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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Benjamin Netanyahu Warns of Long War in Lebanon. Interview With Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Retired Admiral James Stavridis; Interview With Journalist And Writer Malcolm Gladwell; Interview With Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired October 13, 2024 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:48]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, as an anxious Middle East awaits Israel's next move, will talk to Richard Haass and Randa Slim about what a strike against Iran could lead to. We'll also discuss Israel's operations in Lebanon that are drawing international outrage.

Plus Admiral James Stavridis on the other war in Ukraine. What is the way out of that deadlock. And Malcolm Gladwell on what he learned when he revisited his mega bestseller, "The Tipping Point," 25 years after writing it.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take."

As tensions spiral in the Middle East, keep in mind that this is only one of three arenas in the world where regional or global players are trying to upend the international order. In Europe, a war continues to rage and in Asia, a dangerous new dynamic is at work. Taken together they define the most dangerous period internationally since the end of the Cold War.

In the Middle East, the current tensions are rooted in a tussle between Iran and America's allies, Israel and some of the Gulf states. Iran being a relatively weak power has used asymmetrical means, through a series of militias allied with it, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and groups in Iraq and Syria it has supported and supplied for years. Even before Hamas's attack last October 7th, these groups had kept up a steady stream of small bore attacks on Israel and on occasion, the Gulf monarchies.

The effect of this pressure has been real, keeping Israel and the Gulf Arabs on guard and the region on edge. Since October 7th, tensions have made normal commerce much harder. About 70 percent of vessel traffic has been diverted from the Red Sea region as of June. Many airlines have stopped flying to Israel for the time being. Emirates, the Dubai-based airline, has recently canceled some flights to Iran and Iraq. Another Houthi attack on Saudi oil facilities would send oil prices skyrocketing.

If the current Middle Eastern order is under pressure so is the one in Europe. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a traditional war of aggression using the means Russia has aplenty, traditional military power. But it's also an effort to upend the Western-led European security system that is underwritten and dominated by the United States.

Were Russia to succeeded in its aggression, that would significantly erode the entire structure of stability in Europe created after 1945 and expanded after 1989. Putin would press to have Russia's imperial ambitions accommodated in places like Georgia, Moldova, and perhaps the Baltic States, and even Poland.

In Asia, we are also facing a rising threat that has gotten somewhat unnoticed. Robert Manning, a veteran American diplomat, writes these words in "Foreign Policy."

"I have worked on the Korean nuclear problem in and out of government over the past three decades and the Korean Peninsula seems more dangerous and volatile than at any time since 1950."

Ever since the failed summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, the latter has adopted a policy of greater bellicosity. In 2021, Kim announced a major expansion and modernization of his nuclear arsenal. In January, Manning points out he announced the end of a 70-year-old goal for his country, reunification with South Korea, which had always placed some restraints on North Korea's potential military actions.

Now that Kim has designated South Korea as the principal enemy, ordered the destruction of a reunification monument built by his father and shuttered the agencies that plan for reunification, this could signal a greater willingness to risk war.

[10:05:02]

In Asia, more broadly, China has been applying pressure, mostly economic but also military, to rival or even replace America as that region's dominant power. Those tensions are of course greatest around Taiwan, but exists in several hotspots from the Philippines to the South China Sea.

If all this were not troubling enough, there are now increasing indications that this axis of revisionist powers is coordinating and helping one another. "The Economist" points out that this quartet of chaos is actively swapping weapons, supplies, and most importantly, know-how. Iran and North Korea supply Russia with drones, while Russia shares information with Tehran on how to jam drones and disable GPS systems.

It sends seized Western military weaponry to Tehran so that you can analyze the kits. The U.S. government estimates that 90 percent of Russia's microelectronics imports and 70 percent of its machine tools now come from China. Much of this being dual use, meaning it can be used to make weapons.

The U.S. and its allies must strive to thwart these efforts at coordination. But this will require that they themselves be unified in their policies. Above all they should try to drive wedges between these countries, which have long histories of suspicion and tension among them. China in particular is somewhat unlike the other three nations. Those rogue regimes actively seek to foment instability largely because they have little to lose from disorder.

