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Amanpour
Interview with Former Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategy Sasan Karimi; Interview with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Aired 5-6p ET
Aired April 08, 2026 - 17:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[17:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
A ceasefire where both sides claim victory. Can it hold? First, the view from Tehran with Sasan Karimi, Iran's former deputy vice president for
strategic affairs. And what this means for American policy, with experts Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney, both former advisers on Iran to multiple
U.S. administrations.
Plus, Europe between a rock and a very hard place after allies refused to join Trump's war of choice. Where does the NATO alliance stand? I ask the
prime minister of Greece.
And then Israel pounding Lebanon, sparking a major humanitarian crisis. The International Rescue Committee's David Miliband tells me what he just found
there.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
An apocalyptic threat, urgent diplomacy, and now a ceasefire. Giving the United States and Iran two weeks to reach an agreement for lasting peace.
Trump's roundly reviled, some say genocidal language, may have paused the war for now, but it's not entirely clear what the United States has gained.
Trump and his men are putting the best face on this, from saying they will work with Iran to dig up and remove its buried uranium, to a joint U.S.-
Iran venture to control the Strait of Hormuz. And here's Pete Hegseth on regime change.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
PETE HEGSETH, U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY: It's a new group of people who've seen the full capability of the United States military and has a new
calculus about what it means to negotiate with us, hence why they came to the table, wanting a ceasefire and the shooting to stop. So, this new
regime, which the regime has been changed, has a different interaction with the U.S.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: True or wishful thinking? Meanwhile, there are serious signs of trouble ahead with this ceasefire looking increasingly fragile. Trump is
now questioning the Iran 10-point plan that was the basis, he said, of the ceasefire and negotiations. And Iran says it's halting traffic in the
Strait of Hormuz after Israel unleashed its heaviest attack yet on Lebanon. The White House says Lebanon isn't part of this deal.
Let's bring in my first guest, Sasan Karimi. He's a professor of global studies at Tehran University and previously was deputy vice president for
strategic affairs, and he's joining us from Tehran. Professor Sasan -- Professor Karimi, welcome to the program.
Let me just ask you first, you just heard the secretary of defense, Hegseth, claiming that the regime has changed. There's a new regime, a new
group of people. Is that the case?
SASAN KARIMI, FORMER IRANIAN DEPUTY VICE PRESIDENT FOR STRATEGY: Thank you for having me first, Christiane. I think that as long as -- I studied
political science at the university, there's not a regime change, classically. The people are the same, and the top people who are dealing
with the United States are the same. The top negotiator will be the spokesman of the parliament. The constitutional law is the same. The organs
are the same. The defense system is the same.
And the -- you know, the defense minister of the United States wants to just coin something to pretend victory. It is not a big deal, I think.
People need to pretend victory after wars. It is understandable, but it is not that much professional way of redefining the concepts that people are
very familiar with.
AMANPOUR: OK. Well, does that mean Iran is doing what is expected, pretending victory, because it is claiming victory, calling it a great
historic one? All the rightful demands of the Iranian people have been met.
[17:05:00]
But as you know, I'm sure that by any measure, your country has suffered great losses, particularly in the military field. As you know, the U.S.
keeps saying it's decimated capabilities. But there must have been big losses. How do you assess whether Iran won or lost?
KARIMI: You know, victory in a war defines -- depends on which side you are. If you are attacking a country occupation or any other manifest that
declared goal before or during the war can be your victory, you know, achieving this. But if you are defending your country, only defense of your
country, protecting your sovereignty and not being occupied will be your victory.
Not -- for example, no damage can affect your victory, because when you are attacked, definitely you will be damaged. And it is not a point to
criticize you or blame you as a loser. A loser in defending a country is not who is paying the cost that can be compensated in future by the
violators. But anyways, it is not losing.
Definitely Iran suffers a lot and paying a lot of costs and a lot of assets are damaged. But, you know, a big loss like losing prestige, of national
prestige. And today, people on the streets are much more united defending our country. And, you know, they are much more -- they feel much more
prosperous. And that is a very big gain for a country that is defending itself.
AMANPOUR: OK. Professor Karimi, let me ask you, obviously part of what statements went out, there were two, one from the Supreme National Security
Council and one from the foreign minister. But the most, you know, the biggest demands by Iran is that the America has agreed to, in principle,
lift all primary and secondary sanctions, withdraw U.S. combat forces from all bases in the region, accept Iran's nuclear enrichment, recognize its
continued control over the Strait of Hormuz.
While Trump says, you know, that, no, we will have a potentially a joint operation with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. And he says there will be no
enrichment of uranium and the U.S. will work with Iran to dig up and remove all the deeply buried, what he calls nuclear dust. Where is Iran on these
points?
