stands.
Hamas has said that their red line is that they will not agree to disarm. They have said they're willing to agree to an end of the war, to release
all of the hostages held in Gaza, but they will not disarm. And so, that seems to be where the primary sticking point is here.
And beyond that, of course we know that the Israeli prime minister is very much tethered to the right-wing of his government, which is advocating not
just for the defeat of Hamas in Gaza, but also advocating for Israel, completely taking over the Gaza Strip, deporting, you know, Gaza's 2
million plus population out of out of Gaza and then establishing Jewish settlements there. And that's obviously not something that is going to be
conducive to any kind of agreement at this stage.
GOLODRYGA: Yes. Including from the IDF, which has long said that they would not be in favor of long-term occupation of the Gaza Strip as well. All
right. Jeremy Diamond, thank you.
And now, for a closer look at the realities on the ground in Gaza. Abeer Salman has this report. And we must warn you, some of the images are
graphic.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
JANA AL-SKEIFI, GAZA RESIDENT (through translator): My dad has no-one else, I'm the one who carries the water. We wait for hours just to fill up, and
oftentimes we only fill half a bucket. I want to be strong so my father doesn't suffer.
ABEER SALMAN, CNN PRODUCER AND CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): This is the story of one 12-year-old girl, Jana al-Skeifi and her family. But it's also
the story of so many others in Gaza today, where days are punctuated by the never-ending search for water and food. And where the death of one pushes a
family to endure unimaginable hardships.
AL-SKEIFI (through translator): My brother heard a woman begging for help, her children were terrified. He leaned down to point a way out and was shot
by a sniper. It entered into his chest and came out.
MOHAMED AL-SKEIFI, GAZA RESIDENT (through translator): The bullet entered here in his chest. We took off the coat and buried him. He was our only
son. His death broke us.
SALMAN (voice-over): After her brother was killed, it was Jana who stepped up, becoming her family's caretaker and guardian.
J. AL-SKEIFI (through translator): My father is old and has heart disease. My mother has cancer. If my father tries to carry the bucket, he'll fall. I
have to carry all this and my dad does his best to help.
SALMAN (voice-over): It's a burden made worse by Israel's punishing 11-week blockade of food and aid on the Gaza Strip. Israel says the blockade was
designed to bring about the release of all of the hostages and pressure Hamas. So far, neither has happened.
Instead, despite aid now trickling in, the U.N. says 20 percent of the population faces starvation, calling it, quote, "atrocious and beyond
human."
AL-SKEIFI (through translator): I used to play with my niece all the time. She was malnourished, and couldn't be treated here. They told us she had to
be evaluated. This is when she was dying. God bless her.
[13:10:00]
AYA AL-SKEIFI, GAZA RESIDENT (through translator): I didn't even want to travel abroad. I just wanted someone to bring her milk. I stopped eating,
drinking, moving. I couldn't even go to the bathroom because I was afraid she would slip away. At 5:00 in the morning, I realized she had passed. It
felt like someone took my heart away, or stabbed me with a knife. I couldn't proves the feeling.
SALMAN (voice-over): A baby born and perished surrounded by starvation. Her three brief months of life, sustained by a child. Before the war, Gaza
survived on food deliveries from hundreds of trucks a day. Now, with the Israeli military pledging to take over the entire Gaza Strip, whatever
makes it through will almost certainly not be enough.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
GOLODRYGA: The brutal realities of war through the eyes of a 12-year-old. Our thanks to Abeer Salman for the reporting there.
Well, next we turn to Syria, which is rapidly coming in from the cold. The extraordinary sight of President Trump's recent Middle East trip of the
former jihadist with a U.S. bounty on his head meeting the president of the United States marks a watershed moment.
Trump promised to lift sanctions and the interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa has been tirelessly courting the West trying to ensure his country ceases
to be a pariah state. But it won't be easy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio today says the U.S. assesses Syria's transitional government could be weeks
away from collapse.
Let's bring in Rim Turkmani who runs the Syria conflict Research program at the London School of Economics. Rim, it is good to see you again. And as
noted in introduction there, quite a whirlwind five months for Syria, for the Syrian people and for president interim, President al-Sharaa who as we
noted has been courting the West.
He's also in a sense been courting Syrians. And I'm wondering over the course of five months now that he has been in charge how they are viewing
him as a whole.