China, on the other hand, benefits immensely from economic trade and interdependence. It has risen to power thanks to globalization and peace guaranteed by the current international system. China's assistance to Russia shows that Beijing is willing to unsettle the world order, but not necessarily upend it.

The last time the United States faced in lines of hostile powers during the Cold War, it effectively sow discord within the communist world, maintaining good relations with countries like Yugoslavia and Romania. And above all, dividing China from the Soviet Union. But in a Washington that today sees the world in black and white, I wonder if we have the diplomatic skill and acuity to pursue a sophisticated strategy like that one.

Go to CNN.com/Fareed for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. And let's get started.

Israel's war in Lebanon has intensified. Five U.N. peacekeepers were injured in Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon over the past few days. The U.N. secretary-general said these attacks were a violation of International Humanitarian Law. Prime Minister Netanyahu demanded that the U.N. remove its peacekeepers immediately from, quote, "Hezbollah strongholds and the combat zones," unquote.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah, while severely weakened, is not out. Over this weekend, it has launched hundreds of projectiles into Israeli territory. Hovering above all this is the near certainty that Israel is going to strike Iran directly soon.

Joining me now are Randa Slim, conflict resolution director at the Middle East Institute, and Richard Haass, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Randa, let me start with, you. You were born in Lebanon. You have family there. Tell me what is going on there, and what do you make, not of Israeli operations which seem at a tactical level to be very effective. But Prime Minister Netanyahu's now stated goal which he said in the speech, which is that he was asking the Lebanese people to rise up and get rid of Hezbollah. Is that possible?

RANDA SLIM, NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, JOHNS HOPKINS SAIS: Which is a recipe for civil war. The Israeli strike back in 1982 to impose a Pax Israeliana on Lebanon during that invasion of Lebanon. That proxy, Mr. Ishmael, was assassinated. As a result of that, Hezbollah was formed in 1982 and a much more potent enemy to Israel than the PLO, which was kicked out of Lebanon at the time as a result of the invasion. And then we had the U.S. paid a heavy price for that, 241 service members were assassinated in a suicide bomb by a group Islamic Jihad at the time, now we know it is Hezbollah.

The war does not seem to be limited. In fact, if you look at the military evacuation order issued by the Israelis they go into villages as far as 40 kilometers north of the blue line, which is the unofficial border between Israel and Lebanon. You have already 1.1 million Lebanese displaced inside the country on top of the 1.2 million Syrian refugees and more than 200,000 Palestinian refugees.

[10:10:12]

There is no safe area in Lebanon right now. Strikes, Israeli strikes are, you know, not only in southern Lebanon, not only in southern suburbs of Beirut. It is in the north. It's in the northeast, in the Beqaa. It's even in the capital. They are targeting residential neighborhoods, arguing that Hezbollah members or Hezbollah offices exist, but still, according to international law, they have the responsibility, they have the, you know, the legal responsibility to avoid civilian casualties, even while targeting Hezbollah and Hezbollah officers or Hezbollah figures.

And the death toll in the last two weeks we have had more than 2,000 people killed. Most of them are civilians, women, and children. Unfortunately, I don't see either side willing to end this at this point, although we have a short window of opportunity to pivot away from the military operations into a diplomatic process.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you, Richard. In Israel, I think there's overwhelming consensus that this was something they had to do because Hezbollah had been raining projectiles on them. How do you see it?

RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: It was something Israel had to do and it's something Israel had the right to do. Lebanon has the sovereign obligation to make sure its territory is not used by itself or anyone else, in this case Hezbollah, to attack other countries. They're unable to fulfill that sovereign obligation. So to me, Israel had every right to go in.

Israel has now realized its initial war aims. You have Hezbollah saying, we are prepared for a ceasefire. They have delinked that from a ceasefire in Gaza. The whole Israeli national security goal is to allow 60,000 to 70,000 Israelis who are moved back after October 7th, to move back to their homes, presumably that can happen.