KARIMI: You know, I think Donald Trump cannot find the things that he couldn't find with war, now with diplomacy or with a ceasefire. So, he
tested many things, serving the protesters and the terrorists, not the people who protested, the terrorists with weapons that he confirmed in
January, I mean. And two times aggression against the country. So, he lost and he couldn't take what he wanted, like the uranium, et cetera.
Iran is flexible inside the framework declared for gaining the (INAUDIBLE) other fires that it agreed. But at the same time, you know, this part can
be negotiated, but not that much. Today, the topic is a violation of the -- violating of the ceasefire by Israel in Lebanon and sometimes in Iran even,
that is violating the agreement signed by the United States, because you know, Iran does not recognize Israel. And not signature, but a kind of
agreement, a verbal agreement that is being violated.
So, this is today a kind of violence and the agreement and the negotiations will be on the, about the same topics, but inside the framework that, and
based on the framework that Iran declared. So, Iran will push --
AMANPOUR: All right. Let me just jump in there. Let me just jump in because the U.S. says Lebanon is not part of it, but that's to be
discussed. But let me ask you about the Iranian people.
[17:10:00]
You make a pretty notable distinction between the protesters and what you call terrorists who came in with weapons. But I want to ask you about the
protesters because your government massacred, killed, mowed down thousands of Iranians, thousands of Iranians who were protesting for their rights and
their economic survival.
So, my question is, what is going to happen? What will your government do now that it's still in position to these protesters, including meeting
their economic demands? Because right now you have no sanctions relief. There is no way that you can actually meet their economic needs. And
already there are crackdowns that have been throughout this war on, let's say, democracy activists, protesters, taking them to jail, their
executions, and the like. What is going to happen to the Iranian people?
KARIMI: You know, it is not true because it was 11 days protest in (INAUDIBLE) Tehran. Normal people protest -- were protesting, were on the
street. And police was also on the street without any gun. And when Donald Trump declared whatever he said and threatened Iranian political system and
also other things happened, a new group came that today, there are names like the Everlasting Guard, let's say. They are a fake group of terrorists.
And they're not real people. The 11th day of protest, they came to the streets and started for a bloody violation. So, it was not a normal one.
You know, I am following all the protests since 1997, you know, when I was a teenager at the university. And all in 2009, I witnessed all the protests
very closely. But this time was totally different. So -- but yes, that's true that beginning of this -- the start of this protest was economic. And
without relieving the sanctions, it is very difficult to ease the situation.
So, that's why one of the main terms of Iranian 10-point declared situation and the conditions is relieving all the secondary and primary sanctions and
also human sanctions.
AMANPOUR: Professor, I understand what you're saying. We got -- the connection is getting bad. But, you know, I don't know. Do you think you
killed -- no. I mean, the regime killed no innocents? And do you think that once things quiet down a bit, the people will come out and protest again?
KARIMI: No, I don't have enough information, definitely out of 3,000 people. It's difficult to say no protester was killed or not any police was
killed. Both sides were killed, but it was very sad moment. But now it's not the topic of today. Again -- but maybe not because today the social and
the psychological condition of the society is totally different.
And now, it's very much more obvious that the (INAUDIBLE) country is because of nonsense, you know, embargoes against Iran, because of not
having any nuclear weapon, not having any initiation of war, not having any aggression against any other country since couple of centuries ago. So,
now, today after this war, people of Iran are different, I think, much more united and much more aware.
AMANPOUR: Professor Sasan Karimi, thank you very much for joining us from Tehran. Later in the program, European allies are welcoming a pause with
Trump railing against NATO after they declined to enter his war of choice. Where does the alliance go from here? I asked Greece's prime minister.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[17:15:00]
AMANPOUR: Trump's war on Iran has been a lonely one, a joint bombing campaign with Israel, but without the help of America's traditional allies
who all declined to get involved. Europe is in a tricky spot. Trapped between the United States that didn't consult them, and then threatened
with pulling out of NATO when they didn't join in his war of choice. Secretary General Mark Rutte is in Washington today on a damage limitation
mission.
Now, to discuss all of this, I'm joined by the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis from Athens. Welcome back to our program, Prime
Minister.
KYRIAKOS MITSOTAKIS, GREEK PRIME MINISTER: Hello, Christiane. Good evening from Athens.
AMANPOUR: Good evening. So, what do you -- what's your immediate thoughts about the so-called ceasefire, the two-week possibility and window, but
also Iran is saying, you know, what's happening in Lebanon? Trump is saying we can't, you know, negotiate because they're showing us a different
document. What do you think is going to happen from here?
MITSOTAKIS: Well, first of all, let me point out that Greece joined a common statement, which was signed by many European leaders, welcoming the
ceasefire and hoping that we can use this 15-day window to reach a negotiated settlement. And I do believe that we have reasons to be
cautiously optimistic.
