Return to Transcripts main page
Amanpour
Interview with Oxford University Professor of Global History Peter Frankopan; Interview with Former U.S. Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander; Top Diplomats from Europe, Qatar and Turkey on Mediation and the Path to Peace; Interview with The New Yorker Editor David Remnick. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired December 09, 2025 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DONALD TRUMP, U.S. PRESIDENT: Europe is going in some bad directions.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Rebuffing Europe and embracing Russia, Trump sets out a new world order. In his national security strategy, the former Pentagon
official Celeste Wallander and historian Peter Frankopan helped figure this out.
Then --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: War is not a way of settling disputes among people or states. And above all, that a war of aggression cannot have reward.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: -- top diplomats from Europe, Qatar and Turkey on mediation and the path to peace.
Plus --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: These writers are the writers that are at the forefront of thought and literature in our culture.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: -- The New Yorker turns 100, and to mark its centenary, a new documentary provides a rare peek inside the magazine as it creates its
anniversary issue. Walter Isaacson speaks to longtime editor David Remnick.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
Hostile to Europe, warm to Russia, the Trump 2.0 national security strategy is causing a mix of fury, resignation, even accusations of ignorance. But
is it a wish list or a roadmap for a new world order? Moscow has welcomed the plan, saying that it aligns with Putin's vision. While former Swedish
Prime Minister Carl Bildt has posted that it's to the right of the extreme right in Europe. The document doubles down on Trump's U.N. speech in
September where he told European allies they were failing and says immigration to the continent will, quote, "erase its civilization."
But even though the strategy calls for resisting Europe, the E.U. top diplomat Kaja Kallas displayed a determination to keep calm and carry on
when I met her in Doha at the annual forum there.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
KAJA KALLAS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION VICE-PRESIDENT: That's for sure. And, you know, the U.S. is still our biggest ally. And there I read it as well that
we are still the biggest ally. And it's in the interest of the United States as well that Europe lasts and that we are really still the ally and
working together for these things.
I think we haven't always seen eye to eye on different topics, but I think the overall principle is still there. We are the biggest allies and we
should stick together.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Nice try, but here's what President Trump later told Politico.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DONALD TRUMP, U.S. PRESIDENT: I think they're weak, but I also think that they want to be so politically correct. I think they don't know what to do.
Europe doesn't know what to do. They don't know what to do on trade either.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, not quite on the same page then. But still, what does it all actually mean? Celeste Wallander served as assistant secretary of defense
for international security affairs under President Biden and Peter Frankopan is a professor of global history at Oxford University and author
of the Substack Global Threads. And they are both joining me now.
Peter, you're in the studio and you're our European. What's your reaction? I mean, there was the strategy document that dropped when we were all at
the annual Doha forum. And then there was doubling down in this pretty scorching interview. What's your reaction?
PETER FRANKOPAN, PROFESSOR OF GLOBAL HISTORY, OXFORD UNIVERSITY: Well, I think it's not new. That sort of contempt, I think, we saw with J.D. Vance
at Munich in March of this year. I think the way --
AMANPOUR: But it's now been officialized and formalized.
FRANKOPAN: But I think that's how the mainstream MAGA movement around Trump sees Europe as a decaying -- that's the word he used today. It's a
decaying continent which is unproductive, is getting older, doesn't handle all the existential questions right and, quite frankly, is more or less
dispensable to the United States.
So, Trump's America first looks to Europe as it does to most of the rest of the world, which is America alone. And I guess one of the equations is, can
the U.S. do without allies, and particularly without Europe? And is that realignment that you mentioned of U.S. lining up with Russia, is that a
good bet to take? Because I think history would suggest probably you need to be pretty sanguine and pretty careful about what you're doing with the
big Russian bear. And the idea that we're the ones who are going to fail, the Russians will come out on top requires several leaps of faith.
[13:05:00]
AMANPOUR: That's interesting. So, let's wander to the very question that's been posed here. Can America do without its European allies? And, yes,
Trump, for the longest time, has hated the E.U. Remember, he said it was created just to destroy America, or whatever the right words are. Can it do
without the allies?
CELESTE WALLANDER, FORMER U.S. ASSISTANCE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS: Well, it is really amazing that you bring
up the question of the U.S. because his own national security strategy. The strategy that was released last week, states that Europe has a hard power
advantage over Russia.
So, what I think you're seeing is a national security strategy that is internally inconsistent, incoherent, and doesn't even align with what the
president of the United States is saying. And so, it is not clear exactly what the White House strategy towards Russia is because, on the one hand,
it is saying Europe has all these assets and should be confident and able to take care of Russia, and then you're hearing that Europe is on its way
out because of immigration, because it's losing its -- again, the national security strategy refers to Europe losing its civilizational identity, as
if that, you know, is something that is meaningful in a moment where Russia is using hard power to attack a European country, Ukraine.
And so, it's really hard to even grasp onto something to disagree with because the national security strategy is all over the map.