What's happening now, though, Fareed, is really interesting. In the midst of war, Israel is essentially up its war aims, reminds me a little bit of what happened to the United States and Korea after we pushed back the north to the 38th parallel, we said, maybe now we can go further.

ZAKARIA: I thought of the same. And so the hubris of having succeeded is making them push. Do you think the danger is then they do get mired in a civil war?

HAASS: I think the danger is overreach and the idea that you can, quote-unquote, "eliminate" Hezbollah, that you can divorce it entirely from the population. Now again, Hezbollah is a foreign entity to some extent. It's an instrument of Iranian policy. But I think the danger in Israeli policy is the elimination goal to get a Lebanon strong enough and willing to oust Hezbollah, I think is unrealistic.

ZAKARIA: And they are -- correct me if I'm wrong, they do represent the Shia who are the single largest minority. I mean, the plurality in Lebanon, right?

SLIM: Exactly. I mean, unlike 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon to kick out the PLO, PLO was a foreign implant into the country. They did not have much of a supporting milieu. Hezbollah is a Lebanese militant group, is a Lebanese political party that has supporting milieu in the Shia community. You know, they have also engaged in hubris and arrogance since 2006 after they brought the war with Israel to a stalemate.

But I mean, you cannot marginalize Hezbollah. You cannot marginalize the Shia from any kind of political process going forward.

ZAKARIA: So let me ask you then. In that case, is there some -- you know, people talk about getting back to the U.N. resolution, which both sides argue the other side has violated. Is that a possibility?

HAASS: My guess is the U.N. Resolution 1701 is too ambitious as it calls among things, should the demilitarization, the disarmament of all groups. But could you get back to a situation where Hezbollah essentially moves north, where Israel could once against safely realistically puts its people back in the northern reaches of Israel? Yes. Real question is, what is the extent, what is the ambition of Israeli war aims? And that's what this is about.

ZAKARIA: And when we come back, stay with us, we're going to answer Richard Haass' question, but as it relates to Iran. What is Israel's war aim against Iran? And what is Iran's likely response when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:18:49]

ZAKARIA: It has been nearly two weeks since Iran launched almost 200 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for several high-profile assassinations in recent months. Israeli Defense minister Yoav Gallant said this week that Israel's response to the attack would be powerful, precise and above all surprising.

We're back with Randa Slim, conflict resolution director at the Middle East Institute, and Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Richard. Bibi Netanyahu in addition to giving a speech calling on the Lebanese to rid themselves of Hezbollah, also gave a speech calling on the Iranian people to away -- you know, to rid themselves of the Iranian regime. What is the goal of an Israeli strike in Iran? And what should it be?

HAASS: What you raised, Fareed, is the question. We don't know what the goal is. It's arranged from the most. Shall we say, to the wildly ambitious and I would put regime change is not a strategy, but a wish. At a minimum it's to restore deterrence, because that's broken down again with Iran. The real question then is, how much more than -- what does it take, for example, will the Israelis attack, for example, military sites where they produce and store the kinds of rockets and drones that have attacked Israel.

[10:20:05]

That to me has a germaneness. a relevance to it. Do they get more ambitious and think about economic targets, something the United States and much of the world would not welcome. the Saudis would not welcome because they could be a target. Will they tried to do something on the nuclear program? Well, how much can they really accomplish on their own?

ZAKARIA: What should they do?

HAASS: I would say they should go after military targets. These conventional sites where they produce, where the Iranians produce and store weapons.

Let me -- I think the Israelis probably should be thinking about threading the needle. They want to restore deterrence. They want to diminish Iran's ability either directly or through its proxies to attack Israel. But Iran is still sitting on close to 3,000 ballistic missiles. Iran has lots of tools at its disposal against Israel and against the region. So I would say the Israelis want to respond, but not necessarily put in motion something where the Iranian say OK, well, if the Israelis are going all out then we're going to go all out.