Having said that, I would like to express my deep concern about what is happening in Lebanon, because it is very clear to me as a country, which is
relatively close to Lebanon, that the Israeli offensive right now is completely counterproductive. And I do believe that if we want to talk
about a complete ceasefire in the region, it needs to essentially extend to all theaters of operation, including Lebanon.
We need to give some space to the Lebanese government to do its job in terms of taking control of the Lebanese south. And by attacking Lebanon
right now, the only thing that Israel is achieving is giving Hezbollah, which has already been significantly weakened, a new lease of life.
AMANPOUR: Well, I mean, you're very, very clear on a position. I could ask you, do you think, like many think, that the Israeli government just
doesn't want to ceasefire and is not interested in lightening up, certainly not on Hezbollah?
MITSOTAKIS: Look, I want to be very clear, Christiane. We have a strategic partnership with Israel, but, you know, friends need to speak truth to
friends. And my view on Lebanon has been very clear. For the first time in decades, I think we have a competent government in Lebanon. If these
attacks continue, you will have a humanitarian catastrophe. It is already evolving.
But you will also end up legitimizing -- delegitimizing completely the Lebanese government. I don't think this is in Israel's long-term interest.
And I would hope that these operations stop as quickly as possible, not just for humanitarian reasons, but also for making sure that we maintain,
you know, a general framework of a ceasefire that encompasses the whole region.
AMANPOUR: I hate to just harp on Israel, but the prime minister, Netanyahu, is speaking, as we're speaking. He says, we have more goals to
accomplish, either in agreement or by force. Our fingers are on the trigger. So, let's wait and see what that means.
In the meantime, what is your biggest takeaway from what needs to happen in this, if it continues, this ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran,
particularly around the Strait of Hormuz?
MITSOTAKIS: Now, obviously, we have a skin in the game, Christiane. We are one of the largest players in terms of the Greek-owned and Greek-controlled
maritime fleet.
[17:20:00]
And I've always been defending the freedom of navigation. And this is becoming a critical topic vis-a-vis the future of the Strait of Hormuz. I
mean, the Strait of Hormuz was always, you know, a free strait in terms of freedom of navigation. And I think it remains, it needs to remain that in
the future. I don't think that the International Community would be ready to accept Iran setting up a tollbooth for every ship that crosses the
straits. It seems to me to be completely unacceptable. So, I do believe that intense negotiations will take place.
I think it is possible, Christiane, that we may end up needing a separate international agreement regarding the Strait of Hormuz. There are
precedents in history, but this agreement cannot, I repeat, cannot include sort of a fee that ships will have to pay every time they cross the Strait
of Hormuz. This was not the case before the war started, and it cannot be the case after the war finishes.
AMANPOUR: Well, I mean, you know, the Strait of Hormuz wasn't closed before the war started. The war made Iran do it --
MITSOTAKIS: It was closed and it was open, and no one paid anything in order to cross it. We would be setting a very, very dangerous precedent if
that were to happen for the freedom of navigation.
AMANPOUR: So, Prime Minister, what -- I mean, this is your major ally. The Transatlantic Alliance has been the form of, you know, alliance, you know,
since the Second World War. Do you think it's weakened beyond repair? Do you think even Trump threatening to pull out, it weakens it? And where do
you see it in the next month, years, you know, where do you see it going?
MITSOTAKIS: Well, I'm a firm believer in the longevity of the Transatlantic Alliance. At the same time, I do recognize that we're
currently faced with significant challenges. But I would also like to point out, Christiane, that as a result of initiatives taken by the U.S.
president, Europe has gotten its act together when it comes to defense.
President Trump was right to say that essentially Europe did not pick up its fair share of the burden in terms of defense spending. Greece was
always the exception for our own geopolitical reasons. We're currently spending more than 3 percent of our GDP on defense. And I can tell you that
there's a lot of momentum in Europe to strengthen the European strategic autonomy pillar. And I think this will be good for NATO.
So, I think we need to take our defense in Europe much more seriously than we have done so in the past. By doing so, I think we will also rebalance
NATO in a way that will be in the interest of the alliance as a whole. And certainly, Greece is hoping to lead in this initiative. And I'm happy that
many other European countries are taking the defense of Europe much more seriously than they had in the past.
AMANPOUR: Including Greece has joined an initiative to have a nuclear protection, like nuclear umbrella right here in Europe, you know, as was
proposed by the French president.
MITSOTAKIS: That is correct. We've started preliminary discussions regarding some proposals by President Macron. As you know, France is the
only country that currently possesses a nuclear deterrent within the European Union. And again, any discussion to strengthen the European pillar
of our European defense, I think needs to be welcomed by European countries.
