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Acting Secret Service Director Testifies on Capitol Hill; FBI Deputy Director Testifies on Trump Rally Shooting. Aired 10:30-11a ET

Aired July 30, 2024 - 10:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:30:00]

PAUL ABBATE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FBI: There were over 700 comments posted from this account. Some of these comments, if ultimately attributable to the shooter, appear to reflect anti-Semitic and anti-immigration themes to espouse political violence and are described as extreme in nature.

While the investigative team is still working to verify this account to determine if it did, in fact, belong to the shooter, we believe it important to share and note it today, particularly given the general absence of other information to date from social media and other sources of information that reflect on the shooter's potential motive and mindset.

These are the facts, in part, that the investigation has revealed to date. While the shooter is dead, our work is very much ongoing and urgent. Thank you, and I look forward to answering any and all questions.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Abbate. We'll now proceed. Chairman Durbin and Ranking Member Graham will ask the first two questions. I will then ask question, Ranking Member Paul, and then, after that, we will alternate between members of the Judiciary, recognized by Chairman Durbin, and members of the Homeland Security Committee, recognized by me. With that, Senator Durbin, you're recognized for your questions.

SEN. RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL): Thank you, Senator Peters. I would like to begin by making a statement. It's not in the form of a question, and you'll understand why when I say it. In 20 days, we're going to start the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. I have been briefed by the law enforcement agencies plans for security for that event. Tens of thousands of people will be there, including some of the highest-ranking politicians in the United States.

I trust that both of your agencies can answer in the affirmative, if I ask you whether you're actively engaged in working with the development of security plan, taking into consideration the lessons of July 13th.

RONALD ROWE, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE: Senator, that is 100 percent yes from the Secret Service.

ABBATE: Yes from the FBI as well, sir. We've been working on this for well over a year in preparation.

DURBIN: I'm not going to ask for details for obvious reasons, but I do want to ask a question about the Secret Service staffing. Congress has nearly doubled the budget for the Secret Service over the last 10 years, from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2014 to $3 billion in fiscal year 2024. Despite this large increase in funding, the number of agents in protective operations has fallen from 4,027 to 3,671 during that same time period. An approximate 9 percent reduction.

Acting Director Rowe, what accounts for protective operations losing 356 agents over the past 10 years?

ROWE: So, Senator, with respect to where we are today on staffing, and then I'll address the 10-year where we were. In this year alone, we are going to end the year on the positive of 200 plus agents. That's the first time in a number of years that we've been able to do that. Part of that was gaining some efficiencies in our hiring process.

But what I want to reemphasize is that we have not dropped standards only 2 percent, 2 percent of every applicant actually makes it through the hiring process. We are filling our classes at the federal law enforcement training center. We are doing this ramp up as part of what lies ahead of us with the L.A. Olympics in 2028.

With respect to what has happened in years prior, this is a difficult and challenging job being a Secret Service agent. Living your life by somebody else's schedule, constantly away from your family, constantly having to meet increased operational and investigative demands, which we gladly do. But it's not for everyone. And I think there are times where people have to make tough choices and they decide to leave the agency. But that doesn't mean that they were any less of an agent or that they weren't committed to the mission. Because we are all committed to being patriots and serving our country and protecting our nation's highest leaders.

I think there was a variety of factors. Some of it was the pandemic. Some of it was, you know, the economy or other opportunities. We have people that are very skilled in cyber that often leave the job. Some of the protective skills that they acquire are also in demand in the private sector. But some of the mechanisms that we've put in place, just in the last year, is also retaining our workforce, and that's what we are focused on right now.

DURBIN: The Government Accountability Office has determined that restaffing from these losses have been slowed due to a number of factors, including the years long background checks for prospective agents and the assignments agents must work through before being assigned to protection. Given these constraints, what steps have you taken to improve recruitment?

[10:35:00]

ROWE: So, we're actually putting out targeted recruitment opportunities. So, we've just recently put it out for -- within our uniform division, for our counter sniper unit, our hazardous agent, medical emergency response unit, our counter assault team on the special agent side. So, we're actually trying to gather the best and the brightest. And I will tell you that we are having great success with a lot of these vacancies.

But what I want to reiterate is that, for example, on the counter assault vacancy, we had, you know, 700 applicants that applied for this. Really what we will glean after they make it through the process, and they have to be able to hold a top-secret SCI clearance, will be if we realize 15 out of that tranche, that's a 2 percent pass rate. So, it is very competitive and we are trying to make sure that we are getting the best and the brightest without dropping standards.