AMANPOUR: So, just -- I mean, I'd asked also whether the U.S. can do without its longtime allies in Europe, and also you said it's all these
MAGA allies around Trump that have their views. Some people see Stephen Miller in there. Other people see J.D. Vance in there. And as you say, it
is very inconsistent. But on the question of alliance, can the U.S. do it alone?
WALLANDER: U.S. needs Europe for the assets that Europe brings to the table. America, of course, has the largest conventional military force in
the world, but in order to be able to defend and deter, we need to have military bases, overflight permissions from countries across the globe, and
in particular in Europe.
Europe helps the United States to support goals in the Middle East, access to be able to support allies throughout other parts of the world. And
we've, for example, in the operations against Iran's nuclear program, relied upon U.S. military assets based in Europe. The U.S. relies upon
Europe to defend our homeland, to be able to prevent Russian nuclear submarines from being able to evade detection as they move through the
North Atlantic to patrol off of the American North Atlantic coast.
So, this is why NATO is actually in American national security interests. It's not altruism. It is national self-interest. It has been for 80 years.
And the Trump White House just seems to lose sight of the reason why NATO was created. It was created to help protect America.
AMANPOUR: America. And in fact, as we all know, we keep saying it on occasions like this, the only time Article 5 has ever been implemented and
called for was to defend America and support America after 9/11.
Now, Peter Frankopan, can Europe go it alone without the United States, given the U.S. power, but nonetheless, what Celeste Wallander has already
said? And how long can or should European leaders put up with this unseemly abuse, as others have suggested, in the wake of this national security
doctrine?
FRANKOPAN: Well, as Kaja has told you, you know, you need to separate the noise and watch -- with Trump watch the hips and not the lips. You've got
to pay attention to what's actually going on. And one of the first questions is whether which parts of what Trump is saying or the defense
strategy, security strategy saying are fair and right.
But clearly, what you have is a set of hierarchies. And in Trump's global vision, there's no space for Latin America. There's nothing for Africa in
this document. The Middle East is significantly downgraded. And so, the way that the U.S. is seeing the world is a hierarchy with China at the top as
the significant global competitor, and then how Russia fits into that axis.
Here in Europe, I think we've got to work out how do we deal with our defense, how do we deal with some of these existential questions too. And
it's absolutely true that we bring a lot of pieces to the party, including world-class universities, defense architecture and so on that we're a key
part of.
AMANPOUR: And intelligence.
FRANKOPAN: Absolutely. There's no question that we are part of those equations. But how it's seen from this White House is that we're not a
particularly important piece on the jigsaw puzzle board. And unless we can help navigate the U.S. through some of these discussions, probably we're
going to be pushed out of some of these discussions too in the future.
AMANPOUR: Well, I'm going to get back to that in a minute. But you just said about Latin America, so I was going to leave this to the end. But
obviously, President Trump and Trump 2.0 is doing what it wants to do in Latin America. Look at what's happening around Venezuela. Maybe a full-
blown war. Who knows? Threatening other Latin American countries, actually having support from a lot of Latin American countries which approve of the
Venezuela action and also are going more far-right.
[13:10:00]
So, let's just put this out there right now. Do you think, Celeste, that this document outlined what we've all been talking about since Trump 2.0?
And that is a sphere of influence doctrine whereby America gets to be, you know, in charge of and keeps and only wants the Western Hemisphere. China,
which wasn't dealt a very harsh hand in this doctrine, gets to have the Pacific. And Russia gets to have its area. And who knows what's going to
happen to Europe? Do you think that's a sort of -- is that the creeping Monroe or sphere of influence thing?
WALLANDER: That seems to be behind the thinking in prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, which the national security strategy that was released
does do and explicitly talks about a new Monroe doctrine and a Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine. And to the extent that there's pushback
against China in the document, it is -- refers to preventing China from being able to be able to have free reign and relationships in the Western
Hemisphere.
The challenge there, in addition to the whole concept of spheres of influence in the modern world, is that in order to have influence with
countries, you probably shouldn't go around insulting them, as you noted, with NATO allies. And the Trump White House has not been particularly
consistent in respecting and valuing countries in the Western Hemisphere who are our partners and allies and who would be important to be able to
resist Chinese influence.
AMANPOUR: Peter, this idea of not being consistent is clearly catnip to those who are consistent, to Putin, to Xi. They are consistent in their
policies. They know what they want, and they're going for it. And Putin demonstrates this to President Trump every single day. In fact, they've
said -- Peskov, his right-hand man, has said this doctrine mostly aligns with our vision for what's going on.
So, how threatened should Europe feel, and America, frankly, by giving this kind of sucker to Putin, especially now -- and we'll talk about the talks
around Ukraine?
FRANKOPAN: I mean, if you were cynical, you'd think that a lot of these things in the strategy and how Trump talks are Russian talking points. And,
you know, I think one shouldn't underestimate the skills that the Russians have in being able to shape global narratives, not just in Europe, in the
United States, in Africa, too.