Again, I don't think this will happen at the detriment of NATO, but we need to recognize that NATO was essentially, and still is to a certain extent,
an alliance that is way too much dependent on the U.S. So, we need to also pick up our fair share of the burden and make sure that we increase our
defense spending bolster our European defense capabilities. And I can tell you that this is a topic that is frequently discussed at the European
Council, and we're making significant progress in that direction. The Trump effect, so to speak.
AMANPOUR: Now, let me ask you about something else that you have announced as a government, and that is the social ban. You've announced that Greece
will ban social media for children under the age of 15 from 2027. Tell me about these conversations you say you've had with parents. And obviously
other nations have done it. Australia was the first, and there are also other nations who are very interested in doing this.
MITSOTAKIS: Well, Christiane, I first raised this topic 18 months ago at the speech of the United Nations General Assembly. At the time, no one was
really talking about the impact of social media on the mental health of children.
I can tell you, it is the first topic when I discuss with parents who have young kids and teenagers. And they do ask us, do something about it. Even
the kids themselves recognize that the way these platforms are designed contributes towards them spending too much time on screens. There are clear
correlations in terms of their mental health. And it shouldn't come as a surprise because these platforms are in the attention business.
[17:25:00]
But they just should not capture -- start their business model with capturing and monetizing the attention of our kids and our teenagers. So,
we have announced a ban on social media for kids under 15 to go into effect January 1, 2027. But I've also sent a letter to the president of the
European Commission because we cannot do this on our own. We need Europe's assistance.
As you know, the large platforms are regulated by a European piece of legislation called the Digital Services Act. And my vision and my hope is
that what is currently going to become Greece's policy, and of course there are many other European countries moving in that direction, will eventually
also become a European policy.
And I would hope that Europe leads on this front because this is a global problem and the platforms need to recognize that they need to cooperate
with us and they essentially need to accept and acknowledge that they're not just intermediaries, but they are responsible for the design of their
own products. And if these products are addictive by design, they need to do something about it.
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: So, tell me what the do something about it is, because you say you've written this letter to the
President of the Commission. What can it look like and what penalties and what methods?
MITSOTAKIS: Well, first of all, the penalties need to be imposed at the European level because we are part of the single market. But I think,
Christiane, in a few years from now, this discussion will be so obvious that no one will discuss about whether children need to have access to
social media in the same way that, for example, we don't allow our kids to smoke or to drink alcohol. I mean, the evidence is out there.
And again, I don't even need much, you know, scientific background. You just talk to the parents. They're desperate, especially younger kids,
completely addicted to their phones, communicating with their friends through text messages, essentially trapped in a virtual bubble. Kids should
be outside playing, doing sports, playing music. This is not a normal childhood.
And the earlier we recognize it, the more determined we will become in terms of just stating the obvious, that these products should be off limits
for kids under a certain age. And I would hope that we will reach a point where we have a European, a E.U. digital majority age, and where this
becomes E.U. legislation.
And I think that Europe, again, in terms of the protection of children, adolescents, will lead the way. We want kids to have access to technology.
We're not banning technology. We're not banning the internet. But we just want to make sure that they stay away from products which are designed to
just capture their attention for hours. And that has a clear impact on their mental health.
AMANPOUR: Just briefly and quickly, are you willing to risk Trump's ire on this as well? You know that he doesn't want any regulation of the U.S. tech
companies. You've already stood up about Greenland faced him down. You said no to joining this war. And now, the digital space. You're growing some
independence, you in Europe.
MITSOTAKIS: No, let me tell you, Christiane, I'm sure that if you talk or if there are parents listening to us in the U.S., they're having exactly
the same thoughts. And I wouldn't be surprised if this eventually also becomes U.S. policy.
AMANPOUR: And on that note, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, thanks for joining us from Athens.
Well, another European leader, one in particular, has been an outspoken critic of this war. That is the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sanchez. He
closed his airspace to U.S. bombers and upon news of a ceasefire said this, the government of Spain will not applaud those who set the world on fire
because they show up with a bucket.
So, many people are asking what exactly has been achieved here besides global economic chaos and too many lives lost? And what might a lasting
peace deal look like? Let's now bring in Ray Takeyh, an Iranian-American senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and who was a State
Department adviser, and Suzanne Maloney, who's vice president of the Brookings Institution and a former adviser on Iran to both Democratic and
Republican administrations. They also happen to be married, and that's relevant.
Welcome both to this program. I see you smiling, Ray. I'm not so sure Suzanne is thrilled with that. But I do think it's interesting because you
both actually had somewhat differing views on Iran and how best to deal with
[17:30:00]
So, Suzanne, let me ask you, because you just had a big interview in which you said, you know, it would be a war that we would have lost if the war
winds down with the regime intact and Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. What are you thinking this morning?