DURBIN: One last question for either one of you. What is the purpose of a range finder and once this assassin was identified as using a range finder, wasn't that proof positive that he was a dangerous individual?

ROWE: So, I'll say, Senator, that obviously somebody is trying to determine where they are in proximity to a location, a fixed location. I'll defer to my colleague here, but I believe it was a recreation or sports related. I thought I had read that it was a golf range finder. Nonetheless, it still would have provided him the ability to provide the distance that he was away from his intended target.

DURBIN: Wasn't that enough?

ROWE: As far as raising suspicion?

DURBIN: Yes.

ROWE: I think he was identified as being suspicious by local law enforcement.

DURBIN: And nothing happened?

ROWE: Well, I know that local law enforcement was attempting to locate him.

DURBIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PETERS: Ranking Member Graham.

SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Thank you. Let's go back to the resources. Do you need more money?

ROWE: Senator, we -- listen, there isn't a single branch, a single agency in the executive branch that could -- that needs more money. Everyone would take more resources. We've had a great relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Management and Budget.

GRAHAM: Do you feel constrained to ask for more resources by anybody?

ROWE: No, sir, we don't. And actually, we have an -- we have a great relationship with our appropriators and obviously, the authorizing committees. And they have always looked out for the Secret Service. GRAHAM: So, I would encourage you to think big when it comes to resourcing the department in light of what happened here. At the time of the shooting, the Iranians were threatening high level American officials, including President Trump, right?

ROWE: Senator, it's widely known --

GRAHAM: FBI?

ROWE: Yes, Senator. That's 100 percent correct.

GRAHAM: Did that factor into the security footprint?

ROWE: So, Senator, what I will say is that it is widely known that the Iranians do not like us. I refer you to the national security.

GRAHAM: Well, it's not that they don't like us. They threaten to kill certain people and they name them.

ROWE: Correct, sir. But I can't publicly comment --

GRAHAM: It's not like, you know, I hate America. I'm going to kill these three guys.

ROWE: Right. I cannot publicly comment, sir, on --

GRAHAM: Well, they publicly comment on it. I mean, it's not --

ROWE: But, Senator, what I'm trying to say is I cannot publicly comment on what intelligence, but I can assure you that we do a threat-based protective model.

GRAHAM: I'd like to have that model provided to the Committee. Could you do that?

ROWE: Yes, sir.

GRAHAM: Could you also give us the protocols that are in place to secure a site like this?

ROWE: Yes, sir.

GRAHAM: OK. Thank you. One, the protective detail around President Trump, I know them all very well They're brave men and women. And these questions is not to belittle anybody, they're trying to find out how the system fails so badly.

You say you're not reluctant to ask for more money. What do we need to do to make it easier to hire people without lowering our standards? I mean, I know it's a hard job. Can we do anything to help you?

ROWE: So, I think we're willing to take that back, sir. I think we were working on our time to hire.

GRAHAM: Well, if you had more people, you'd have more time off?

ROWE: That's true, sir. Yes.

GRAHAM: OK. Well, let's get more people and more time off. Let's -- these are tough jobs. I mean, people in this Committee know.

ROWE: Yes, sir.

[10:40:00]

GRAHAM: I don't know how they hold a family together doing what they're doing. It's the military really on steroids. The encrypted app. Paul, can you tell us about these apps? Have they been broken into, the guy had some apps that were encrypted?

ABBATE: I think we've experienced a range of returns on this. Some of the applications that he was using online were encrypted in nature, some of the e-mail accounts that --

GRAHAM: Have we broken into them?

ABBATE: We've received returns. There are some that we have not been able to get information back because of their encrypted nature.

GRAHAM: Is there any way to solve that problem?

ABBATE: Sir -- Senator, we've talked about this before. We need a solution that provides lawful access to law enforcement.

GRAHAM: So, you're telling me the guy that took eight shots at the president, former president, has apps that we can't get into that may, if you could get into, reveal some relevant information?

ABBATE: That is correct, Senator.

GRAHAM: So, if he were talking to some foreign power, and I'd -- I don't think any foreign power would hire this guy by the way So, I'm not overly worried this was some great plot by the Iranians because they couldn't even think of this. However, there could come a day where something like this is very important. How do we solve this problem?