But, you know, just to pick up on that Latin America, you know, China's trade with Latin America in 2000 was $12 billion. It's now more than $500
billion. Its trade with Mexico has doubled in the last four years. The idea that China's going to get shut out of the Western Hemisphere looks like
it's a pipe dream. You know, I suspect that some of this is around how Russia seems to fit into how the U.S. sees the new global world order. And
Marco Rubio, in his confirmation hearing in the Senate in January, said, he said, the post-World War global order is not just obsolete but acts against
U.S. interests. So, we see the U.S. using coercion.
AMANPOUR: Do you think that's true?
FRANKOPAN: It doesn't matter what I think, it's what he thinks.
AMANPOUR: No, but you think factually. They might think that, but is that factually true?
FRANKOPAN: I think that you could make the case that I've never seen in my lifetime the United States this powerful and being this willing to use
coercion globally. And to some extent, there are different optics of what it looks like. And a U.S. leader who looks like he's willing to use force,
use tariffs, threaten invasions and so on, that looks bad. Whether he actually does it or not, there's a separate degree of belief in what you
think actually will happen. But we're in a world where China uses its coercive tools quite aggressively, too, as do Russia.
And I think in a world of predators and of carnivores, being vegetarian, which is how the European Union is set up, probably is not helpful. So, we
need to emerge more in Europe and the United Kingdom from just being a trade bloc where we're willing to buy and sell and have the same standards
for our light bulbs into something that's much more joined up and together. And maybe Trump, ironically, is going to push us together like he helped
save NATO by mistake.
AMANPOUR: By mistake. Celeste Wallander, I want to follow up on this because it is clear that China is the rising superpower. Maybe it already
is, objectively. I don't know, but there's a lot of argument about that. And there are, I think, arguments within the Republican National Security
Group about how best to deal with China.
But do you think that that Rubio was right, that the post-World Order is now no longer helpful to the United States and acts against the United
States?
WALLANDER: Well, in the defense sphere, that is clearly not the case. Again, I've already referred to the network of bases that enable the United
States to strike at real threats wherever they may be in Eurasia and through Asia Pacific and in the Middle East. And while it is the case that
The Hague summit did succeed, President Trump did succeed in getting a 5 percent commitment, a 5 percent of GDP spending on defense commitment, that
trend was already in the works after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022.
[13:15:00]
In 2024, 23 allies had already met or were near meeting the 2 percent commitment of the Wales Pledge. So, the notion that somehow our
relationships with Europe in particular and also allies and partners in Asia Pacific are a negative for American security is just undermined by the
facts.
And if you look at our ability to protect and prevent the growth of adversaries and their strength, Russia and China, by having those strong
relationships, those strong partnerships in the regions of Europe and the Asia Pacific, it helps Americans be safer because those adversaries are
kept at bay and their power is limited.
So, those allies and the partnerships help to protect the American homeland. And that's the part that's completely missing in this national
security strategy that has been a common element of strategies of Republican and Democratic presidents for decades.
AMANPOUR: Every single administration, I think, for a period of years has come in with their -- you know, with their national security rejections and
strategies like this one, it's not actually a doctrine, it is more of a vision of what they want.
But given that this is very public and very ad hominem and all sorts of horrible words come from the president of the United States against his
European allies, they're now kind of doing things sort of on their own, right, they're trying to rescue what they consider a very unbalanced so-
called peace plan for Russia, Ukraine. They had very important top-level meetings here in the U.K.
Do you think, Peter, that it is happening and is it possible and should it happen that Europeans now allies should be, quote, "de-risking themselves,"
trying to go their own way? Can they go their own way?
FRANKOPAN: Well, there's some irony in all of this, right? So, a lot of the discussion here in the U.K., as you know, it's about Chinese supply
chains and its overdominance in the way in which we have critical vulnerabilities from minerals through to operating systems and so on.
Because the way that Trump talks and it has gone bipartisan now, this is a very standard view in the United States. It's not just about Trump and
people around him talking about Europe and the way that Trump is doing it, it's something that's caught in the U.S.
When you start talking to people in Silicon Valley or in New York or in Washington, you start to hear this from people who wouldn't have talked
this way a few years ago. I think the question now is, can we rely on American supply chains? Is there other vulnerabilities to in the fact that
all of our -- you know, in the United Kingdom, 85 percent of our defense procurement comes from the U.S.? Are there points at which that might get
turned off by the president or those around him? And suddenly, that sense of vulnerability means we've all got to step up. There's no question about
that.
And I think that goes one of two ways, either we do what Trump is saying, which is we decay and we become irrelevant or there has to be a rebirth and
reinforcement. And a lot of that is going to depend on domestic politics and whether leaders here in Europe can articulate confident visions for
what the European Union is for, what the United Kingdom is for. And how do we stand up in a world of technological, climatological and biohealth,
other sorts of changes?
AMANPOUR: And, Celeste, I want to refer to an article that you wrote a few months ago -- or rather, I think you talked about this or in relation to
what Macron, President Macron said this week. It was reported that he had warned other European leaders that Washington might soon betray Ukraine.
And you had said earlier, beware the Europe you wish for in your article, I believe.