SUZANNE MALONEY, FOREIGN POLICY VP AND DIRECTOR, BROOKINGS: Thanks very much, Christiane. And I'm really glad to be here and to be here with Ray.
We do have different views. And I think in this case, I believe that the war was a strategic miscalculation by President Trump and Prime Minister
Netanyahu. And it is stunning to see that at least at the moment, the Iranians appear to have retained the upper hand.
For the first time in history, they closed the Strait of Hormuz over the course of the past five weeks. And it appears that they will be able to
continue to control that key waterway as well as to potentially monetize it, as they've been doing. And that is an enormous victory for a regime
that only two months ago was facing massive protests on the streets as a result of economic problems.
AMANPOUR: Ray, obviously, the Iranians say that they have won, but so do the Americans. Pete Hegseth was very verbal and loud and insistent today
and listed all the ways in which the United States has won. You disagree with Suzanne, I think, about how this has turned out.
RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: Well, up to a point. As you mentioned, both sides have a narrative of success. And in
both cases, there's some plausibility to that narrative. The United States and Israel can demonstrate quantitatively the level of destruction that
they have, particularly on Iranian defense forces and so forth.
But the way this war is ending with Iran also having a narrative of success, namely that they managed to impose costs on the global economy.
They managed to interdict maritime traffic through the Gulf with primitive technologies. And they also now have a diplomatic off-ramp in terms of the
discussions that will take place in Pakistan or mediation of it.
So, both sides are coming out with a narrative of success. I think in this war, the president failed to make the case to the American people that the
United States would have to have a long-term commitment to the security of the Gulf. And that essentially meant a concentration of naval assets in
that region for a foreseeable future. He failed to do that. He failed to establish a domestic consensus. He failed to bring allies on board. These
are not his strong suits.
But the level of Iranian program that's been set back and the defense forces that have been set back, that's real. And it will take a long time
for Iran to recover from 13,000 American strike on their targets and the decapitation of many of their critical leaders.
AMANPOUR: Can I now ask you both to look a little bit forward to think what might happen if indeed the two sides meet in Pakistan at the end of
this week? This is what Trump has put on Truth Social today. The United States will work closely with Iran, which we have determined has gone
through what will be a very productive regime change. There will be no enrichment of uranium.
And the United States will, working with Iran, dig up and remove all the deeply buried, I don't know, he's put B-2 bombers, nuclear dust. I think he
means they were buried by B-2 bombers. He also then said that we could have a joint operation to safeguard and securitize the Strait of Hormuz.
Suzanne, is this wishful thinking or is it a way to come out of this?
MALONEY: Well, I think that there is a possibility of constructing an agreement that does require some meaningful concessions from the Iranians
in the aftermath of the war, particularly around reimposing constraints on their nuclear program and extracting the highly enriched uranium, which is
believed to be buried near Isfahan, but may have been dispersed around the country prior to the June 2025 war. That's a really critical issue because
the world needs to ensure that, with this regime still intact, that it cannot move quickly toward nuclear weapons capability.
And I think the Iranians appreciate that there is going to be some need for some concessions and what that looks like and how they phrase that. The
Iranians can't, in fact, enrich uranium at the moment anyway because of the destruction of the program over the course of these two wars. And so, there
may be a creative way to manage that.
I find it quite interesting that the president is hoping to sort of get in on the action in the Strait of Hormuz in terms of the toll-taking that the
Iranians appear to aspire to at this point in time. I imagine that our partners in the Gulf, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and of course the Omanis,
whose territory is involved here, will have some views on exactly what a maritime regime in the Strait should look like and which parties should be
benefiting from it.
AMANPOUR: And, Ray, Javad Zarif, who, as you know, was the former foreign minister under Rouhani and was the lead negotiator in the JCPOA, the Obama-
era nuclear deal, he actually published a piece in Foreign Affairs calling on Iran to declare victory and make a deal. So, this was last week.
[17:35:00]
But he also proposed nuclear limits and non-aggression pact and even suggested that American companies could come into Iranian -- you know, the
Iranian oil space to do business. Do you think that's realistic?
TAKEYH: And he was criticized --
AMANPOUR: Yes, by all sides.
TAKEYH: -- by domestic audiences in Iran for making that point.
AMANPOUR: Yes.
TAKEYH: I don't think there's an overlap suggesting an agreement here. Both sides, the United States and Iran, have issued their terms and both
sides have issued terms that they had before the war. So, this is the same, essentially, proposition they have. The Iranian 10-point plans are
ridiculous. They're an eyesore. They call for essentially elimination of sanctions, secondary and otherwise, and so on and so forth. These are not
serious proposals between the two sides.
However, they have allowed the two sides to essentially have some kind of a ceasefire and began a diplomatic process that may actually cause the
ceasefire to be prolonged. I don't think those who are ruling Iran today are really that interested in an agreement. I'm not quite sure if the Trump
administration is interested in that kind of an agreement along the lines that the Iranians are envisioning.