ABBATE: Senator, you know, as we've been saying, we need a solution that provides lawful access where when we go to a company --

GRAHAM: So, you're telling me -- I agree with you. I'm not blaming you. We have encrypted apps of an assassin who -- a murderer and we can't get into them all these days after. That needs to be fixed, folks. I'm all for privacy but to a point. What if in the future somebody is using these apps to communicate with the foreign power? I think we need to know these things We need to know them in real-time.

So, lessons learned is that everything failed. Corrective action. It seems to me you need more money and more people. Accountability. At the end of the day, how many people do you think will be relieved of their duties, Mr. Rowe, because of this?

ROWE: Senator, I publicly cannot, and I cannot weigh in on that right now, right? It has to be a fair and neutral process.

GRAHAM: Absolutely. From a fair point of view, would you say this is a major system failure at every turn, and those in charge of the system in question, not only was it embarrassing, they failed?

ROWE: So, Senator, again, if there were policy violations, those individuals will be held accountable, and they will be subject to our table of penalties.

GRAHAM: Just send this to policies if you could.

ROWE: Yes, sir, we will.

GRAHAM: Thank you.

ROWE: But they will be held to our table of penalties, which will include up to termination.

GRAHAM: Thank you.

PETERS: Director Rowe, in your testimony here today as well as in your written testimony, you said very, very clearly that you can't defend why that building with the -- could not -- with the shooter on top of it was not better covered. You were very clear. You cannot defend that. So, my question to you is -- my understanding is that there's a detailed site survey that is done prior to an event to identify potential threat points.

So, talk to me about that site survey. I'm sure you've had a chance to look at it now after action. And how did that site survey get approved when it was so clear that that was a major threat from that building?

ROWE: Thank you, Senator. So, our Pittsburgh field office did the advance. During that advance, not only were they discussing amongst themselves about mitigating the line of sight but also, they were discussing with other agencies that were supporting it. Our counter snipers met with their counterparts, the team lead and team lead met. They walked the site. They identified the AGR Building.

And if I may, Senator, if I could point out something, right now, if I may, and we will place this for the record. But this is the point of view. This is from the second floor of the AGR Building. This point of view is the point of view where the counter sniper team locally was posted. The gold arrow indicates where the shooter fired from.

Looking left, why was the assailant not seen? When we were told that building was going to be covered that there had been a face-to-face that afternoon that our team leads met, this was the view.

[10:45:00]

Let me show you another view, Senator. B. This view is a reenactment by one of my agents, lying flat. There is a five-inch rise on the middle of that roof. The assailant would have had to present his bore over that to get his shot off. The view underneath reflects the perspective that he would have had. Again, I call your attention back to the first exhibit, if they to look left. Give me C. This is what our counter sniper team saw. Shooter. No elbows. You barely make out the crown of his head. Below it, the assailant up prone. And let me just tell you, our counter sniper, this individual, I know him. I consider him a friend. He has covered me operationally in conflict zones. And when I did my time on the president's detail, he exemplifies the courage, the skill, and the ability to respond under great stress in such short time to neutralize the threat and prevent further loss of life.

Getting back to your question, Senator, these were discussions that were had between the Pittsburgh field office, the local counterparts, and everyone supporting that visit that day. And that's why when I laid in that position, I could not and I will not and I cannot understand why there was not better coverage or at least somebody looking at that roof line when that's where they were posted.

PETERS: Director Rower, the Secret Service, state, and local law enforcement were on multiple communication channels is my understanding during that time, and as a result, local law enforcement was only able to call into a state command center that was then relayed from the Secret Service. There seemed to be a recurring issue in emergency situations that we're finding with the federal government that there's not a seamless way to communicate, particularly if you're relying on local law enforcement to deal with what was clearly a major, major vulnerability.

Local law enforcement in Butler told my staff that they had no way of communicating directly with the Secret Service. And if I listen to Mr. Abbate saying, there was about 30 seconds between when the local law enforcement reported that there was a man on the roof with a gun, 30 seconds. If it's communicated directly to a counter sniper team, would that be enough time to react prior to the firing of those shots?

ROWE: Senator, if we'd had that information, they would have been able to address it more quickly. It appears that that information was stuck or siloed in that state and local channel. I will tell you, though, that there were -- our tactical elements did have -- not only did they have embeds from Butler County ESU with them, but they also had radios on the tactical net.