So, to continue this bit, Europeans are growing a little bit wary, aren't they, of the United States. Can you see any sort of bifurcation?
WALLANDER: Well, we are already seeing European countries reconsider purchases of American defense production, of defense systems for the very
concerns that Peter pointed to. So, we're already starting to see that effect. And it is clearly the case that any kind of a peace settlement
between Russia and Ukraine that the White House prioritizes and has said that is a major objective of President Trump depends on Europe being on
board. It is simply not the terms that have been discussed are not enforceable or implementable without European agreement.
So, while the United States may, I hope we do not, take a position of throwing, of betraying Ukraine and throwing them under the bus and letting,
you know, the Kremlin just steamroll over the country and reacquire its sphere of influence in Ukraine, in fact, that really can't happen the way
that the Kremlin wants unless Europe agrees to it.
[13:20:00]
For example, the Kremlin wants NATO to commit that Ukraine will never be a member of NATO, not just Ukraine to say, not just Ukraine to say, not that
Ukraine will say this, but not just Ukraine to say it. So, it is within the hands of European publics and European leaders to play a role in a peace
settlement.
And again, I come back to, so therefore you would think, if that is an important objective for the White House, that they would work with Europe
to be able to go together to that kind of strong negotiating position. So, I do think we are already seeing those kinds of divergences and we're
seeing the effect of the United States not taking Europe seriously.
AMANPOUR: 20 seconds left, Peter. Where do you think this topsy-turvy negotiation process over Ukraine, Russia is going to go?
FRANKOPAN: I think that the United States can't force a settlement. Trump can complain as much as he likes, but I think this will depend on what
Ukraine wants. And to some extent, the talking points that Trump has been, I think, walked into by the Russian side of being promised free -- lower
energy prices, access to metals, all the kinds of things that Putin would have put together in a package, all depends on thinking that Russia will be
a good actor if there is some kind of settlement. And I don't think that's a good bet to make.
AMANPOUR: Yes. Peter Frankopan, Celeste Wallander, thank you very much. Really interesting to get your perspectives on all of this.
And meantime today, in the wake of Trump's scorching public criticism of European allies, the U.S. ambassador to the U.K. visited Prime Minister
Keir Starmer at No. 10 Downing Street. Politico reports there'll be no readout of that particular conversation.
And stay with us. We'll be right back after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Now, soon after the Trump administration published that new national security strategy, I moderated a panel of influential foreign
ministers from around the world at the annual Doha Forum in Qatar to assess the fraught efforts at negotiations, particularly over the wars in Ukraine
and Gaza. I started by asking Qatar's foreign minister, Mohammed bin Jassim Al Thani, how his country, described as a small state in a turbulent
region, became the world's preeminent mediator.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
MOHAMMED BIN JASSIM AL THANI, QATARI PRIME MINISTER: I think, you know, overall, if you look at, you know, the region in general, it's not an easy
region. It has like a lot of history that kept this region with very heavy baggage. And what Qatar -- you know, the way Qatar is situated as a small
nation among bigger nations, we have also to make sure that our region is prosperous, our region is stable. And basically, our national security
stands on the stability of the region.
But as a small nation, we cannot become a superpower by military. But of course, by, you know, being -- reaching out through diplomacy, reaching out
through investment, through partnerships, that's what creates really the footprint of the State of Qatar.
AMANPOUR: Just quickly, before I move on, there are some in the world who will say, why does Qatar host Hamas, for instance, negotiators, or has
supported in terms of, you know, money and things like that in the past? Why does it, you know, host the Taliban? Why does it host, you know, many,
many parties and peoples that some would consider terrorists or bad actors? Can you give the world the rationalization for that part of mediation?
[13:25:00]
AL THANI: Well, when we are talking about mediation, mediation is a conflict between parties. And if those parties -- normally, if you have
like state actors, this is like always sounds normal sometime. But in our region, unfortunately, it's between states and non-state actors. And those
non-state actors, we don't keep the open channels with them, then none of those conflicts can be resolved. And this has been demonstrated and proven
throughout the last few years.
If you look at what we have achieved by ending the longest war in the modern American history between the U.S. and Afghanistan, hosting the
office of Taliban was for a single purpose to facilitate this mediation efforts. And this mediation efforts remained for almost like more than
seven years in order to achieve to that result.
On Hamas also, when you look at it, there is, you know, all the outcomes that we have seen throughout '23, '24, and '25 reaching to the peace deal
was only happening because of this open communication. Qatar is criticized for, you know, hosting them just, you know, for some very short-term
political goals. Unfortunately, those people who are criticizing Qatar, those are the same people who are in need for countries like Qatar to have
an open channel with those non-state actors.
And at the end of the day, Qatar provide the platform, provide the forum for those parties to talk. It doesn't mean that we are taking one side or
the other, our role is to make sure that the dialogue is ongoing and the dialogue coming out with a positive outcome or constructive outcome that
ends the conflict and end the humanitarian suffering.