RIM TURKMANI, DIRECTOR OF SYRIA CONFLICT RESEARCH PROGRAMME, LSE: I think he gathered to rally considerable support behind him in the first two
months. Then kind of reality hit people, the honeymoon was over, the economy was getting worse, and people starting doubting his ability to
rescue the country.
So, the lifting of the sanctions or announcing to lift the sanctions by the Americans is very timely. I think the remarks by Marco Rubio, you just
referred to, that the country was weeks away from collapse, he said that would have been the case had the U.S. not have lifted the sanctions and
engaged with the interim government, because they saw the economic collapse coming and that prevent the president's ability to bring the country
together, especially the different armed groups.
So, the logic of the interventions, as we understood it from the secretary of state's remarks today, is that they did this prevent the collapse. They
don't see the collapse coming anymore. They say it's a possibility, but they hope that the lifting of the sanctions will enable the region now to
help President al-Sharaa to rebuild the country and that could help him bring more support from around the country again.
GOLODRYGA: Right. Because the secretary of state went on to say the most important thing is that the partnering nations in the region want to get
aid in and they want to, quote, start helping them and they can't because they're afraid of the sanctions, and thus lifting the sanctions will enable
them to get aid back into the country and that's in line with the reporting that it was Mohammed bin Salman who himself had been pressuring and asking
President Trump to effectively lift these sanctions and meet with al- Sharaa.
How soon do you expect that aid to start coming in and change to be visible?
TURKMANI: It is going to take time. Initially, there will be the positive impact of the announcement itself, but the chilling effect of the sanctions
goes very deep. The private sector will remain reluctant to deal with Syria.
However, if the neighboring countries of the Gulf countries are able to help the state, then we expect to see an impact on the short and medium-
term. So, from that point of view, I think the U.S. did the right thing, because the narrative in the last few weeks was the U.S. now is the
obstacle, the U.S. standing behind Syria -- broken Syria or prosperous Syria. The U.S. sanctions are causing starvation and misery.
[13:15:00]
So, by saying we are going to the sanctions, U.S. relieves it from that. And now, the new government has an opportunity. Whether they are going to
be delivering or not, I think that is still a question and we have to watch closely how are they going to integrate the country? What kind of economy
are they going to create out of this opportunity?
Is it going to be inclusive, transparent, or is it going to exclude many Syrians, like the previous regime did? Are they going to create a new crony
capitalist or is it going to be fair development across the country? That remains to be seen, and we have to keep watching on the, all these issues
because these are some of the issues that led to the current conflict in Syria.
You know, some areas were deprived, some communities were completely marginalized, excluded from the economy. So, now all these tabs have been
opened, the obstacles have been lifted. We have to keep an eye on what kind of economy. And that is very linked to the security.
I think today, the security of state emphasized that security is key in Syria and the region. That if you have Syria secure, the region will be
secure. But key to that is the ability to involve all the Syrians, to have democratic, transparent governance, decentralized one that allows local
community to take part in governing themselves and also in creating, as I said, a fair and transparent economy.
GOLODRYGA: Yes. And it's important to note that sanctions waivers alone are not enough. And Secretary of State Rubio was pressing that Congress needs
to get involved too to lift these sanctions. It's notable that al-Sharaa was describing the decision as a turning point in state television last
night -- or sorry, last week. And he said this, he said it alleviates the suffering of the people, contributes to their rebirth, and lays the
foundation for stability in the region.
Could lifting these sanctions risk, however, empowering certain factions because we know that Sharaa doesn't have full control of the country just
yet.
TURKMANI: Absolutely. It brings so many other risks. First of all, when there are resources flowing, that on its own creates a competition. So,
from within the al-Sharaa circle itself, you're going to be -- you're going to see more competition for resources and power and access and all of that.
But also, across the country, people will see more -- something more worth it to fight for. But all of that on its own is not enough. Now, he's really
under washed. Now, all the obstacles have been lifted. He is being given an opportunity, and I think his biggest challenge is his very own approach,
which is very authoritarian, very central. He wants to take -- he and like two or three people around him want to take all the key decisions. And it's
not going to work like that.