Right now, that ceasefire has notionally broken down because Iranians are objecting to the fact that Israel has continued operation against Lebanon,
and the United States suggests Lebanon was not part of that ceasefire, but it was part of the Iranian proposals. So, we'll see how this goes. To
suggest there's an agreement possible here, I think, is a misreading of what is happening.
Both sides just wanted to essentially have a success story and get out of this war, and this process may allow them to do that.
AMANPOUR: And then what? I mean, Suzanne, Ray, then what? What if, you know, none of these proposals that either side are floating are good enough
for the other? What then happens? I mean, do they come back and go to war again or what?
TAKEYH: My guess is that the United States doesn't want to do this again, doesn't want to go to war again, at least for the foreseeable future,
unless there's some kind of a nuclear urgency in Iran, which as was suggested, there is not. I think the president wants to move on to other
issues, other crises, other problems, and therefore the diplomatic process may allow him to do that in a sense that there will be a process.
The Gulf security is now going to remain unimpeded. The Iranians do have the ability to essentially interdict Gulf traffic as they wish, and that is
their leverage over the International Community, over the United States, and actually also over Israel, because I think without American
participation, and at least approbation, the Israelis are unlikely to be able to strike Iran again.
AMANPOUR: Suzanne, we need to -- clearly, because this was really about the Iranian people when Trump started this, and Netanyahu started this, and
of course the protest by the Iranian people at the end of December into January, the massive crackdown and the bloodshed by the regime against the
people. Now, the people have been left with, oh, my God, what are we left with? A ceasefire that leaves them in place, and what happens to us? What
do you think is going to happen to the people there?
MALONEY: I think the Iranian people are, as has been the case for at least 47 years, really in the losing situation here. They have risked their lives
countless times, and most recently in January, to try to push for some more responsible, more respected government in the world, and they have been
repressed viciously by their own leadership.
And what has happened over the course of the war is not just that the regime has remained intact, but the very people who were orchestrating the
brutality in January are now in a stronger position, and they have been making that point through continued executions, through text message
warnings to the Iranian people not to go back to the streets.
It is incumbent on the world to ensure that their cause is not forgotten, that we continue to look for avenues to try to advance a democratic outcome
over the long term in Iran. This is a country that is profoundly ready for some kind of democracy. They just have a government that has been averse to
it for 47 years.
AMANPOUR: And, Ray, to you this same question. You grew up in Iran, you left at the time of the revolution, like many of us did, and clearly there
are a lot of people outside Iran who don't believe you can do anything with this regime. Reform is just a sham, any kind of contact is appeasement and
collaboration. Where do you think, as Suzanne says, that somehow the International Community has got to try to encourage some space, some civic,
some democratic space?
TAKEYH: The Iranian people are trapped in their usual position, cruelty by their government and indifference by the International Community. That is a
reality.
[17:40:00]
One of the things that one can be certain of in terms of Iranian politics is there will be another protest movement. And this is one of the reasons
why the regime was so insistent on not capitulating to the American demands, because they understand that right now their power is demystified,
their cadre is depleted, and their security services are stretched. So, they're very concerned about their capabilities of dealing with the next
round of protests.
I suspect that the balance of power still favors the regime and the Revolutionary Guards are capable of maintaining order. And throughout the
past 30 days when there has been war abroad, the Iranian regime has not stopped arresting and even executing some of its own subjects.
So, the question is, when that protest movement breaks out, and I think it will, what is the response of the International Community, not just the
United States and not just the Israelis who actually have spoken on behalf of the Iranian people, but the larger International Community in terms of
their reception? And I should say one thing, having lived through the 1979 revolution, the future of the Iranian people depends largely on themselves,
and that's just the reality of the situation.
Whether they can displace this regime will be a power that they have themselves, as they did in 1979. Whether they succeed or not, I'm not sure,
but the agency lies with them.
AMANPOUR: You know, yes, and unfortunately, as you know, they don't have the weapons, the regime does, and as we've seen it, and I've also reported
on that crackdown many, many times. But let me just ask you, if it's possible to even think, let me ask you, Suzanne, I'm sure that both of you
have thought about this a lot. Is there a way to create a unified, competent opposition movement, something that can help, like in many, many
other countries, they've had their opposition, who's helped to try to, you know, further the cause of the Iran -- of their own people? What do you
think, going forward now, Suzanne?
MALONEY: There's a lot that we can do to help create the conditions for a serious opposition movement within Iran, and also press for reform and
splinters within the existing regime, which I think are probably more likely in the aftermath of this conflict than they were beforehand. There's
a lot that we could do in terms of funding for free media, for internet connections, for organizational capacity, both inside Iran and within the
diaspora. Many of those programs were those that were slashed by the Trump administration during the first year of this second term of President
Trump's administration.