AMANPOUR: Let me ask you then, because mediation is hugely important now in a war that threatens Europe. This new strategy describes an expeditious
cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is a core interest of the United States. The goal of the peace deal would be to reestablish strategic
stability with Russia and to enable Ukraine's survival as a viable state. How do you read that given the current negotiations that are going on to
try and end this war?
JOSE MANUEL ALBARES, SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER: You know, when you're a European, you are constantly asked for what the president of the United
States says or what is the foreign policy of the United States. And I think that what we should really be interested right now in Europe is what we can
do in this very challenging moment in war history, in which for some countries, one of them is Russia, war has become a normal tool of foreign
policy. It's not the only one. In the Middle East, Israel thinks exactly the same way.
We think the opposite. We stick to the U.N. Charter. We think that war is not a way of settling disputes among people or states. And above all, that
a war of aggression cannot have reward. What is at stake right now in Ukraine is, of course, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of
Ukrainian people, which is already huge. We are talking about a democratic state with a democratically elected government.
But we are going to design with whatever peace will come one day, and I'm sure that there is a future in peace for the Ukrainian people, we are to
design the future security scheme of Europe and also of the world. If a war of aggression has a reward, tomorrow's war and certainly tomorrow's Europe
is going to be more unstable. No one will be out of the risk of waking up and realizing that a strong neighbor wants a part of its sovereignty or of
its territorial integrity.
So, we welcome the efforts of peace of the president of the United States. We think it's good. We have been asking for peace since the very beginning.
If it was up to us, the Europeans, or to the Ukrainians, this war would have not started. We want peace. We just want to make sure that it is a
just and lasting peace. Just and lasting peace means that there is no reward for the aggression, that there is a sovereign Ukraine that can take
its own decision, including which international organization is a part of, and that at the end, that peace is stick to the United Nations Charter.
[13:30:00]
AMANPOUR: Foreign Minister Al Thani, in the ceasefire agreement and in the 20-point plan, for Israel-Gaza, there was an indication that there would be
an effort to move towards a Palestinian State. For the second time this year, the Israeli Knesset, basically, well, they don't want that to happen.
And actually, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his far-right allies, they don't want that to happen. They don't want that to happen, and they don't want
boycotted a vote that was to move the phases along because of the reference in the plan to the two-state solution.
When you're talking about mediation, how do you get beyond that kind of ideology? How do you get beyond the hard-liners who don't want even what
President Trump has put forward?
AL THANI: Well, actually, here where the enforcement is needed, because one of the lessons learned that we have seen and experienced throughout the
last two years that if accountability is absent and enforcement is absent, things can just keep going and we remain hostage in the hands of the
extremists, and that's what we want to avoid.
And we have seen that the efforts that all of us, we put together in order to reach to the ceasefire that we have achieved this year needed for the
next phase, which is the stabilization, and then the third phase, which is the Palestinian State.
If this extremist agenda will just, you know, overshadow all our efforts as an International Community, then everyone is recognizing that there is
something wrong with the structure that we are working through. And I believe that the U.S. role is key in this because the U.S. has the
enforcement part of that in order to put this conflict on the right track for a resolution.
ALBARES: It's time to work to put in place a real Palestinian state, and that means the West Bank and Gaza under one single Palestinian authority.
We have to stop the violence of those settlers that is really out of way, and we have to stop all those illegal settlements that are spreading. We
have to go for reconstruction in Gaza.
And the day we will have one single Palestinian authority that will control the West Bank and Gaza connected by a corridor with an exit to the sea and
its capital in East Jerusalem, living in good neighborhood with Israel, I think that we will have achieved what Europe stands for, and it's peace and
the respect of international law and international humanitarian law.
AMANPOUR: Kaja Kallas, can I ask you, we're going back to the European war right now, or the war on the continent. The 28-point plan that President
Trump put forth a couple of weekends ago was vigorously amended or discussed by Europe and Ukraine. On the other hand, would you agree that
Europe has not put a peace plan forward for Ukraine?
KAJA KALLAS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION VICE-PRESIDENT: In Ukraine war, there are no both parties because there is one aggressor and one victim, and that's
why, you know, if we want to have a sustainable peace, a long-lasting peace, we should make sure that the concessions are on the aggressor's
side, that the aggression does not pay off, it's not rewarded.
If you look at the last 100 years, Russia has attacked 19 countries, some as many as three or four times. None of these countries has ever attacked
Russia. So, putting limitations and stress on Ukraine actually does not bring us long-lasting peace. OK, we give security guarantees to Ukraine, it
will end there, but it will start somewhere else, because the problem is the Russian military. Their army is extremely large, their military budget
is enormous, and they will want to use it again, if not on Ukraine, then somewhere else.
So, focusing on really putting the pressure on the aggressor, like Jose Manuel said, you know, if aggression is rewarded, we will see it happen
again. And not only in Ukraine or Gaza, but all around the world because aggression really pays off. That's why we have so many wars nowadays going
on, that the international law is really under heavy fire.
[13:35:00]
AMANPOUR: OK. But the question really is, what is the leverage that you have? Because if the U.S. is pulling back, which it is, in terms of making
you step up and fill that gap militarily?