If he doesn't relax things, if he doesn't delegate, decentralized, meaningfully include Syrian in the decision making, create a more
democratic process, then I'm not sure he's going to succeed, especially in regards to communities that still see themselves out of the transitional
process, including people from Alawite backgrounds, northeast of Syria, like the Kurds, the Suwayda, the Druze in the south. They still don't quite
trust the new government. They want to give them an opportunity, but they don't see the conditions are enough for them to sign in, to hand in their
weapons and say, OK, we are joining the new army you are creating.
So, unless he really builds trust with this community, his ability to unify the country and make the best out of the opportunity would remain there,
will still be limited.
GOLODRYGA: Reuters is reporting that Syria's defense minister has called on a small armed group that have yet to merge with security apparatus to do so
within 10 days. If that doesn't happen, is that a litmus test as to the power that he can amass as a whole over the country?
TURKMANI: I think they are hasting the process a little bit. I think building a security sector, they're building a whole new security sector
after dismantling the old one. It does take trust. People are not going to hand in their weapon and sign to the new security sector if they don't
build trust with the new authorities.
The little arm groups are maybe not the biggest obstacle. I would say others that are in areas with minority backgrounds, you know, who still
have deep trust, as I said, with the government. It's not enough to come and say, I am the state now, hand in your weapon to me. You know, I'm the
one who has monopoly over violence. You have to build trust with them before they give that to you.
Because what they see a new security sector being formed that excludes them, that is indoctrinated around an Islamic identity. So, the training to
join the new army is still Islamic training. New foreign fighters are appointed in the army while Syrian generals who are defected from the Assad
regime, and we're talking about many thousands outnumber the foreign fighters still sitting in the margin.
[13:20:00]
So, Syrians want to see a national army being created that brings back all the generals that had the guts to stand up to Assad regime. An army that is
very inclusive, reflects the real composition of the Syrian people and that runs under a national framework. A national one. Yes. Not more
transnational, Islamist one.
When they see this happening, when they see this process, they will trust the state and they will hand in their weapon, but just send it coming like
this from the top and putting ultimatums on its own, I don't think that is going to work.
GOLODRYGA: Yes, and it didn't help, I would imagine, what happened and what we witnessed back in March when armed men loyal to the new regime carried
out field executions to those who were loyal to the Assad regimes, the Alawite community specifically. And you said that was an area to watch
closely. Has any of that changed in terms of brokering more trust between the two sides?
TURKMANI: Not much actually. In some areas we've seen improvement, but there is -- when you talk to the people in the Alawite area there is still
deep mistrust. They still live in panic. They're panicking. They have historically deeply rooted stories. You know, they -- there's a memory that
comes from many, many -- goes way before Assad, you know, that tells them that you -- you know, the Sunnis are going to come and kill you one day.
And now, they feel existential threats.
So, they're fighting for their survival, not for Assad regime. No one fights for Assad anymore. So, this trust is not there yet. But if the --
al-Sharaa uses this economic opportunity now to start inclusive development in their area that involves all these frustrated, angry youth, then he has
an opportunity to integrate them gradually.
But the deeps are -- the fears are still deep and they're still small, micro massacres or events happening on daily basis. People being kidnapped,
especially women, they disappear. We don't know where they go, and they're only deepening the fears, sadly, among the Alawite community.
GOLODRYGA: There were no mandated preconditions attached to the lifting of sanctions from President Trump, but they did come with asks. And he
proposed that Sharaa take a series of measures, including normalization with Israel, perhaps joining the Abraham Accords, expelling foreign
Palestinian terrorists, as he described them, and helping the U.S. prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Are these achievable asks in your view?
TURKMANI: Some -- have yet leadership that has enough -- that has what it takes to rally all Syrians behind it, towards a final deal with Israel.
They could agree to an ordinary relation right now, like a temporary arrangement, but to sign a full deal like the Abraham Accord, I don't think
the Syrians are ready for this.
And we have to remember, Syria is a neighboring state to Israel that shares borders. So, that's very different calculations from the countries that
already signed the Abraham Accord, you know, in Morocco or the Gulf countries. Also, to prevent the ISIS coming again. What we need is to build
legitimate political authority, and that takes time.
It's doable. It is doable, but it's a long process. It takes time. And key to that, as I said, is in close -- inclusivity and allowing the local
community itself, which is your strong -- strongest ally against extremism is the local community. We have to allow them to be active and to have
power at their level. Right now, the power is extremely central in Damascus.
