Return to Transcripts main page

Fareed Zakaria GPS

Trump Vows Tariffs on Eight Allies If No Greenland Deal Reached; Trump's Plan for Venezuela. Interview With Johns Hopkins SAIS Professor Narges Bajoghli; Interview With Former CEO And Chairman Of Goldman Sachs Lloyd Blankfein. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired January 18, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:54]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, we'll talk about Greenland, Iran, Venezuela and more with a great panel, Richard Haass and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

Then the Iranian revolution of 1979 deposed the shah and put in place the mullahs. Can the protesters reverse that in 2026? Are the elements in place for a counter revolution? I'll ask an expert.

And Fed chair Jerome Powell says the Justice Department's investigation of him is politically motivated. His extraordinary statement moved many politicians and businessmen to speak out against the probe. I'll ask the former Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, what he thinks.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take." For years now, Europe has been caricatured as too divided to act, too lethargic to decide, too comfortable to think strategically. Yet over the past year, Europe has behaved with a quiet shrewdness that contradicts that stereotype.

Faced with an unpredictable United States, it has neither lashed out nor capitulated. Instead, it has adapted. When President Trump returned to office and unleashed the country's highest tariffs in nearly a century, many expected Europe to retaliate. A transatlantic trade war would have fed inflation, disrupted supply chains and weakened already fragile growth. Europe resisted the temptation. It absorbed the pressure, avoided escalation and bought time.

That restraint prevented a downward global spiral. Then last week, Europe acted. After 25 years of stalled negotiations, E.U. countries approved a sweeping trade agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. If ratified, it will create one of the world's largest free trade zones by population. More than 700 million people. Nor is the outreach to Latin America an isolated move. In recent weeks

Brussels and Beijing have signaled that they have resolved a fresh set of trade frictions that had threatened to turn into a broader confrontation over EV subsidies and market access. Europe remains wary of China's industrial policies and its political system. But the E.U. now views China as a necessary partner.

At the same time, Europe has accelerated its outreach to Southeast Asia. The E.U. now has trade agreements in force with Singapore and Vietnam, has concluded negotiations with Indonesia and is pushing ahead with talks across the region. The region, by the way, is already the E.U.'s third largest trading partner outside Europe.

This instinct to diversify is spreading far beyond Europe. Consider Canada. For three decades, Ottawa made a clear strategic bet that its future lay in ever deeper integration with the United States. Economically, diplomatically, politically. More than 75 percent of Canadian goods exports flowed south in 2024. It was one of the most successful integration stories of the post-Cold War era.

That trust has now been shattered. Trump's tariffs, threats to reopen trade agreements and bizarre declarations about annexing Canada have forced a rethink. Canada's new prime minister, Mark Carney, has responded by openly seeking distance from Washington. Arriving in Beijing this week, Canada's foreign minister Anita Anand put it bluntly. It is necessary for us to diversify our trading partners and to grow non-U.S. trade by at least 50 percent over the next 10 years.

That is not hedging. It is a strategic reversal.

[10:05:00]

China's trade data revealed that the world is not de-risking from Beijing, but from Washington. Despite sharply reduced exports to the U.S., China's overall exports continue to rise. Its trade surplus surged to nearly $1.2 trillion in 2025, as shipments to Latin America, Africa, Europe and much of Asia expanded rapidly.

Tariffs did not wall China off from the world. They encouraged many countries to keep trading with Beijing. Public opinion reflects the shift. A major new poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations finds that in key emerging powers, India, Brazil, South Africa, the share of respondents who would prefer their country join an American led bloc rather than a Chinese one dropped by between 15 and 19 percentage points in just two years.

Among 10 European countries, only 16 percent now describe America as an ally. A majority still consider the U.S. a key partner, even as views of China remain mixed rather than warm. As Singapore's former foreign minister George Yeo put it recently, Trump is fast forwarding the future towards multipolarism.

What is at stake here is not America's image, but its future power. China is methodically building one of the most resilient economic ecosystems in modern history, dominating critical mineral processing, achieving scale in batteries and electric vehicles, and diversifying export markets to withstand shocks, sanctions and tariffs. The only credible U.S. response is not tariffs, which over the past year have coincided with declining manufacturing employment. But ecosystem building of our own.

The U.S. still has an extraordinary advantage. A vast network of allies and partners that together control most of the world's advanced technology, capital, skill, labor and consumer demand. In theory, that coalition could source critical materials from friendly countries, spread manufacturing across trusted partners, share research and anchor markets that remain open and predictable.