KALLAS: Yes.
AMANPOUR: Clearly Putin doesn't feel any leverage right now.
KALLAS: Well, we have leverage, and that is economic leverage. I mean, wars also end when the aggressor runs out of money.
AMANPOUR: Foreign Minister Fidan, can I ask you, I think it was 10 years ago, Turkey, Turkiya, shot down an incursion by a Russian air, you know,
fighter jet, and it was fine. The rules of the world were established, you said don't, you know, come into our, you know, airspace, they did, you shot
them down, boom, that was the end of that.
So, I wonder, I know you're not Europe, maybe one day, but Russia upped the ante this week saying, it's ready to wage war on Europe right now if, you
know, Europe goes to war. How do you see that, and what do you think Europe should be doing to force Putin to a reasonable negotiating position?
HAKAN FIDAN, TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER: I think up until now, as Kaja has just said, I think Europe is trying to do their best to counter this
aggression. On the other hand, you know, they have started partnering with the United States, but now in the absence of the United States, Europe is
in need of finding more creative solutions to become more resilient. But I think the only viable way to go and finish this war is to engage faithfully
and forcefully in peace talks.
KALLAS: And by the way, you know, there was a recent study about the peace, different peace talks. If women are around the table, then the peace
agreements actually last 35 percent more than those where women are not at the table.
AMANPOUR: Clearly, I'm going to clap to that. So, it's a great way to end. Foreign Ministers, High Representative, thank you so much for this
discussion. Thank you.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: And we'll be right back after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Now, The New Yorker magazine turns 100 and it is celebrating in style with a new Netflix documentary that takes us behind the scenes, which
follows staff as they produce the anniversary issue. From seminal pieces such as John Hersey's 1946, his recently released film, Hiroshima Report,
to satirical cartoons, the magazine has been a pillar of quality journalism and has remained so relevant for 100 years. Here's a clip from the trailer.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I think almost everyone who works with The New Yorker is obsessed in some way.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: It's a little bit like whack-a-mole. You think you're done, but all these little things keep popping up.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We fact check everything that is published in the magazine.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, cartoons get fact checked.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: The cat's names are Tiger, Loverboy and Gummy Bear. Is that correct?
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: David Remnick is The New Yorker's longtime editor and he's joining Walter Isaacson to reflect on his precarious beginning to its
significance today.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. And, David Remnick, welcome back to the show.
DAVID REMNICK, Editor, The New Yorker: Thanks for having me, Walter.
[13:40:00]
ISAACSON: For the 100th anniversary of The New Yorker, you had Netflix come do a documentary on you putting together the 100th anniversary issue,
and one of the things in the show is they asked celebrities to say a little vignette about when was the first time you encountered The New Yorker. Let
us show the clip, and then I'm going to ask you that question.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: We actually didn't have very much money, but we did have a New Yorker subscription.
NATE BARGATZE, COMEDIAN, AUTHOR, ACTOR: I think the first time I heard about The New Yorker was on Seinfeld. They had a great episode where Elaine
did not understand one of the cartoon captions.
JESSE EISENBERG, FILMMAKER: You know, I grew up in New Jersey and was very kind of like starry-eyed about all things New York. The first time I ever
heard of The New Yorker and understood it to be this important magazine was in an episode of the animated show "The Critic." Bravo, Mrs. S. And I
remember just thinking, oh, that's The New Yorker. It's this important thing.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I don't know how I knew about it, but it's just there. It's one of those institutions. It's like saying, like, when did you first
hear about the Statue of Liberty?
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ISAACSON: So, let me ask you, when did you first encounter The New Yorker?
REMNICK: In my father's office. My father was a dentist in suburban New Jersey. He had a very small practice, and on Saturdays and Sundays, it was
obviously closed, and I'd go down and read Highlights Magazine and Time Magazine and Life and Look, and I encountered this thing that I didn't
understand very readily.
There was a magazine that had drawings on the cover and gag cartoons and, in those days, lots of advertisements. And I didn't quite get it, Walter,
to be honest with you. And even when I was a teenager, my favorite magazines were The Infinitely Cooler, Rolling Stone, and I liked The
Village Voice a lot. Esquire was where this was all happening.
I got to The New Yorker and got to understand it and get a feel for it when I had a teacher in college who wrote for The New Yorker.
ISAACSON: And that would be, of course, John McPhee, right?
REMNICK: That's right. John McPhee, who these days is 93, and we worked together at The New Yorker, and he even made me into one of his fishing
buddies. Life works in strange ways.
ISAACSON: And you called the magazine a miracle. Why is that?
REMNICK: I think it's a miracle, first of all, most publications, if they're lucky, if they're lucky, have a moment in time when they're
important or they catch the zeitgeist in some way. To be on the cover of Time Magazine, I didn't tell you, at a certain period in American history,
was an astonishing thing. Life Magazine had a moment because of its visual nature that preceded television, but when TV came along, life was eclipsed.