GOLODRYGA: Yes. Still many challenges ahead, but a window of opportunity as well. Rim Turkmani, thank you. We appreciate the time.
TURKMANI: Thank you very much. Thank you.
GOLODRYGA: And stay with CNN. We'll be right back after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[13:25:00]
GOLODRYGA: The risk of war in the Taiwan Strait is high and getting higher. That is the sobering warning in a new piece from Foreign Affairs, which
lays out the growing tensions between China and Taiwan, particularly under Taiwan's president, William Lai.
Now, China's military activities are on the rise, undertaking major exercises and pursuing an unprecedented military buildup. So, is war
between Taiwan and China inevitable or can an off ramp be found? Bonny Lin co-authored that piece for Foreign Affairs and joins the program from New
York. Bonny, it's good to see you. Thanks so much for taking the time.
In fact, the head of the U.S. military's Indo-Pacific Command said, to your point, of the growing military activity in the region, and he said that,
China's aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not exercises, they are rehearsals. Talk to us about the heightened risk right now of potential
conflict between these two sides.
BONNY LIN, DIRECTOR, CHINA POWER PROJECT AND SENIOR ADVISER, CSIS: Thank you Bianna. It's great to join you today. So, as I lay out my piece in
Foreign Affairs with my two co-authors, John Culver and Brian Hart, we're seeing a lot more Chinese military activity against Taiwan.
Since the start of William Lai's administration, which started January 2024, we've seen China engage in three large name exercises against Taiwan,
and that doesn't include the smaller or not named military exercises against Taiwan. In addition to these large exercises, we're also seeing
China engage in more daily provocations and intrusions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone. We're seeing this increase at a rate that we
haven't seen before, to an extent that even Taiwan's ministry of national defense is saying that they're now seeing about every two weeks these
larger joint patrols from China. So, it's an unprecedented rate of military activities that we haven't seen for quite some time now.
GOLODRYGA: And you've also picked up on the fact that these activities are coming now just after speeches and fiery speeches that may be made by
President Lai as opposed to in the past when you would see a state visit from members of Congress or vice versa here to the United States. What is
that supposed to signal?
LIN: It's supposed to signal that China's responding more to William Lai almost everything he does, everything he's saying and when he rolls out
major policy efforts China is responding. Of note, today is the one-year anniversary since William Lai has been inaugurated, and he did make a
speech today in Taipei time, May 20th. So, we're waiting to see if China is going to do another military exercise after this speech.
But I will note that this speech is -- he didn't really address China or cross trade dynamics as much as some of his prior speeches. So, it's
possible that China might not react as strongly or feel the need to, from their perspective, punish William Lai.
GOLODRYGA: Yes. I believe he said things along the line of war has no winners. But historically, what has his stance been vis-a-vis China, and
how has that differed from his recent predecessors?
LIN: So, William Lai's stance on China is actually not too different from his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, but the way he's talked about China and the
measures that he's implemented to defend Taiwan has been, I would say, firmer and bold than Tsai.
So, for example, when he was inaugurated last year, he used terms in his inauguration speech that characterized Taiwan as a -- as almost a separate
country from China. And of course, Beijing did not like that. He also talked about Taiwan as having a separate history and talked about -- and
used terms that suggested to China that there was some separation between the island and China.
This year, during his anniversary of his inauguration, he actually didn't really address China at all during his speech, but he did mention China as
an aggressor during Q&A.
GOLODRYGA: You mentioned the last time that a military conflict between these two sides came close was in 2008. And I'm just wondering how you can
compare the brinksmanship of today to that of the past, and are you worried that perhaps the west, the world maybe too complacent at this point?
[13:30:00]
LIN: Well, I am very worried that Beijing has a lot of incentives to potentially use force to coerce Taiwan, not necessarily immediately to use
force to unify with Taiwan. But we're seeing a pattern of more and more military use against Taiwan.
In our piece, we mentioned that one of the last times we saw a major risk of conflict was in 2008, when then-Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian was at
the end of his second term, and he proposed a referendum in Taiwan that China did not like. And as a result of that referendum, we saw China ready
its missiles on alert, and there were even discussions within the United States that China might be willing to engage in a missile strike against
Taiwan.
Luckily, the referendum that then-Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian tried to push through didn't receive enough votes. Usually, referendums in Taiwan
have to receive at least 50 percent of the votes to be valid. So, it was invalidated.