ZAKARIA: Do you think the Iranians would view am Israeli strikes. Sau. on military issues as a kind of a beginning of a de-escalation or is there a real danger that Iran feels like it has to now escalate?

SLIM: I think there is a real danger of a succession of tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes, partly because the risk tolerance of the Iran regime has changed. You know, when they decided in April that the risk -- the cost of inaction outweigh the risks of a regional war dragging the U.S. into it. And then in April, they launched those ballistic missiles and drones. And now, you know, in October, they repeated that because they felt that a pre-strike did not restored deterrence.

Like the Israelis, I think both of these belligerents, Iran and Israel, are in the process of renegotiating red lines. Those red lines that existed before and regulated the rivalry have been upended. And partly again, I think the decapitation of Hezbollah leadership, which has been the linchpin of Iran's resistance axis. and the primary deterrent for Iran against direct Israel strikes on its territory.

I think that has changed that calculus. On the Israeli side, I'm afraid that the prime minister might be seeing and his right-wing ministers this as the unique opportunity to achieve or to go into what many Israelis say it was an inevitable war, the big war, going after the source. And so they see this as a unique opportunity given the political moment we are in the U.S. They know that we will come to their defense no matter what.

ZAKARIA: Richard, I think the way many Israelis see this, maybe not the government, but look, we've had this amazing success with Hezbollah. Our plan worked better than we could have hoped. Why don't we just press our advantage, take tactical success after tactical success against both Hezbollah and Iran? Who knows where it will lead? By the way, the world hates us anyway, they're going to criticize us anyway, the only country that matters is the U.S. and the U.S. is not going to stop us three weeks before an election. So just battle to the metal, you know, just see what happens.

HAASS: You may well be right, and that might end up being the dominant Israeli policy both in Lebanon, conceivably in Iran. It already is to some extent in Gaza. The problem with all of this, Fareed, is if you add up tactics, tactics, and tactics, it doesn't get you to a strategy. And none of these situations and none of these venues do I see a definition of victory, of war termination? What exactly are you prepared to settle for? What price are you prepared to pay or do you want to avoid? Because Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas all still have tools they can bring to bear.

I just don't see anyone in Israel who's looking at this in its totality and say, how much is enough? What can we accomplish at this point at a reasonable price? That's a dangerous thing to be missing.

ZAKARIA: And finally, it seems to be, Randa, that one of the mistakes that America makes and that Israel is now making is they say a lot of things about Hezbollah being -- having taken over the Lebanese state which is correct, what Hamas, you know, having taken over Gaza. But the idea that a foreign army, that an Israeli army will be the instrument of the liberation of the Lebanese people or the Iranian people seems to me forgets nationalism doesn't work like that, right?

SLIM: Exactly. And the longer this war in Lebanon continuous, in fact, it's going to create more opportunities for Hezbollah to reassert itself politically and militarily. Already there are reports of them starting a recruitment process and of people wanting to join them partly because of the opposition to the Israeli invasion. Remember, these are people whose villages are being destroyed and they're going to put everything they've got and entrench Israel in long, bloody, protracted fight.

Instead of Israel capitalizing on the tactical gains it has achieved, it's going to be drawn into a long-term occupation.

[10:25:01]

ZAKARIA: Fascinating. Thank you both very much.

Next on GPS, we will turn to another bloody conflict in Ukraine. I'll ask the former NATO Supreme commander, Admiral James Stavridis, what could bring about a ceasefire there.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: As the Middle East dominates headlines, it's very important to remember the other grinding conflict in Ukraine. Two and a half years on, Russia controls roughly a fifth of Ukraine's territory. Meanwhile, Ukraine still holds that slice of Russian territory it captured this summer. So what are the hopes of a settlement and a lasting peace?

I want to bring in Admiral James Stavridis. He was NATO's Supreme Allied commander between 2009 to 2013. And unlike most military leaders, he is also an accomplished writer of fiction. His latest novel, which is a must read, is called "The Restless Wave."

Jim, I've got to ask you because we have you about Ukraine.

ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS (RET.), FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER OF NATO: Sure.

ZAKARIA: When you look at it right now, you know, there's a lot of concern that the Russians are gaining ground, that Ukraine is holding on to these parts of the Donbass, and it's very fragile. What does it look like to you?

STAVRIDIS: It looks a lot to me, unfortunately, like the end of the Korean War. What I mean by that is it seems highly unlikely that Vladimir Putin is going to be dislodged from the 20 percent of Ukraine he currently holds. As a result of that, we ought to begin thinking about a negotiation, an armistice, freeze the frame. Perhaps in the time ahead, the Ukrainians can renegotiate for that lost portion. But the real goal, Fareed, is to get the rest of Ukraine sailing on free democratic part of NATO, part of the European Union.

ZAKARIA: So, we'll get to that second part in a bit. But first I want to ask you, the Ukrainians believe very strongly that they can still gain more momentum, more advantage, that this is part of what they've asked President Biden for. And one of the things they keep asking for is this ability to strike into Russia itself, to use -- you know, if Russia is launching missiles from Russian territory, they should be able to strike those bases.

So, I've talked to administration officials. They believe this is not as big a deal as the Ukrainians make it out. That the Russians could pull those guns back, that this is more symbolic. What do you think?

STAVRIDIS: I think militarily, I would want to take the shackles off Ukraine and that's both militarily important because the Ukrainians can strike into deep targets that are airbase long-range missile strikes. That's a real military target.

And by the way, if you're forcing the Russians to push those 500 miles away, they become ineffective. So, I think it is a big deal. We ought to unleash the Ukrainians. Tell them, don't go to Moscow, don't go after civilian population centers. But military targets, 300 or so miles into Russia makes both symbolic and military sense.

ZAKARIA: So, now let's get to the issue of Ukraine. You were the supreme allied commander in NATO. How would you provide us a NATO membership to a country when, you know, a fifth of its territory is occupied by Russia? Does that mean the minute Ukraine joins NATO, it is -- now -- NATO is now at war with Russia because Russia and Ukraine are still kind of warring on that front?

STAVRIDIS: I think this is why it's crucial that we have a negotiation that gets to an armistice. If we can stop the hostilities, have a cease-fire with an armistice, perhaps agreed roughly along the lines that exist now, I think, that is the key that would unlock the door to bring Ukraine into NATO. And there might be a halfway house, Fareed. You might start with a security guarantee, that short of a full membership.

But I think over time NATO wants Ukraine inside NATO. And I'll tell you why. When this is over Ukraine will have the most highly blooded technologically capable and innovative land force in Europe. We want them on team NATO.

ZAKARIA: When you talk about moving toward a negotiation you need two sides to negotiate.

STAVRIDIS: Yes.

ZAKARIA: Do you think Putin is ready? What would make him ready and isn't he waiting perhaps for the outcome of the November election?

STAVRIDIS: A hundred percent. He's waiting for the outcome of the election because he sees a real difference. And I think it's a realistic expectation on his part. President Trump -- former President Trump has been very skeptical of Ukraine. Whereas Vice President Harris has been very supportive.

But what is pushing Putin toward a negotiation are his losses, his attrition. He has lost probably 1 million young Russian men, 200,000 killed in action, 400,000 grievously wounded, 600,000 have left the country in order to avoid the draft. None of that is good for Russia long-term. He knows that. I think he would be willing to negotiate on the basis of where we are now after the election.

ZAKARIA: Always a pleasure to hear from you, Jim.

STAVRIDIS: Thank you, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: For more on Admiral Stavridis' new book, "The Restless Wave," go to CNN.com/Fareed for an extended interview about it.

[10:35:08]

Next on GPS, it has been nearly 25 years since Malcolm Gladwell's debut book "The Tipping Point" became an international sensation. Now, he has revisited that mega bestseller in the form of a fascinating new book. I'll ask him all about it when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:40:04]

ZAKARIA: Why do certain trends gain momentum, while others fall flat? What makes an idea go viral? This was the phenomenon that journalist and writer Malcolm Gladwell explored in his immensely popular debut book "The Tipping Point" in 2000.