So, to have something last 100 years at a very, very high quality with the prospect of lasting a lot longer, that's something quite unusual in
American culture. And newspapers, obviously, The New York Times has this. So, we're celebrating a centenary year and celebrating some of the things
that have been published in the past, but a lot of time has been spent thinking about what's going to be ahead for us.
ISAACSON: You've only had five editors in those 100 years. Totally amazing. And I think my first encounter with The New Yorker, believe it or
not, is I had a favorite book my father had called "The Years with Ross" by James Thurber. And it talked about Harold Ross and how his personality
imprinted the DNA of The New Yorker. Tell me about that founding editor.
REMNICK: Well, Harold Ross was a newspaperman from out west. Like all great New Yorkers, he's somebody who made his way here.\
ISAACSON: And worked on the item in New Orleans where I was.
REMNICK: That's right. That's right. And I think he bounced around. He must have been in a newspaper every six months. He really bounced around a
lot in old style. But he came to New York and he had ideas for all kinds of things, shipping news. And then there was this one idea to have a kind of
funny cosmopolitan news magazine. And mainly comic, Walter, at first. Mainly comic.
And he got a family, the Fleischmann family that made money in yeast, to put a few dollars behind this cockabamie idea. And at first it was a big
flop. It was not good. And it was a financial failure as well. And they almost shut the thing down. And Harold Ross, who was a bit of a card player
and a bit of a -- and he was familiar with the bottle occasionally, in an all-night poker game, nearly lost the whole thing. Nearly lost the whole
thing. So, it's a miracle that it lasted to 1926, much less 2025.
ISAACSON: He said this magazine wasn't for the little old lady from Dubuque.
REMNICK: Yes.
ISAACSON: I think I was reading in the years with Ross, there's a -- they had a cartoon proposed where they had to have Harold Ross go apologize to
his aunt from Dubuque at a hotel. Why? What did he mean by that? And is that still what the magazine is about?
[13:45:00]
REMNICK: I think he meant that he wanted that magazine to be it for a very particular community. It was a really -- it wasn't even, the community
didn't even extend to the Brooklyn or the Bronx. It was a very Manhattan jazz age idea meant to be a very small publication. It's since expanded,
it's expanded in its seriousness and its reporting and its length and its ambitions. I don't think Harold Ross imagined a magazine that would break
the Abu Ghraib scandal or Hiroshima by John Hersey. That came infinitely later.
By the way, I just wanted on the record that I'm happy to have anyone in Dubuque reading The New Yorker. It's for whoever, whoever has eyes to see
and read. So, I'm much -- my attitude about that, I don't share with Harold Ross.
ISAACSON: Harold Ross has succeeded by his deputy for many, many years, William Sean, Mr. Sean to everybody. And he did not seem to have a great
sense of humor, but he had a feel for the long form, right?
REMNICK: He did. I mean, he was Ross' deputy for a long time. And just as Catherine Angel, who became Catherine White, introduced really top-level
fiction to The New Yorker, William Sean played an instrumental role in bringing deep reporting to The New Yorker. The apotheosis of this was John
Hersey's piece about Hiroshima, Rachel Carson on pesticides and James Baldwin on race and so on.
So, it also shows you that a magazine, a publication, really any imaginative process that's not just individual is a collection of
intelligences that come together. And I think a good editor is not somebody that believes that he or she has the answer to everything and the only
person who's generating ideas.
ISAACSON: You mentioned John Hersey's Hiroshima. And I was at the New York Public Library. That's what I do for fun. And that's where your archives
are. And they have a display, I'm sure you know, of all the archives. And I saw on the wall the most amazing letter. I actually took a photograph of
it. And it says, Dear Bill, do you think you could tolerate four parts on Hiroshima? I can't say of my material on the bombing that it's wonderful,
but it is sobering, moving and newsy.
REMNICK: Yes.
ISAACSON: First of all, I can't imagine anybody calling Mr. Sean, Dear Bill. But also, the rest of that letter, that was amazing leap.
REMNICK: It was at that time. And it's a leap that's since been taken innumerable times. You know, very often a reporter will come back from
wherever he or she has been. And they have a story to tell that is beyond the imagining of any editor or even, you know, the current media.
In his case, he had witnessed something that had not been publicized at all, except in the most abstract terms. The atomic age had begun, but the
human cost of it on the ground had not been seen in the United States.
So, we are at a point now, Walter, where still foreign journalists are not allowed into Gaza. And yet, at the same time, we've seen a lot of
innumerable images because of for all the reasons we know, because of the phone and God bless them, journalists in Gaza and bless the memory of those
who have been so horribly killed. That was a different world. That was not a world of social media and videos on your phone. And Hersey brought that
human news to the United States and it made international news. It had incredible resonance.
ISAACSON: In this Netflix documentary, Tina Brown, your predecessor, plays a big role and talks about having to really kind of dust it off and sweep
out some of the cobwebs. Tell me what she did.