But that just shows the concern that we see -- we're seeing among Chinese analysts that they view, like, William -- President William Lai, similar to
Chen Shui-bian, as having similar tendencies towards independence from China's perspective and willing to stir up domestic issues or utilize
domestic actions to -- from their perspective to promote Taiwan independence. Again, this is their perspective, not necessarily our
perspective.
GOLODRYGA: But what we have seen just objectively is China double down on its investments since 2008 on its military, in particular on its technology
sector, its military has grown enormously. Its navy now actually larger than that of the United States, and coming rather close to matching the
prowess of the U.S. military and capabilities there.
We keep hearing about the date 2027 as perhaps a date that China would be willing or prepared to launch some sort of attack against Taiwan, maybe
even a blockade of sorts. How serious is that threat and how prepared now is the Chinese military?
LIN: That's an excellent question. I would say the Chinese military is largely on track to be able to have the capabilities by 2027 to engage in
amphibious invasion of Taiwan, that was where the original day came from, right? That was from U.S. intelligence assessments that Xi Jinping has set
that as a target date for the PLA to be able to achieve those capabilities.
Again, as you know, capabilities is not the same as intent. But what makes 2027 even more sensitive is it's also links to other dates that we talk
about in the piece. One of the most significant dates is that's when we will see the end -- the near -- the end of the first term of President
William Lai. So, we'll have another Taiwan presidential election underway with the actual election January 2028.
So, if, if China views William Lai like Chen Shui-bian, there's going to be a lot of worries in late 2027 that Lai may take these efforts that could
try to swing the election or Taiwan's voters his way. So, I think there's a period of uncertainty in terms of Chinese thinking about Taiwan that gets
really heightened by late 2027.
I would also note 2027 is also the 100th year anniversary of the establishment of the People's Liberation Army, as well as in 2027, we'll
see the next party Congress in China where we expect Xi Jinping to have his unprecedented fourth term as leader of China.
So, there's lots of special meaning in that ear that could drive different motivations for why China might want to be -- might want to appear bolder
and might want to appear like it has a more control over Taiwan.
GOLODRYGA: And then of course, there's a question of how far the United States would actually go in defending Taiwan. President Biden really broke
a year's long policy by not once or twice or I think three times publicly stating that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China were to invade. We
haven't heard that from President Trump. And you talk about in your piece how there's conflicting views, even within his own administration, as to
what that policy would be and what the United States actually would do if that were to happen.
You know, prior to the tariff war, the focus had been on what the United States was doing vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine and how seriously the U.S.
was willing to support Ukraine. Now, with this trade war and heightened tensions between China, but China also getting a sense that the United
States or that President Trump can blink first, how concerned are you about a massive miscalculation on the part of China?
[13:35:00]
LIN: I'm quite concerned about a miscalculation on China's part for a number of reasons. What we outlined in the piece are what we perceive to be
misperceptions from the Chinese side. We're not trying to say right now that the Trump administration's policy on Taiwan is actually that different
from the Biden administrations.
If you actually look at it, there has been real no change in our -- in the U.S. government's position or policies on Taiwan.; But there's lots of
media reporting on exactly what you talked about, which is Trump not making the same state -- President Trump not making the same statements as
President Biden.
And I think it's also important to note that when President Biden did make those statements about the United States willing to defend Taiwan, his
advisers quickly walked back those statements. So, it's not like under President Biden, we had strategic clarity to defend Taiwan either. We still
have strategic ambiguity. We had that under President Biden and we had that under President Trump.
I think what the Chinese focus on is also a sense that under the first Trump administration there was a lot more support for Taiwan than before.
And they're also worried that if they're not really certain where President Trump is from their perception and they worry that below President Trump,
all his advisers are much more supportive for Taiwan, then it might make sense for China to use more military force, to raise the issue to President
Trump so he's able to see this, and potentially even check what's happening with his advisers.
Again, those are perceptions from Beijing. I'm not saying that there's actually been any change in the Trump administration's policies towards
Taiwan.
GOLODRYGA: Well, a really thoughtful and provocative piece. Thank you so much --
LIN: Thank you.
GOLODRYGA: -- for explaining it all to us. Bonny Lin. We appreciate the time.
LIN: Thank you.
