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Acting Secret Service Director Testifies on Capitol Hill. Aired 11:30a-12p ET

Aired July 30, 2024 - 11:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

SEN. MAGGIE HASSAN (D-NH): You have talked today and in our secure briefing about the interoperability of the Secret Service's counterdrone capability, that it failed early on. And so it didn't catch the drone flown over the site by the shooter.

[11:30:12]

First, what changes are -- you have addressed this a little, but what changes is the Secret Service making to ensure that it has backup technology, but also what efforts did the Secret Service undertake to coordinate with other law enforcement regarding anti-drone capability at the rally site?

RONALD ROWE, ACTING U.S. SECRET SERVICE DIRECTOR: We're working to determine that right now, Senator.

We're getting the redundancies in place. Counter-UAS authority, it is a little complex. State and locals don't necessarily have this ability to do that.

HASSAN: Right.

ROWE: It does require coordination with the FAA, because it does -- it could impact commercial travel.

HASSAN: Right. Yes.

OK, thank you.

And Mr. Chair, I'm just going to follow up. And I think one of the things that you're hearing from a lot of folks, but I'm not sure we're really clear on yet, is, how is it that somebody who clearly is arousing concern from law enforcement isn't identified as suspicious, and how is it that information doesn't get to the president -- the former president's detail?

So I will follow up in writing. Thank you.

SEN. RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL): Senator Cornyn.

SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Rowe, can you explain why the shooter's drone worked?

ROWE: Because there was no counter-UAS present, sir.

CORNYN: Well, you had a drone system, but you had bandwidth problems. The bandwidth apparently was adequate for the shooter's drone, but not for the Secret Service. Can you explain that?

ROWE: I have no explanation for it, sir.

CORNYN: We also know that, in the military context, electronic warfare or jamming capabilities are commonly used on the battlefield. Does the Secret Service have jamming capabilities or drones?

ROWE: We have drones, sir. And when it comes to -- I have to be very careful about how I answer this one in an open forum. What I can tell you is that we have technical security measures, sir, to address, I think, what you're asking me.

CORNYN: Well, the question is, can you take down a suspicious drone? Because this can be used not only for surveillance by the shooter, which obviously it was here, but also drones can be weaponized and be used as a threat to the president or, in this case, President Trump.

Do you have the capacity to stop a weaponized drone?

ROWE: What I will tell you, sir, is that we have technical security measures that we utilize at permanently protective sites. We also have the ability, in a limited fashion, at temporary sites.

What I can tell you is that, on this day, the counter-UAS system had technical difficulties and did not go operational until after 5:00.

CORNYN: So, in this case, the shooter had a rifle, but somebody who wanted to kill a president or a former president or a candidate for president would not need a rifle. They could use a drone, correct?

ROWE: It is a potential threat vector.

CORNYN: So, this individual was identified as a suspicious person. Can you explain to us when a suspicious person becomes identified as a threat?

ROWE: Well, I think it's also when a weapon or some other dangerous item is then presented.

CORNYN: A range finder would not render somebody a threat, as opposed to somebody who was under suspicion?

ROWE: I think the range finder is what initially brought him to the attention of local law enforcement.

CORNYN: And why would the president be allowed to take to the stage while a suspicious person had been identified and before the Secret Service or local law enforcement were able to investigate the circumstances?

ROWE: So, at that time, Senator, suspicion had not risen to the level of threat or imminent harm. CORNYN: Well, you didn't -- ultimately, that suspicious person did become a threat. Do you think if the president had been asked not to take the stage during the time it took to investigate to eliminate that suspicion, that -- wouldn't that have been the appropriate way to deal with it?

[11:35:03]

ROWE: Senator, it certainly is one way to do it. This is a challenge for law enforcement in general, is that being able to -- you identify somebody that comes to your attention, and you're trying to determine, what are their intentions?

This is a challenge for law enforcement. The individual is actually -- came to the attention for suspicion. He's on the outer perimeter adjacent to the secured site. Law enforcement is circulating for him. But, again, without additional information, at that point, we're not rising to the level yet where perhaps we should pull him off or delay him.

CORNYN: And I'm just suggesting that maybe, just maybe, President Trump's appearance should have been delayed while that suspicion could be adequately investigated.

But you -- I have always thought of the Secret Service as the best of the best when it comes to their willingness to put themselves in harm's way to protect the life of their person they are detailed to. And I think you described the very rigorous process by which people are screened.

And I think you mentioned the 2 percent standard. People who are interested in serving, only a very small fraction of those individuals are actually accepted in the Secret Service because of the high standards that your agency has.

But explain to me why the Secret Service, being an elite law enforcement agency, would delegate to local law enforcement or others who did not meet that same 2 percent standard. In other words, isn't that something that Secret Service should have covered, as opposed to delegating it to local law enforcement?

ROWE: So, Senator, again this is where I went back to earlier when I said it was a failure to challenge our assumptions.