Now nearly a quarter of a century later, he has revisited many of the themes of that first book in a fascinating new one, "Revenge of the Tipping Point."

ZAKARIA: Malcolm Gladwell, always a pleasure.

MALCOLM GLADWELL, AUTHOR, "REVENGE OF THE TIPPING POINT": Thank you, Fareed. Happy to be here.

ZAKARIA: So, you've done something very unusual. I can't think of a famous author who has done this. You've revisited your most famous book, "The Tipping Point." Do you even know how many copies it sold around the world?

GLADWELL: A fair number, yes.

ZAKARIA: I mean, in the millions and millions and millions.

GLADWELL: Yes.

ZAKARIA: Why did you do it?

GLADWELL: Well, it was the 25th anniversary. And I thought, why not? That's sort of fun. And you're right. I hadn't heard of another writer -- you know, people do sequels, but they didn't right away. I hadn't heard of someone going back a quarter-century. So, I just thought it would be fun.

And when I re-read the original one, I just realized I didn't -- the original -- it was just to kind of update it and then, no, no, no. I felt there was room for a lot more kind of complexity and nuance.

ZAKARIA: You have a great chapter called "The Mysterious Case of the Harvard Women's Rugby Team." What is that about?

GLADWELL: I could not resist. You know, I have an unhealthy obsession with, what's wrong with the Ivy League? So, I was trying to answer the question of, why does Harvard compete in more varsity sports than any other college in the country? And why do they give greater preferences at admissions to athletes than do any other group, right? It doesn't make any sense.

You would say, if I told you that was true of Clemson, you would say that makes -- no, no, no. It's not Clemson that's unhealthily obsessed with athletics. It's Harvard. The question is, why?

And I concoct this elaborate explanation to explain Harvard's behavior. I think either explicitly or implicitly they're using athletes in sports, you know, who are participating in, let's be clear, upper middle-class sports like fencing --

ZAKARIA: Lacrosse.

GLADWELL: -- sailing and rowing. They are using them to keep their -- to keep the Harvard culture intact. In other words, if you look at Caltech, Caltech, 100 years ago, was a Waspy school. Fifty years ago, it was a Jewish school and now it's an Asian school. It's a meritocracy and it just changes with every new meritocratic wave.

And my prediction is in 20 years, it's a Nigerian school, right? It makes sense. But if you don't want that to happen, you have to take steps, Machiavellian steps to demand -- you know, Harvard didn't want the Jews to take over in the 20s. They didn't want the Asians to take over in the 90s and odds. And they don't want -- I'm guessing the Nigerians to take over --

ZAKARIA: You make the point that, you know, the -- one of the central activities of the American establishment is social engineering.

GLADWELL: Yes.

ZAKARIA: What do you mean by that?

GLADWELL: I mean, controlling who gets in and out. In a kind of -- in a kind of gross 19th century kind of way. I think that there is still very much an attempt by certain institutions in this society to police who gets in and to be -- to be on some level quite Machiavellian in what their make up -- or how they keep their culture intact. That's really the issue here.

I don't know whether -- I wouldn't call it racism. I would say it's something else. It is -- there's a certain thing called Harvard-ness, or Yale-ness, or Princeton-ness, that those schools are anxious to hold onto. And that means that they don't want to just let in every immigrant off the boat.

ZAKARIA: Do you think that -- these kinds of mechanisms account for some of the, you know, the animosity, the outrage that people feel mostly on the MAGA right toward, you know, urban, liberals, these institutions?

GLADWELL: Yes, I mean, noted today. Absolutely, I noted that California banned legacy admissions at all California schools. And legacy admissions are -- I mean, the kind of thing that would inflame an outsider trying to -- trying to climb the ranks.

Why would we -- Adam Grant has a wonderful idea, which was he thinks that legacy admissions should work in the opposite way. If you have a parent who went to Harvard that should be a strike against you because you've already benefited from Harvard. So, why would they need to -- you should be -- you have to go back to the back of the line. I think that's actually a brilliant idea.