GOLODRYGA: And we'll be right back after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
GOLODRYGA: Well now, after a slew of multimillion dollar tech deals, President Trump may have opened the door for the Gulf to become the next
global artificial intelligence hotspot. But could opening that door have repercussions for U.S. national security?
Years ago, our next guest laid out the idea of a techno polar world. President and founder of the Eurasia Group, Ian Bremmer, joins Walter
Isaacson to discuss how Trump's trip to the Middle East could be taking us closer to that vision.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Bianna. And, Ian Bremmer, welcome back to the show.
IAN BREMMER, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, EURASIA GROUP: Always good to be with you, Walter.
ISAACSON: Last time we were here, we talked about global recession, meaning that our institutions these days aren't keeping up with the changes that
are happening in the world. Now, Donald Trump has done that tour of the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, and done a very transactional
type of foreign policy, enlisting all of the Persian Gulf into sort of an economic orbit with the United States, maybe weaning them for China. How
big of a tectonic change might that be?
BREMMER: I think it is an incremental shift. Let's keep in mind that when Trump was president first time around, his first trip was also to the Gulf.
He went to Saudi Arabia. You remember all of those leaders collected and they grabbed the orb together. They were talking about counter-terrorism,
counterinsurgency. Not as many deals got done though.
This time around, you're right, the commercial numbers were a lot bigger. Trump had a lot more CEOs, some of the world's biggest CEOs in tow with him
on that trip. Also, notably this time around, he didn't go to Israel. And there's a lot more tension between him and Prime Minister Netanyahu,
especially on the back of some of the diplomacy the Trump is trying to get done.
[13:40:00]
But I mean, the fact remains, as in 2017, Trump's best relations with the leaders that he has on speed dial are with the leaders who have
consolidated a lot of power in the Gulf States, particularly MBS in Saudi Arabia and bin Zayed in the UAE. And I think those relations are only
getting stronger, only getting deeper and yes, more, if you will, strategically transactional with Trump himself, with the United States and
with the business community.
ISAACSON: And how does that play off against China? Some of the Gulf states had been getting closer to China. Is this sort of part of a rebalancing the
way Kissinger and Nixon may have done of China and Russia?
BREMMER: Well, of course, these are oil producers. And the United States isn't taking any oil from the Middle East of note. That is overwhelmingly
going to China and will continue to go to China. So, those commercial interests aren't going away. And the Chinese are going to continue to do a
lot of investment on the ground in those countries.
But when we start talking about national security and here, not just in terms of the presence of U.S. military bases and the sales of material, but
also critically, when we look at advanced technologies and artificial intelligence, there we are seeing a real decision by the Emiratis, first
and foremost, they want to work A.I. with the United States and its corporations and they're going to take the Chinese out of their system.
And there's a lot of pressure and a lot of effort to do the same with the Saudis and other major Gulf states, and I think that is a shift as we think
about the future of the Gulf. Yes.
ISAACSON: So, how does he justify the out shoring a lot of the A.I. stuff to the Persian Gulf states?
BREMMER: Well, it's inconsistent, Walter, you're right to point it out. I suppose he justifies it in part because there's a great asymmetry in the
size of the economies and the fact that the United States provides all this military support.
Hopefully, there'll also be some guardrails in whatever Trump does to replace the diffusion rule on A.I. and semiconductors that the Biden
administration had put in place. So, I think what Trump is trying to put together. Are rules that say that most of the sales that come out of these
centers in the Gulf will have to go to the United States. That the most of that data is going to have to be with American companies and only a small
percentage could go to any other country in the world, say 7 percent is a max. That's the quantitative measure that I've heard talked about.
But then you need people in the White House with competence to formulate and implement what is essentially going to be a multi-agency rule. And
that's -- you know, as we know from the Trump administration, there's not a lot of time spent on the details of how you get policy actually done. So,
how long it takes to get that done and how capable the eventual rules will be I think is something we're going to be -- is something to be seen.
ISAACSON: It seems to me, and I think you've written about it in one of your latest pieces, that the world has sort of divided on A.I. between more
open countries and then more status countries that try to centralize it. How does the Persian Gulf countries fit into that?
BREMMER: Well, you have the Chinese who have shown that they're very capable, even with constraints from the U.S. on semiconductors, they can
build some of the world's most advanced models in artificial intelligence. And the state controls what those companies do, determines who the winners
and losers are going to be and how they deploy those algorithms and who has access to them. So, the state really captures the corporations.