It is troubling to me that we did not get that information as quickly as we should have. We didn't know that there was this incident going on. And the only thing we had was that locals were working an issue at the 3:00, which would have been the former president's right-hand side, which is where the shot came. Nothing about man on the roof, nothing about man with a gun, none of that information ever made it over our net.

PETERS: So, that will change?

ROWE: Yes, sir. We are working right now to figure out the interoperability and also make sure that we do have access to those channels, whether through their counterpart system or some other means.

PETERS: Very good. Ranking Member Paul, I recognize for your questions.

SEN. RAND PAUL (R-KY): Director Rowe, I'm encouraged by your attitude, what you brought here today, what you've talked about as far as immediate changes that you've made, and I hope you'll follow through with that. I'm encouraged by the fact that you acknowledge that it's indefensible that the roof was unattended. Would you say the roof being unattended breaches standard protocol for setting up a security perimeter?

ROWE: What I would say, Senator, is that that roof should have had better coverage, and we will get to the bottom of if there were any policy violations.

PAUL: I would think indefensible would go along with breaching protocol, and I can't imagine how indefensible would not be breaching protocol. What I would caution though is that I sense, you know, and you're the Secret Service, and these people are your friends, and they are heroic people who do good things, that we can't let our friendships blind us from responsibility.

[10:50:00]

So, someone's in charge of the security at the zone. Would the Secret Service be in charge of the entire operation and they work with law enforcement, but they're in charge? The person in charge of the entire operation is the Secret Service, not the local police.

ROWE: You're correct, sir. This is a failure of the Secret Service.

PAUL: So, that's what I mean. And look, I don't wish anybody harm. I appreciate the bravery of the Capitol Hill Police. I was at the shooting at the ball field. I've heard a hundred shots coming my way. Fortunately, none came to me. But I appreciate the bravery of all the people who protect us. But there's also the idea that there are certain mistakes that don't make you a bad person, but they're just inexcusable that you -- if you made that mistake.

So, for example, let's say you determine local police should have been on there and they told us and local police says no, they didn't tell us to do it. And it's a he said, she said. Still, ultimately, the agent in charge should be walking the grounds and say, there's a roof a hundred yards away from the stadium with a clear sight. Someone's got to be on the roof. Local police, I told you to get on the roof, get on the roof. Or you put the Secret Service. So, ultimately, the buck doesn't pass along to somebody. Whoever's in charge is in charge.

But really, I think it would be helpful to all of us. I know the process has to be meted out, but there needs to also be a process for protecting the next Trump rally. The fact that whoever was in charge in Butler next week is not in charge of a rally in Las Vegas. And so, I think you really should say that, you should simply say that the leadership from that event is going through a process, but until that process, they won't be in charge of the Democrat National Convention. That would reassure a lot of people that they won't be in charge of security until it's determined . Can you tell us something to that accord? ROWE: Yes, sir. So, I can tell you that the team planning the Democratic National Convention, that is a national special security vet. That team has been on the ground. That's from D.C. with support from our Chicago field office.

But I just want to reiterate that our Pittsburgh field office staff, they are wearing this harder than anybody right now in the Secret Service. They feel completely demoralized. And what I'm trying to do is also let them know that, listen, they need to be focused on the mission at hand. I also have to walk a tightrope here and make sure that I am not tainting any future from, you know, discipline action.

PAUL: From one point -- I understand and I have great respect for all the officers. But ultimately, someone had to be in charge and someone made a terrible error, and it's an error of judgment. The big error is the roof. But another big error is we have 90 minutes of a suspicious person.

Now, Senator Durbin mentioned the range finder. None of these are enough to shoot a suspicious person, but they certainly, you would think, would be enough to stop the proceedings. That's where I think you get to the second major management or judgment error of this.

Now, Trump's done probably a hundred rallies like this. How often at one of his rallies are there 90 minutes of looking at one person and at least a half a dozen pictures of that person? How often does that happen? And is it against protocol to let a proceeding go on when you've got a suspicious person, 90 minutes worth of people talking about this person, and we don't stop the proceeding? Does that defy protocol?

ROWE: So, Senator, so while there's 90 minutes in total from when he's first identified by local law enforcement, we have about a 30- minute window. But in no time is there anything ever communicated about weapon or harm. And I think that's where the threat --

PAUL: I'm not about a weapon. A weapon -- you shoot people with a weapon.

ROWE: Sure.