And so, I think that should be a high priority for the U.S. Congress, for other governments around the world, to really press for that kind of
financial support that will make it possible for Iranians to organize in a way that would put pressure on the regime and help produce an eventual
outcome that would be more favorable to democracy in Iran.
AMANPOUR: And finally, Ray, just in the region, the United States, according to polling that's been happening right now, is really losing
popularity and influence across the Arab world, across many, many parts. China now out polls the U.S. in upholding, get this, international law,
maintaining regional security and protecting rights. And China apparently had something to do with pushing Iran towards a ceasefire. How do you see
the fallout in a part of the world that's traditionally allied with America, including having bases there?
TAKEYH: Well, I suspect the Gulf states will move back to their pre-war policy of having detente with Iran and having some kind of a balance in
terms of their relationship with the Iranian government and the American government, because at some level, they distrust both and they depend on
both for their own security and safety, particularly as they want to have a tourism industry, data centers and so forth.
In terms of China, actually, the relation with Iran may change because one of the things that the Islamic Republic should recognize and perhaps has
recognized is that those great power patrons such as China and Russia that invested so much in ultimately didn't come to its defense. And there are a
lot of voices within Iran today, particularly in the security services that are talking about returning to the original principles of the revolution,
self-reliance and self-dependence. And that leads only to one direction, an autonomous nuclear capability.
One thing that the Iranian regime recognizes coming out of this war and the last one, if they had the bomb, they wouldn't keep getting bombed.
AMANPOUR: Yes, and that is not a great lesson. Ray Takeyh, thank you so much indeed. Suzanne Maloney, thank you very much, both of you, for being
with us. And we'll be right back after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[17:45:00]
AMANPOUR: Now, the Middle East is anxiously awaiting further details of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire. Pakistan says Lebanon is included, but Israel and
the White House say it's not. And as we mentioned, Israel carried out its largest attack today just after the ceasefire was announced on Lebanon.
Since its war with Hezbollah began, that is, more than 1,500 people have been killed and more than a million people have been displaced.
David Miliband is president of the International Rescue Committee, a former U.K. foreign secretary. He's just returned from Beirut, and he's joining me
now from New York. David, welcome back to the program. And I just have to say, even the Greek prime minister was saying that absolutely Israel has to
stop this on Lebanon because it's just creating further and further instability as you're trying to get some kind of ceasefire and more
stability, at least with Iran and in that region.
DAVID MILIBAND, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE: Yes, the great fear in Beirut last week when I was there was that Lebanon would
be left out of a deal to end the war in Iran. And the tragedy is that it looks like that fear is now being borne out.
Yesterday on CNN, there were -- it was going across the bottom of the screen. Pakistan says that Lebanon is included in the ceasefire deal.
France and Egypt have said the same thing. But now we understand from the White House and obviously from the Israeli actions that they're not
included. I got a text just earlier saying this is the bloodiest day in Beirut for years, over 100 dead.
And the fact that this comes just hours after a, quote/unquote, "ceasefire" is just worse than cruel irony for people in Lebanon who have suffered
enormously. I think you said this earlier in the program at some point. Over a million Lebanese displaced from their homes as one in five of the
population as a result of the last five weeks.
AMANPOUR: I know, and we're seeing these horrendous pictures. And it's Beirut. It's also other parts of Lebanon. It's the southern part where
Israel has actually said that all Shiites need to leave, i.e., Hezbollah and what they, I suppose, are accusing of being all Hezbollah supporters.
How is -- A, is that possible? B, can they do that under international law? And what can you or the U.N. or anybody else do about it?
MILIBAND: Well, the real problem, of course, is that we've seen this play out before. Between 1982 and 2000, Israel occupied southern Lebanon and
proved to be a recruiting sergeant for Hezbollah as the war and the violence continued.
When I spent last week in Syria and in Lebanon talking to people and the sense of dread about the future in Lebanon was absolutely overwhelming.
That you're right to say it was people from the south. It was people from the southern suburbs of Beirut. But also, my own organization had a former
employee and her husband her three-year-old kid killed in the Beqaa Valley.
So, this is a whole of Lebanon problem. And, of course, the movement of people that we refer to is movement of people predominantly, but not only
Shiite, going into communities that are dominated by other confessional groups. And so, the sense of dread is about not just personal circumstances
and personal safety, but also about the future of the country.
I just want to say one other thing. 2025 was actually a good year for Lebanon in the sense that it got a new credible government. It was also a
good year for Syria because they got rid of the hated Assad regime. All of the sense of possibility is in danger of being quashed as a result of
what's happened over the last five weeks.
[17:50:00]
You could say there couldn't have been a worse time for a war with Iran and a further war in Lebanon.