In the United States, it's very different. In the United States, in many ways, the technology companies are capturing the state. They're writing
their own rules. They're determining how they will be governed. And they spend a lot of money to ensure that they have that access to the
government. But the capture really comes from the technology companies.
Now, as I said, in the Persian Gulf there is a desire to align with those American corporations, at least right now on A.I. And a lot of money is
being spent and a lot of infrastructure is being developed to facilitate that on balance, that is a win for the Trump administration and the United
States.
I think there are two questions that it raises. First of all, to what extent, if it's the tech companies and not the government that are writing
the rules do American citizens get taken care of? How do you ensure that you have rules that work for the average American as opposed to just for
the profitability of the most powerful companies in the world?
[13:45:00]
Second of all is, what happens to governments that aren't playing dominant role in A.I.? I mean, there's another big model out there that you didn't
ask a question about, which is Europe. And in Europe, the government's superpower is the regulatory environment, but that isn't driving the
creation of any companies at scale in the tech space. And so, does the E.U. just lose, even though they have a model that, in principle, is looking out
for rule of law, in principle, is looking out for a more sustainable society?
Right now, I'd say the Gulf States are looking a lot faster, more nimble, more savvy in aligning with how this power is changing than the Europeans
or the Japanese are.
ISAACSON: I want to read you something that President Trump said in a rather remarkable speech, the speech he gave in Saudi Arabia, which he has
-- he said, the great transformation has not come from Western interventionists giving lectures on how to live or how to govern your own
affairs. No, the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by nation builders or neocons, or liberal, non-profits, the so-called
nation builders wrecked more nations than they built, and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies they did not even
understand.
Do you see this as an emergent Trump doctrine, or is that just some random statements?
BREMMER: I thought it was a great applause line for Trump. It spoke to the incredible national pride of the Saudis in the room, and there was a lot of
applause, and I think that applause was genuine. The United States historically as this exceptionalist nation frequently believes it has all
the answers for other countries, irrespective of the hypocrisy and not always living up to those things at home.
And the U.S. has made a lot of mistakes in trying to nation build in other countries, most dramatically in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And of course,
both of these had a lot of impact on American allies in the Gulf. But I wouldn't take that too far. I mean, the reality is that when the Saudis and
the Emiratis were trying to build global countries that had access to the rest of the world, they were bringing in expertise from the United States.
And not just consultants, but engineers and coders, right, and planners. And because these are small countries that didn't have that expertise
themselves. And I do think that the United States is at its best when it brings its best to its friends around the world. And also, when the United
States helps educating those countries.
I mean, the Saudis and the Emiratis are doing very well by creating -- forging partnerships with America's best institutions of higher learning,
with America's best hospitals, with America's best research labs, they're bringing those in. And that's not because the Americans are arrogant, it's
because these countries recognize that the U.S. is world class there. Where the U.S. is not world class is its political leadership, lecturing them on
how to run their countries. That is a place where the Americans not only have done a bad job outside the U.S. but frankly, have done a bad job for
the average Americans. And we see the results of that in election after election after election.
ISAACSON: The opening potentially to Syria, he met with the new interim president there. Is this being done, do you think, in consultation with
Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel? Are they being sidelined?
BREMMER: I think they're being sidelined. I think that Trump is not particularly happy with the Israeli prime minister. He doesn't feel that
he's interested in listening to the U.S. You saw that Israel and Netanyahu, that was the first country invited to meet with Trump after Liberation Day,
and that was a give by the Americans and Netanyahu came over and, you know, said he was going to zero out his tariffs and was expecting, you know, that
a deal from the Americans. And Trump said, no, you should be really thankful we give you billions of dollars in military equipment. We're going
to continue to do that. And by the way, we're going to start talking with the Iranians and we're not going to ask you about it.
And I think you've seen the same thing in terms of the deal cut with the Houthis that doesn't include no attacks on Israel, just includes no attack
on American ships. I think this is Trump who is by far Israel's number one supporter globally, that remains the case today. They're helping them
defend themselves. They're providing massive military aid. They're certainly giving them huge amounts of cover to continue the war on the
ground in Gaza and frankly, in the West Bank too. But that doesn't mean that they're going to coordinate with them their broader military moves in
the region.