In practice, America has squandered much of that advantage by treating allies as transactional customers, weaponizing tariffs against them, and turning long standing commitments into shakedowns. Washington has encouraged others to hedge. Most extraordinarily, the U.S. is no longer the trendsetter. It is retreating to protectionism and nationalism while the world is searching for more trade and cooperation.

For decades, the global order was built on an American platform. Trade flowed through U.S. designed institutions. Security rested on U.S. guarantees. Crises were managed, for better or worse, by Washington. The global agenda was set in America. That platform still exists, but the world is no longer building on it. It is building around it.

Go to FareedZakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. And let's get started.

This week, President Trump announced additional 10 percent tariffs going to 25 percent on imports from several of America's closest allies, including the U.K., France and Germany. The move is part of his increasingly serious effort to pressure Denmark to give up the semi-autonomous territory of Greenland.

For more, I'm joined by two former top State Department officials. Richard Haass is the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, served as policy planning director under President George W. Bush. Anne-Marie Slaughter is the CEO of the think tank New America. She held the same job at the Obama State Department.

Richard, this strikes me as perhaps the greatest crisis in transatlantic relations because, I mean, you have a -- amid the NATO member state, the United States, essentially threatening to annex territory from another NATO member state. Where does it go from here?

RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: You know, Fareed, we talk about all sorts of difficult issues on your show, what to do about China, Gaza, Ukraine, Russia, Venezuela, what have you. This is not a difficult issue. Obviously, we want to have closer security and economic ties with Greenland. And I get it. That's why God invented diplomats.

Marco Rubio, the secretary of State, should simply be over there negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement. These tariffs, these threats, this mafia-like talk, you could be forgiven for thinking the United States wants to provoke a crisis with Europe. [10:10:09]

Europe has been the, shall we say, least favored part of the world for this administration since it took office almost a year ago. So the real question is whether the president backs down and we avoid, if you will, the crisis?

But even if that happens, Fareed, let's be honest, a lot of damage is already baked into the cake. I think essentially the Europeans -- this reinforces the European view that the United States is no longer a partner, can no longer be depended on, reinforces all the doubts that have emerged because of our policy towards Ukraine and Russia. Essentially, it's what you were just talking about in your opening statement.

This is just going to flip the perception of the United States as an ally, a partner, someone to work with. And increasingly, we're either someone to work around or even worse, work against.

ZAKARIA: Anne-Marie, when you look at this situation, what do you think the Europeans should do? What are their options?

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, CEO, NEW AMERICA: I think it's time for the Europeans to actually fight fire with fire. You know, your column this week talks about how they have resisted a trade war, how they've pursued a strategy, really, of broadening their own trade agreements. I agree with that. At this point I think they have to use what we call the bazooka, which is to impose 25 percent tariffs on the United States, maybe across the board, maybe only on the tech industry.

But they have to act as a unified body and they have to put -- to say enough. Otherwise, you know, it just gets pushed and pushed and pushed. And that's exactly what the president is counting on. At this point, you know, people laugh that he's the biggest force for European integration and since Jean Monnet. This is NATO. And I agree, I agree with Richard. I think the damage here for NATO is probably lasting no matter what happens. But if Europe really wants to say enough, they've got to really strike back hard.

ZAKARIA: Richard, why do you think -- you put it very well. This is the least favored part of the world for this administration. These are historically America's closest allies. Why does he hate Europe?

HAASS: It's almost cultural, Fareed. If you think about it. I actually think they look at Europe and they see an Ivy League university. They see it as the region of wokestan, of overregulation. And it stands for so many things that this administration opposes domestically. And this is their international thing.

Let me just answer one other thing that you asked Anne-Marie. What I think the Europeans ought to do is a version of what they did on Ukraine. You remember, they didn't like the 28-point plan, so they came up with a version, their own 20-point plan? I think the Europeans ought to go public working with Denmark and Greenland and make a totally reasonable proposal that gives the United States a lot of what it wants strategically and economically, in a way that's consistent, though, with Greenland's interests, and essentially fight this out a little bit in the court of public opinion. Embarrass this administration, make it easier for some of the people in Congress and elsewhere to distance themselves what I think is truly a ridiculous policy on the part of the Trump administration here.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you, you talk to Europeans a lot. It feels to me like there is a kind of shattering of trust that has taken place. I'm struck by the degree to which they just feel like they're, you know -- you know, all of these Europeans are so pro-American when you talk to them.