AMANPOUR: I know. And the U.N. is saying that Lebanon is a breaking point. You talk about Lebanon and Syria. I don't know. It seems that Israel, which
Netanyahu tonight has said, we still have our finger on the trigger. We still have other business to finish, whether, you know, he's talking about
Lebanon.
And it's just -- I wonder what can be done, because it appears that Israel believes that its security is guaranteed by whatever you want to call it.
Fragmenting, destroying, collapsing countries around it, that it feels to be threat.
MILIBAND: I think there are three -- you know, I think three things come to mind. First of all, the people I met need humanitarian aid. Now, I mean,
they've been moved -- 85 percent of the people who've been moved as a result of this latest conflict are living on the floors of relatives and
friends. Only 15 percent are in government shelters. So, there's a desperate need for help for the people who've been turfed out of their own
homes.
Secondly, the government of Lebanon is the right place to vest power and to support establishing that there is one rule of law in Lebanon. It comes
through the government and there is one form of security and that comes through the Lebanese government. The third thing, obviously, is that I
haven't heard President -- Prime Minister Netanyahu's comments.
What I did hear before I came on is that the Straits of Hormuz have now been reclosed because the Iranian government are saying that the ceasefire
is not being upheld. And so, we're in the first 24 hours of this ceasefire. And the point I would make is not only is Lebanon so often a victim of
other people's wars, wars in Lebanon are getting in the way of and multiply wars across the region. And that's what we have to watch.
AMANPOUR: Exactly. And look, as a former foreign minister, you know, we know, and you've just alluded to it, that the current government of Lebanon
and the Lebanese people are literally furious with Hezbollah for bringing this down on them again.
So, how does one neutralize a militia that is not part of a sovereign government's army? You know, in this way, and also, I guess this is a
compound question, but all the cuts in aid, in humanitarian aid, whether it's the U.S., the U.K. or whatever, that's obviously compounding these
poor people's dire need right now.
MILIBAND: Yes, that's a good point. I mean, first of all, the anger that was expressed to me by different Lebanese people, I went to meet government
ministers, I met public officials, I met clients of the International Rescue Committee, I met our own staff.
The anger is widely spread. There's anger at Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into the war. There's anger at Israel for the way in which it's conducting
the campaign. There's anger at America. There's anger at their own government. There's a lot of anger and the tension is high because a whole
society is at risk. Second point, there's also anger that Lebanon is a silent emergency. It's ignored.
Thank you for having me on your show to talk about Lebanon. But my own organization, we've had to cut in half from about 220 to 105 the number of
staff that we've got in Lebanon over the last year because of precisely the funding cuts that you are describing. Overall, around the world, there's
been a 50 percent cut in humanitarian aid in the last year led by the U.S., but it's not only a U.S. phenomenon. Sadly, the U.K., Germany, France have
also cut their aid programs. The European Union has not cut its aid program. I think that's very significant. And so, the aid cuts are
compounding the problem.
I just want to bring something to your attention. New research from the Center for Global Development, which is a highly respected organization,
it's already tracked that the aid cuts of the last year have led to a 5 percent increase in the amount of conflict that's going on. So, this is a
very vicious circle that we have to understand. Yes, it's about politics that has broken down, but it's also about basic humanity that's broken
down.
AMANPOUR: Do you think there's going to be anything? And we've got 30 seconds. Do you think anything can be done to stop the Lebanon part of
this?
MILIBAND: Yes, I think a lot can be done. First of all, the interests of the U.S. and Iran are in upholding their ceasefire, and both of their
interests are in upholding or enforcing or ensuring a new ceasefire in Lebanon. That's what the White House comes center stage. I know you've only
got 30 seconds, so that's the message.
AMANPOUR: Yes. In other words, Trump has said ceasefire in Iran. He needs to tell Israel to ceasefire in Lebanon, basically, is what people are
saying. Thank you very much, David Miliband. Thank you so much for being with us.
MILIBAND: Thank you very much. Thank you.
AMANPOUR: And a final thought. Now, you've all heard of the madman theory, pretty self-explanatory. Trump 1.0 used it against North Korea's nuclear
threats and indeed secured summits with his so-called little rocket man Kim Jong un.
[17:55:00]
But look at North Korea now. Continued militarization, an ICBM test, and nuclear bombs. In a recent speech, Kim called that irreversible, and that
no one would dare attack North Korea now, as they have done Iran. As if to signal where his policy is headed even after he's gone, Kim is giving a
whole new meaning to teaching your kid how to drive. In this case, his 13- year-old daughter and presumed heir in a tank. A clear message that the family dynasty is here to stay. Peace and friendship with his previous best
friend, Donald Trump, a long-forgotten mirage, it seems.
That's it for now. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[18:00:00]
END