[13:50:00]
If you remember, Walter, three months ago, all -- everyone was talking about diplomatically was, will Trump come in and cut a deal that brings the
Saudis into the Abraham Accords, right? And that will help them facilitate an opening to Israel. Well, it's very clear to Trump that's not happening.
And so, he's given up on that and he's moved on to let's work with the Saudis, let's work with the Emiratis. We'll work with the Gulf States. We
trust them. They're very transactional. They'll give us lots of money, including me and my family directly. And that is the way that we can cut a
deal with Iran.
And, you know, Bibi will continue to provide support for Israel, but we're not going to coordinate our diplomatic approach or our economic approach to
the region with him. That is absolutely where we are today.
ISAACSON: Trump's family members have so many dealings in the Middle East and so much money coming in and out. Do you see that becoming an issue? And
what corruption bothers you in that?
BREMMER: I wish I saw it becoming an issue. I don't, Walter. I think the reality is that the United States, for a very long time, has been the most
kleptocratic, the most coin operated of wealthy democracies in the world, it's the billions and billions that are spent by special interest on every
election, and they expect and they see a return on that investment. It is deeply transactional.
And so, when Trump comes out and he launches a crypto coin for himself and for his family, when Trump comes out and he supports major deals for
members of his family with the countries that the U.S. is doing diplomacy with, that's, you know -- frankly, it's even more kleptocratic, but the
companies around the world, they're used to writing big checks for access. They're using writing big checks even for people that can get them access
to members of the family. That's, it's more obvious for Trump than it was for Biden, but it happened under Biden too.
So, I don't think you see --
ISAACSON: Well, wait. Don't you think that this is not just continuation of what's been happening? But Eric Trump going to Dubai when they're giving $2
billion, the UAE, to this I don't know, World Liberty financial coins. That seems to be a different league.
BREMMER: I mean, this is the problem, the United States has been actively talking as if it has the best example of democracy in the world for
decades, and it doesn't. And it doesn't. And it doesn't specifically because people around the world feel like you can pay to get access to a
different legal system. You can pay to write your own regulations. You can pay to get outcomes you want. And by the way, I think that's not true in
terms of autocracy.
So, when Trump goes after the law firms and says, I'm going to extort you because you've decided to represent someone that deserves representation,
and this is an attack on foundational rule of law in America, the law firms react to that because they're not used to dictatorship in the United
States, companies are used to kleptocracy.
When Trump goes after universities and says, we're not going to let -- allow you to educate students in a manner that you see fit, universities
respond and say, we -- whoa, whoa, whoa. We won't tolerate that. So, I don't believe that the U.S. is on the precipice of becoming a dictatorship,
but I do believe the U.S. has been driving speedily on the road to kleptocracy for a long time now, and I think Trump has his foot on the gas.
That's the way I would put it.
ISAACSON: Ian Bremmer, thank you so much for joining us.
BREMMER: Great to be with you, Walter.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
GOLODRYGA: And finally, celebrating the rich diversity of America. Trailblazing choreographer Bill T. Jones is back with a new show,
"Curriculum III: People, Places & Things" explores what it means to be an American today. As the nation faces mass deportations, increased
surveillance and censorship.
Well, last year, Bill T. Jones sat down with Christiane around the revival of his multimedia work still here to discuss the power of art to express
shared experience.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BILL T. JONES, CHOREOGRAPHER: I had this belief in art. I thought that art was participation, the world of ideas was like religion. If you want to
know what makes life worth living, give yourself to an aesthetic pursuit. What is a poetic phrase? How can language be used? And am I an anonymous
number or am I somebody, am I some entity that has a place?
I think artists in this very ego-driven world that we live in, celebrity culture, can give us a chance of answering that question, I have some
uniqueness. I have a voice that matters, and yet, I'm part of, how does Hannah Arendt say, plurality. She says, politics is plurality.
[13:55:00]
How do we live together? That's a big one for me. That's what a work like still here is trying to do. It wants to make some common experience and a
common experience is we live, we grow, some of us will reproduce, and we will certainly die. I thought we all knew that. But we have to be reminded
again and again that is the arc. Now, what are we going to do with it while we're here?
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: What should we do with it?
JONES: Make something beautiful. Have honest conversation. Don't fall back on cliche and be brave.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: And his new work can be seen at New York Live Arts through May 24th.
Well, that is it for now. Thank you so much for watching, and goodbye from New York.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