PAUL: Without a weapon, we're talking about people you stop and say -- he had a backpack which was probably big enough to have the AR-15 in it. In all likelihood, the backpack has that -- has the weapon in it. So, a guy with a big backpack would never get to the perimeter. So, once again, a big mistake was not having the perimeter wide enough to prevent people from shooting outside the perimeter.

But the thing is, he would have never gotten through the perimeter, right? His backpack would have been checked. But people with big backpacks are very suspicious. And I would think he's been seen six times. But you got 20 or 30 minutes of knowing about it. But the thing is, there's all kinds of chatter going on about this. And you would think the chatter going on with the local police is on a police radio. And a policeman with that radio is standing in the control tent. So, you get that communication. So, there's a huge and massive breakdown. But really, my question is, how often has this happened at other rallies, where there's a half a dozen pictures and 90 minutes of people talking about a suspicious person? I just can't imagine that it's real common.

[10:55:00]

ROWE: So, Senator, at rallies, there are people that come to the attention of law enforcement for a variety of reasons. And, you know, if they come to our attention for some other activity, that might, you know, put it a little bit, hey, we probably need to go check that individual out. This happens, and that's why we attempt to locate them. That's why it's important for us to try to find them. And it's important to have the information.

And so, local law enforcement did their very level best to try to locate him. They did provide us the photos 30 minutes prior. It's just he evaded any detection by law enforcement.

PAUL: But once again, it's the overall person in charge. It's a terrible breakdown, it's a terrible management decision not to have stopped, if there was a chance to stop the proceeding. And the question is not whether there's enough information to take down an individual, it's a much lower standard to say, hey, we're going to wait until we get this individual.

The roof and the 90 minutes of it, both I think are failure of your protocol. And I think when that's determined, the person who made these decisions can't be in a position of authority again.

PETERS: Senator Klobuchar.

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): Thank you very much. Thank you to all of you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it, Actor Director Rowe, and we had the classified briefing and also today, there was taking responsibility for the agency and your own personal emotion and reaction to your visit and what had gone wrong.

For the people in my state that keep asking me, I just don't get how he got on the roof. I know we've gone through great details and a lot of examination, could you just give a minute on what went wrong and how you think it can be fixed? Because I think it's just going to help to dispel the conspiracy theories. There are some people that think it didn't really happen, which of course is completely ridiculous. It did. There are some people that think all kinds of conspiracies went on within the government, which is also false. But could you just tell them what went wrong so they understand?

ROWE: Yes. Thank you, Senator. I thought long and hard about this. I think this was a failure of imagination, a failure to imagine that we actually do live in a very dangerous world, where people do actually want to do harm to our protectees. I think it was a failure to challenge our own assumptions. The assumptions that we know our partners are going to do everything they can, and they do this every day. But we didn't challenge our own assumptions of we assume that someone's going to cover that. We assume that there's going to be uniform presence. We didn't challenge that internally during that advance. So, moving forward, I've directed that when we're talking to people and we're making requests, we are very specific about what we want. We are providing explicit instructions on exactly what our expectation is and what we need them to do and what we want them to do. That's the only way that we're going to be able to move forward beyond this.

And let me just tell you that our state and local law enforcement partners are the best. So, this belief that somehow they are less than federal law enforcement or they're less than the Secret Service, they're out there patrolling communities every day. They're the ones out there going into hazardous conditions every day. They know their communities. They have the ability to enforce state and local laws. Our advance agents do not.

KLOBUCHAR: Right.

ROWE: We need them and we need them to be partners with us. And I think we need to be very clear to them, and that may have contributed to this situation.

KLOBUCHAR: Yes, I appreciate that, and I have the same respect. Next, one of the things you mentioned to me was -- and to all of us, was in this other briefing, was just the texting protocol. And I think a lot of us think about this in non-security settings about how people are just texting all the time instead of talking and how it takes our eyes off, in your case, the target.

Could you talk about what might have gone wrong there and how you think things could change when there's the hope is that their eyes are constantly on the scene and on the potential targets and risks?

ROWE: Yes. Thank you, Senator. So, again, we need people focused on the problem or on their area of responsibility. It was great that there was a text chain, but that communication needs to go over the net. It needs to go over a radio channel so that everyone has situational awareness of it.

And I -- what I was -- the point I was making in the closed-door briefing is that we have to get to a point now where we are using our radio systems, to have that collective awareness of this. The -- I think, you know, one of the things that I've directed is that in addition to the interoperability.

[11:00:00]