SLAUGHTER: I think the Europeans rightly now see that notwithstanding the traditional East Coast pro-transatlantic foreign policy makers, we are -- we've become a different country. And they, you know, they were all for Biden. But even under Biden, European leaders were worried about 2024. And even if the Dems were to win in 2028, I think Europe now sees that we've got a whole population that doesn't have World War I and World War II ties to Europe. That doesn't -- their families don't come from Europe, and they have a view that says, why are we, you know, why are we paying for European security?

ZAKARIA: But, you know, it's worth pointing out. Everything you said is true. 75 percent of Americans in the poll done two days ago oppose Trump's policy in Greenland. I mean, to me, it's extraordinary that this policy is being done without any public approval or, you know, I mean, this is -- we've got to go.

When we come back, I will ask the panel about Donald Trump's approach to Venezuela and Iran when we get back.

[10:15:07]

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: The idea of regime change is back at the center of American foreign policy as the U.S. weighs how to deal with governments in Venezuela and Iran. To discuss, I'm back with my great panel, Richard Haass and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

Richard, Venezuela is an odd case of, quote-unquote, "regime change," right? Because you got rid of Maduro in what I call the most expensive arrest in human history. Must have been $20 billion to get that one guy. But the entire regime is in place and more repressive than ever. So what is the plan there?

[10:20:04]

HAASS: Well, you've got it exactly right. It's not regime change. It's leadership change in a very narrow -- it's one person got swapped out. The number two became number one. In some ways, Fareed, it was as if they read the playbook of what the United States did wrong in Iraq after 2003, and decided they were going to do just the opposite. So this is not no disbanding of anything. Essentially, Venezuela today is what Venezuela was a few weeks ago with one person out.

And what they're hoping they can do is have a narrow, transactional relationship with the new leadership that would allow American companies to get involved in the production and export of Venezuelan oil. So this is -- this is a carve out within the preexisting Venezuela. It's a repudiation of regime change.

And by the way, the opposition has been sidelined. Indeed, the administration has made the decision. Regime change would be too risky, too costly. We can't do it from afar. So as a result, the president was more than happy to accept a Peace Prize. But the leader of the opposition, again, is sitting on the sidelines.

ZAKARIA: So what does the United States get out of this massive Venezuelan operation, other than some American oil companies may be able to go back. But as the CEO of Exxon said, Venezuela is right now uninvestable because the amount of money you'd have to put in, and then there's a simple math that an oil executive explained to me, which is it costs $80 to extract oil out of Venezuela. The current market price for oil is $60. He said until that changes, you're not going to see a huge investment in Venezuelan oil.

SLAUGHTER: So I think that's right. I'm not certain politically that gets through. I think for many of Trump's supporters, he's gone back in, he's reclaimed American property. I think that's actually a theme that for certainly Miami voters, Florida voters, ex-Cuba, you know, the Cuban diaspora says next might be Cuba. We're going to go in, we're going to get back what is ours.

I think he's right in Venezuela, regime change would be absolutely impossible. What he wants is a government that will do deals with him, and he wants that. He's got that in Argentina. He's got -- if you look at the reactions to what happened in Venezuela, you know, there's strong opposition on the left. But he's got right-wing governments in Latin America, and he wants a kind of business friendly, open to deals.

He doesn't care about the corruption and he doesn't care about democracy. That's not part of what his national security strategy says we're looking for. We're looking for friendly governments.

ZAKARIA: So, Richard, when you apply that to Iran, why is Trump encouraging Iranian protests, and then saying, I'm not going to do anything about it, claiming that the Iranians have promised him they're not going to execute any more people, which, you know, all evidence suggests is not really true? Why encourage people to go out on the streets then?

HAASS: Well, the answer is we shouldn't be doing it, Fareed. It's irresponsible. We've put people at risk. I don't know if the president was misinformed, thinking that Iran was on the verge of a revolution or collapse or regime change. He encouraged people to come out. He then did not match his words with any actions.

And, you know, two thoughts are possible at the same time, Fareed. It's possible that Iran is more vulnerable to collapse than at any time since the 1979 revolution. But at the same time, it's not on the verge of collapse. The security forces are intact. They're loyal to the regime. The opposition, as you know, is deeply fragmented. It's weak. The United States can't promote regime change or anything like it from offshore.

We're not going to go invade a country of 92 million people. So I don't know what playbook the president was operating from. But right now, I think what you see is a significant American pullback, which given where we are, is maybe not the worst thing, but we need to recalibrate. And what we need is a serious long-term strategy for trying to rein in Iranian capabilities that are threatening to the region and perhaps over time to promote reform and evolution within Iran. But there's no quick, easy American solution here.