But no, it's that kind of thing, the kind of obviousness with which they are rewarding people with privilege is that's -- if the one -- if there's something that is absolutely central to what America is I believe that America has -- had the promise of -- had a bolder and clearer promise of meritocracy than any other industrialized country in history.

[10:45:21]

And we need to defend that. And to the extent we let that erode, it is to our great detriment.

ZAKARIA: I have to let you go, but I want to point out that it's an amazing book and it's an amazing thing that you tried to do, which is to go back. And we haven't talked about them but there are places where you say you were dead wrong and you own that and you talk about why -- all your books are fascinating but this -- for a Gladwell fan this is a must read.

GLADWELL: Thank you, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, remember Iraq where America was mired in conflict for more than 20 years? It often seems forgotten but Iraq holds an important place in the Middle East and we should all be paying more attention to it. When we come back, my conversation with that country's prime minister.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:50:49]

ZAKARIA: One might hope that Iraq today is safe and secure, a flourishing democracy, and a trusted ally of the U.S. after 20 years of conflict there and trillions of dollars spent. But that is not the case. The country's own prime minister has admitted that corruption is a huge problem. U.S. bases in Iraq have been attacked multiple times this year. And some believe that Iraq is today more allied with its neighbor Iran than with the United States.

I had the opportunity recently to sit down with the prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, when he was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Ever since you have taken office, you have called for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Yet the reason they are there, which is ISIS, seems to be a problem that has not gone away. ISIS has expanded its operations in Syria. There are even some accounts that it has made terror attacks within Iraq. Are you sure that if U.S. troops leave ISIS will not return as it did once in the past?

MOHAMMED SHIA AL-SUDANI, IRAQI PRIME MINISTER (through translator): My government has committed itself in front of the parliament to rearrange its relationship with the international alliance to fight ISIS. This alliance was formed because of an invitation by the Iraqi government in 2014. And this alliance achieved, with the help of Iraq and friends outside of the alliance, historical success by defeating ISIS.

The end of operation inherent resolve does not mean that Iraq will cut its relationships with the countries in the international alliance especially the United States. Rather, it will move forward with a bilateral security relationship based on the Iraqi constitution and law. ZAKARIA: It's 21 years now since the United States' operation in Iraq. But I think the concern most Americans would have is, we've spent a lot of blood and treasure in Iraq. We ended up with what is maybe somewhat democratic government but it's pro-Iranian. It is corrupt. It does not -- it does not, in any way, seem to embrace America and its interests. Are they right?

AL-SUDANI (through translator): This is not correct. The problem is, everybody looks at Iraq through its relationship with Iran. Yes, there is a tense relationship between the United States and Iran, and this is actually a problem on how to manage this relationship.

Iran is a neighboring country. We have a lot in common culturally, religiously, and socially. And they supported us and the political process, and supported our efforts against terrorism. Iraq and the United States have had a strategic framework agreement since 2008. And our mission and our role as a government is to activate this agreement, to have a relationship in the fields of economy, education, health, and technology instead of cooperating only in the security and military aspect.

ZAKARIA: Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, let me ask you, you yourself come from a background of where you have been persecuted under Saddam Hussein. I think you lost many members of your family who were executed by Saddam.

You are now prime minister. What do you want your legacy to be? What do you want to leave Iraq with if you are successful?

AL-SUDANI (through translator): Certainly, if somebody goes through injustice, he will be very keen to not put someone through injustice as well especially in a position like mine as the prime minister of the government of my country Iraq.

[10:55:12]

All I hope for is to be in service of Iraq and Iraqis, and to put Iraq first in all our policies which are built on respecting others and building balanced relationships.

ZAKARIA: Prime Minister, thank you for joining us.

AL-SUDANI: Thank you.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

If you ever miss a show, you can always listen to my podcast. Go to CNN.com/Fareed for a link so you can listen on whatever app you use.

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