We assumed that the state and locals had it. By no means do I want to diminish the commitment, and I'm sure you agree. State and local law enforcement do their jobs every day and protect the communities that you represent.

CORNYN: No doubt about it.

ROWE: So, I think what -- we made an assumption that there was going to be uniform presence out there, that there would be sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be countersniper teams in the AGR building. And I can assure you that we're not going to make that mistake again. Moving forward, I have directed our Office of Protective Operations

that, when our countersnipers are up, their countersnipers are up and they're on the roof as well. And we have -- we do this all the time with our colleagues in the New York City Police Department when we cover the United Nations General Assembly.

And so that is our TTP moving forward.

CORNYN: Director Rowe, I would just submit to you that those assumptions can be lethal.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Senator Scott, you're recognized for your questions.

SEN. RICK SCOTT (R-FL): Thank you, Chairman.

PAMELA BROWN, CNN HOST: All right, you have been listening to this hearing with the Secret Service acting director, as well as the deputy director of the FBI.

We're going to take a quick break, and we will continue to monitor this hearing on the other end.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[11:43:06]

BROWN: All right, let's listen back into this congressional hearing about the attempted assassination of Donald Trump.

SCOTT: -- with your approach.

I just want to finish. I have got -- like everybody else, I sent -- I did a letter July 18. I haven't gotten any answers yet. I want to put it into the record. And I'd love to get the answers to this, because this is what the public is asking for. They want more information.

They want to know what happened, who's going to be held accountable, and how we're going to make sure this never happens again. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Without objection, it'll be entered in the record.

Senator Blumenthal.

SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL (D-CT): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here to both of you. And, more important, thank you for your professional dedication, your personal bravery, and your devotion to the ideals of law enforcement. I know, for both of you, this moment is a painful one.

And, Acting Director, I have heard you speak in a private setting very emotionally and passionately about the need to take responsibility and take action that will assure accountability. And I know that you share a commitment, along with Director Abbate, to full public disclosure to the maximum extent possible. We can make speeches at you. And I have made one myself in that

private setting about the need for broader, fuller disclosure to the public, not just in press conferences, but in the course of your investigation, about what you know and feel you can disclose without compromising your investigation.

Let me ask you. Last week, Senator Peters and Paul, along with Senator Johnson and myself, sent requests to both of your agencies to produce documents. We have only received a handful so far. Can you commit to when we can expect those documents?

[11:45:03]

ROWE: We will get them to you as quickly as we can, Senator. And we're --

BLUMENTHAL: Well, can we expect them this week?

ROWE: We will work to get -- to meet that deadline, sir.

BLUMENTHAL: And when can we expect all the communications, the text messages that agents have sent to each other? Eventually, all of it is going to come out, as you know.

When can we expect all of those documents?

ROWE: We will gather them up and get them to you, Senator.

BLUMENTHAL: You, I think, took the position as to the local law enforcement responsible for the shooter on the roof, the snipers that were in place, that it was their job to take him out.

But, ultimately, doesn't the buck stop with the Secret Service?

ROWE: It stops with us, sir.

But let me just clarify. The perspective that they had on that roof, when I show you the perspective from when our sniper saw, he's on the downside of that ridged roof. Their perspective from the AGR building, looking out, their area of responsibility, looking left, they should have been able to see.

You can see in that photo in exhibit A, which we will make part of the record and turn over to the committee, he's already crossed over that bridge or the walkway and stepped up onto that roof. I'm not saying that they should have neutralized him, but if they'd had just held their post and looked left, maybe -- and there's a lot of maybes there, Senator -- maybe he would have been detected.

BLUMENTHAL: A lot of maybes, but somebody needs to be held accountable.

And I think Senator Graham hit the nail on the head. We need to know who specifically was responsible for doing what? Who was responsible for saying to former President Trump, sir, it's not safe to go out there yet? Who was responsible for making sure that those local law enforcement were doing their job? Who was responsible for tracking down that suspicious person who fit the profile, 10 to 25 years old, young male. The FBI has warned us about it. Year after year after year, Director Wray has come before us and said: The threat is from domestic extremism, the lone gunman. We're all aware of it in law enforcement.

So I think we need individual accountability here, and people need to be held responsible, in fact, lose their jobs, if necessary, to send a message that this massive intelligence and surveillance failure, as well as the enforcement failure, cries out for accountability.

Let me just ask in the short time I have left, what is the nature of the Iran threat?

PAUL ABBATE, FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR: I'm sorry, Senator, can you repeat the question?

BLUMENTHAL: What is the nature of the Iran threat, the threat to former President Trump that has been mentioned --

(CROSSTALK)

ABBATE: Well, we know that -- let me be clear here. The terrorist regime of Iran have been targeting people, our country for many, many years now. We have talked about that here before. I want to be clear about that.