ZAKARIA: Richard Haass, Anne-Marie Slaughter, always such a pleasure to talk to you.

Next on GPS, more on the protests in Iran. Can they topple this regime?

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:29:13]

ZAKARIA: Yesterday, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei admitted that thousands had been killed in the recent unrest in his country. He put the blame for those deaths on the shoulders of President Trump for encouraging the protesters. In response to Khamenei's speech, President Trump said in an interview it is time to look for new leadership in Iran.

Will this sustained pressure crack the regime?

Joining me to discuss is Narges Bajoghli. She is a professor at Johns Hopkins University.

Pleasure to have you on. Tell me, when you look at this situation, it does feel like a broader set of protests than before, deeper, and the Iranian regime is very weak, battered by Israeli strikes, American strikes, battered by an economy that is doing terribly. The currency has plunged. So does it mean that they are genuinely vulnerable?

NARGES BAJOGHLI, PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS SAIS: Well, the reality is, is that Iranians are extremely angry at the economic situation and the political situation. They are backed against a wall where they know that the economic situation is not going to get better unless there is significant concessions that are made in foreign policy, because much of the economic situation, it is due to, yes, economic mismanagement, but also severe U.N. and U.S. sanctions on the country.

These uprisings that have taken place, they have been squashed in a very, very violent manner. And so, far things seem to be calm but the underlying issues have not been resolved. And until those are there will be, you know, more uprisings and more protests to come into the future. That's sort of the nature of Iran's society.

Now, if we're trying to think about, is this going to lead to some kind of regime collapse or regime change, what we have to see is that so far all indications point to the fact that the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's various paramilitary and security forces have actually cracked down with a vengeance. There does not seem to be any kind of pulling away from the establishment or any kind of, you know, coming away from following the orders of those in charge in Iran.

And then more importantly there is not a unified opposition with a clear sort of organizing across the country. And so, what you see is a lot of outpouring of anger but not necessarily any kind of movement that is organized to be able to take over and topple this regime at this moment.

ZAKARIA: So, what you're describing is kind of a regime that remains united that, you know, as you say, not only are the Revolutionary Guard able to issue orders which are followed, the guards, the army, everybody does what they're told, but there are no fissures or cracks within the elite, as far as we can tell. Though, there have been some -- you know, there have been some indications of a differences in policy.

What about, you know, the kind of the bazaar, as people used to say, when the shah was toppled, there was this, you know, this theory that what happened was the religious elements, the clerics joined hands with the bazaar, the traders of Iran. And that was a potent combination. Where is the Iranian bazaar right now?

BAJOGHLI: Yes. So because in this protest we saw the -- it came out of many bazaars closing their doors and calling and joining for strikes and protests. There has been a lot of hope that this is sort of a repeat of 1979.

But the fact of the matter is, is that the Islamic republic has systematically weakened the bazaar over the past 47 years. And in particular over the past nearly a decade of maximum pressure, sanctions on Iran, the bazaar has actually, in many ways, had to rely upon the Revolutionary Guard and the political elite in the country in order to bust through sanctions. So, it is not the independent economic powerhouse that it was in 1979. And that is very significant here.

The other component of this is that the -- what led to the 1979 revolution was years of organizing on the ground and movement building that brought in the different institutions of power in Iran. The institutions of power in modern Iranian history are the bazaar, as you mentioned, the clergy, civil society, the military, and in the past the monarchy.

During 1979, you had three of these different traditional power centers in Iran aligned to topple the monarchy. Currently, not only is the bazaar systematically weakened, especially under these kinds of sanctions, and made to rely upon the Revolutionary Guard and political elite to bust through sanctions, but also the clergy it is decentralized in Iran, and it does not have that kind of unifying leader like Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 revolution today.

So, we don't sort of see these institutions moving in a similar kinds of ways that would seriously challenge those who are in power in the current situation.

ZAKARIA: Narges Bajoghli, very important and interesting remarks. Thank you so much. Pleasure to have you on.

Next, Lloyd Blankfein on Trump v. Jerome Powell.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:39:37]

ZAKARIA: President Trump's long running crusade against Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell took a wild turn last week. In an unprecedented move, the Department of Justice launched a criminal investigation into the Fed chair over the central bank's $2.5 billion renovation of its headquarters.

Powell, who has avoided escalation with Trump for years, broke his silence. In a remarkable on camera public statement, he said the probe against him was a politically motivated attack meant to intimidate the independent institution he runs.