REMNICK: Well, you know, you want to be careful at any given moment in time that you're not just admired, but actually read. You're right. And I
think there comes a time in the life of any longstanding publication where you can fall into habits or self-satisfaction. There's no question that The
New Yorker was publishing terrific things during late Sean and during Bob Gottlieb's reign, but Tina had an outsider sense of how to shake things up.
We're not the same people. I don't know that we make every absolutely every editorial decision the same. Of course not. But I -- you know, I work for
her as a writer and I was very much behind this idea of shaking things up. And she'll -- to be perfectly honest, she made my life a lot easier coming
in.
ISAACSON: One of the most iconic aspects of The New Yorker is the magazine's cover, of course. And I wanted to do a clip we'll see of the
arts editor, longtime arts editor, right? Francoise Mouly, is that how you say your name?
REMNICK: Yes, Francoise Mouly.
ISAACSON: Discussing what goes into deciding the cover. So, here, let's look at this clip.
REMNICK: Sure.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
[13:50:00]
FRANCOISE MOULY, ART EDITOR: Until you have the cover, you don't know what's personality of the issue is. You know, it's not something that you
can just slap on at the last minute.
A cover needs to speak to the moment, but also be a timeless piece of art that should be able to be framed and put on a wall. Frankly, chasing that
week after week keeps me up with anxiety, even after 30 years.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ISAACSON: What are your elements where you say, yes, that's the one?
REMNICK: Well, it has to work the way a grenade works, right? You can't -- if you have to explain it for five minutes what's going on, or you have to
have explanations about why this may or may not be good, it doesn't work. It has to work immediately. It has to work immediately.
Now, people interpret a joke or an image in different ways, and that's fine. In fact, it's great. But if you're sort of puzzling over it, as if it
were an obscure Escher drawing or something like that, that doesn't quite work, then there's a problem.
And so, Francoise and I are -- I mean, basically a two-person operation. She's generating ideas all the time and sketches, and then she comes to me
and we discuss what we like and what we don't like. And once in a while, if I'm on the fence, I'll take that sketch around the office to, you know, a
few people that I trust or will put pressure on my presumptions, and we'll make a decision.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There aren't that many places that do this kind of super labor-intensive, super-confronting journalism. I mean, they're not
activists, but they are fearless when the facts support it.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ISAACSON: One of my favorite things in The New Yorker, of course, is Talk of the Town, and it's evolved. And one of the great writers was E. B.
White, who mastered that art. And my favorite is something he wrote, which is, we received a letter from the Writers' War Board the other day asking
for a statement on the meaning of democracy.
REMNICK: Yes.
ISAACSON: Now, it's a beautiful piece he writes, very sort of dry and clever, but it's also about democracy, and that still seems to be one of
the causes of The New Yorker.
REMNICK: It absolutely is. And I'm glad you brought that up because of -- look, I watch your show, and I think you would say the same of your
program, is that democracy, to say the very, very least, is under great challenge now. It's under great challenge from, above all, the president of
the United States. And that's not just something to say. That's something to do rigorous journalism about, fair-minded, rigorous, accurate
journalism.
But democratic institutions are, including your own, by the way, public television, are under assault. And it is -- we are duty-bound as a
democratic institution ourselves to stand up for it and do the work that we're supposed to be doing at the highest level, tirelessly and without
compromise. And when I say without compromise, I don't mean once -- you know, just kind of in some sort of vitriolic way, but to do the work of
reporting.
I was on a panel about journalism the other day, and I looked around, and I realized that the lion's share of people at the table were not anybody that
had taken out a notebook in 10 years. They had things to say, they were commentators, they were talking heads, they were comedians. But at the
heart of this enterprise of journalism is reporting, finding out what is true, what is hidden, and bringing it to light, and applying the real
standards of truth as best you can in a given time, knowing all the while you will fail at times. You will fail. And we should be honest about our
failures as well.
But that is at the center of our work, too. We're not the only ones, to be sure, not even remotely. But I'm -- you know, that's my -- if that sounds
sanctimonious, then I don't really care.
ISAACSON: David Remnick, thank you for joining us.
REMNICK: Thank you, Walter.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
AMANPOUR: And of course, he's right, it is all about reporting. And finally, as the clock struck midnight in Sydney, millions of Australian
adolescents are now locked out of their social media accounts. From Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, to TikTok, X, and YouTube. The sweeping
government ban aims to shield under-16s from harmful content, online grooming, and cyberbullying. Some say this is long overdue.
Critics, however, warn that it could isolate young people and drive them towards even more unregulated corners of the Internet. This is what Prime
Minister Antony Albanese had to say.
[13:55:00]
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ANTONY ALBANESE, AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER: Well, we're listening to parents and listening to the community. And I want to see kids off their
devices and onto the footy fields and the swimming pools and the tennis courts. We want them to have real experiences with real people.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Real experiences in real life with real people. Countries around the world are watching closely, with Australia being cast as the first
domino in a long overdue social media regulation which has been demanded by so many for so long.
That's it for now. If you ever miss our show, you can find the latest episode shortly after it airs on our podcast. And remember you can always
catch us online and on our website and all-over social media. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