From the FBI's standpoint, we have -- we know, publicly, they have put -- they have targeted former President Trump. They have called for his assassination, along with other current and former government officials.

BLUMENTHAL: Was there a specific --

ABBATE: That's public information.

(CROSSTALK)

ABBATE: -- everyone.

BLUMENTHAL: Was there a specific or imminent threat on July 13?

ABBATE: We have no information that there are any co-conspirators or that -- foreign or domestic, including Iran, related to this.

But we're not -- I want to be clear, we have no evidence of that. We're not ruling anything out. We're looking into all possibilities and leaving our minds open to that.

BLUMENTHAL: Was that on the minds of the Secret Service on July 13, that there might be some threat from Iran?

ROWE: Sir, we -- as Deputy Director Abbate said, we're aware of the public -- the public sentiment and statements of the government of Iran to do harm to Donald J. Trump, and we use a threat-based model. [11:50:11]

BLUMENTHAL: Thank you. Thanks, Mr. President.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Senator Ossoff, you're recognized for your questions.

SEN. JON OSSOFF (D-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for your testimony today and for your service.

Mr. Rowe, I want to begin discussing Secret Service staffing and the extent to which HSI or other personnel are augmenting or backfilling inadequate Secret Service capacity generally and on the day of the assassination attempt.

To what extent are HSI personnel, for example, filling close protection roles that would normally or optimally be filled by Secret Service personnel?

ROWE: So, thank you, Senator, for that question.

So, as we have done, even back when we were with Treasury, we enlist during campaign years the assistance of other law enforcement agencies in that department. So, when we were in Treasury, we used ATF. We used IRS:CI.

When we transferred over to the Department of Homeland Security, we have brought that practice with us. So, going into a campaign year or during a national special security event like the United Nations General Assembly, we will enter into a memorandum of assistance for the campaign with HSI.

HSI will provide post-standers, essentially federal agents, law enforcement, to be able to help secure a site. When it comes to close protection, the only time that we were -- we will utilize them is during a United Nations General Assembly, where they may be utilized to protect a low-level head of state or provide security at a hotel in New York City where those protectees are staying.

OSSOFF: So, on the day in question, all of the former president's close protection detail were full-time Secret Service personnel?

ROWE: They were, and they were assigned to the Donald Trump detail.

OSSOFF: OK.

Interoperability with other federal and state and local law enforcement agencies, specifically, on communications, what have you determined to date played a role in failures to swiftly communicate between agencies the suspicion or identification of a threat?

ROWE: I think there was a delay in reporting, not having that real time. So, as they were closing in on him, as information is known, as --

OSSOFF: Be more specific. When who were closing in on him? ROWE: As local law enforcement were closing in on him, as he is seen

scurrying across the roof, right, that information -- and we are getting to the bottom of that. We are working on trying to figure out, what was the delay. Why didn't we hear that coming out of the unified command?

So, based on the information I have right now, what I can tell you, Senator, is that, apparently, not having that real-time information is what really hindered us in being able to understand more than it was just the locals working an issue at the 3:00. There was actually a little bit something more urgent than that.

OSSOFF: Does it appear that that is due to a lack of communications links between relevant officials and agencies or poor communications practices and a failure to report?

ROWE: I don't want to rule out -- I want to have a neutral opinion that. So I don't know if it was poor practices.

I can tell you that the interoperability, having the -- not being able to have that technical fix, which is a lofty goal to be able to do that, is something that has been a hindrance. But that's why we use a counterpart system.

OSSOFF: So, there, in fact, is not the capability -- when an intergovernmental interagency team is deployed to secure a site like this and to mount if necessary a quick reaction, there is not currently the capability for, for example, state law enforcement SWAT personnel or local law enforcement officers to communicate directly with Secret Service officers on site?

ROWE: So, there -- technically, you could do it, but it would take a long time to get it done. And for a one-day or an eight-hour operation, it requires a lot.

And it would be months of planning, of knowing that we are going to go to this particular jurisdiction and that we are going to need your frequencies, the keys, and we are going to need to load you into our radios and you are going to be needed to load it into ours and vice versa.

OSSOFF: Right.

Well, this presents potentially, I think, an opportunity for the Homeland Security Committee, not just in an executive protection context, but any complex incident response, any counterterrorism, any natural disaster context. The inability swiftly to link personnel from disparate jurisdictions at the local, state and federal level is a vulnerability for the nation, is it not?

[11:55:17]

ROWE: I would think -- and based on my experience, being able to talk to other agencies in real time certainly would assist in that response.

OSSOFF: Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more question?

DURBIN: No. Yes.

OSSOFF: Thank you.

I know others have touched on this. One of the things that has been most baffling to the public has been the failure to fully --

BROWN: You have been watching special coverage of this hearing on the assassination attempt of Donald Trump.

I'm Pamela Brown.

"INSIDE POLITICS WITH DANA BASH" starts after a quick break.