[10:40:09]

Joining me now to discuss is Lloyd Blankfein, the former CEO of Goldman Sachs. Lloyd, what was your reaction to this latest round, as I say, of Trump v. Powell?

LLOYD BLANKFEIN, FORMER CEO AND CHAIRMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS: Oh, I was, you know, quite saddened by it because in one -- in one shot he managed to do a lot of damage to the Fed. But of course it does a lot of damage to the Department of Justice as well, which is another which is another -- which is another institution that we should all take quite seriously, whose independence we should take quite seriously.

ZAKARIA: How would you explain to, you know, to kind of an average viewer, why is it so important that the Federal Reserve be able to do its work without having the president command it to do -- to do what he wants or she wants?

BLANKFEIN: We are a debtor country. We have to -- we have to appeal to creditors to lend us money.

And you just think of this. How does the U.S. default on its debt? The U.S. prints dollars. It could print as many dollars it wants. If it owes you dollars, you know they're going to pay you back dollars, but you don't know what those dollars are going to be worth.

The way the U.S. government can default, in effect, is by returning dollars that are inflated, that are -- that aren't as worth as much because the dollar is allowed to depreciate, or inflation is allowed to take down the purchasing power of the dollar. That's how the U.S. could default to its creditors.

Now, if you are considering lending money to the U.S. treasury you want to make sure that the dollar is going to be upheld, that the purchasing power of the dollar is going to be upheld and it's not going to be inflated away. And the way you do that is not by reliance on the political sector. You want a strong independent agency protecting the purchasing power of the dollar against inflation and against the depreciation of the value of the dollar against other currencies.

With the Fed not being independent, the agent that you're looking to, the agency that you're looking to, will not be on post. And so, the people who lend to you will either require a lot more in the way of interest rate so that they can -- you know, for the -- for the sake of the risk -- additional risk they're taking on or else they're not going to lend to you at all. And that has, by the way, even more implications, because at the end of the day, we're a reserve currency. The reason why we can run such big deficits and finance them is because people have been keeping their reserves in U.S. dollars. That's not going to go completely away, but we can increment our way to a much worse position.

ZAKARIA: And this is not just theoretical, right? When you -- I mean, I don't remember exactly when you started your career, but right around then Nixon pressures the then chairman of the Fed, Arthur Burns, to lower rates, goose the economy because he's worried about his reelection. And that is in part the reason why you ended up with terrible inflation in the -- in the 1970s.

BLANKFEIN: Sure, absolutely. And of course, the political sector will always look. Everybody wants to give away money, not pull money back from their constituents. So, the political sector is always going to want easy money, cheap money, you know, burgeoning money supply to accomplish their political goals.

It's baked in the cake. No one's -- no one's different. It's not a Trump thing or a Nixon thing or, you know, a Republican thing or a Democrat. It's kind of baked in -- that's kind of baked in. That's why we assign this responsibility to an independent agency, because people recognize the weakness of the of the political sector to be disciplined in the short term in order to achieve much longer term objectives.

ZAKARIA: Who do you think wins at the end of the day in this -- in this struggle, Trump or Powell?

BLANKFEIN: I think I know who will lose. I think the American economy and the markets will lose. And by the way, it'll be hard to reclaim once lost because inflationary expectations, once they become embedded they become part of the cycle. And they're hard to -- they're hard to pull away from.

But I think in this case, the response of even some of the Republican senators who have routinely backed Trump, and I'm not saying for wrong reasons they believe in and to the core, but even those that have been loyal to the -- to the to the goals of Trump as he set them from time to time, have really, really snapped back on this one. And so my guess is the institution will prevail.

ZAKARIA: Do you -- does this make you worry about who the next Fed chair will be? Because Trump is clearly going to want somebody who is essentially amenable to pressure from him.

BLANKFEIN: Of course. And, you know, once you're in that job, you're pretty set in that job. You know, Trump may think he can fire the person, but there's a lot of people who disagree with that. Once he's in, you could say that person may rise to the requirements of the office and actually behave more independently.

[10:45:07]

But it's not just the actual inflation that occurs, it's the inflationary expectations that lead to people responding and requiring prices to be higher, which sets off the self-fulfilling prophecy. So, even a name of someone who really, in his heart of hearts, will think, well, I'll be more independent, I'll do the right thing and I'll honor the requirements of the job, the signal of somebody who is really comes across as subservient to the whims of the political sector will -- could very much unleash those inflationary expectations from the get-go, even before he makes an official act.

ZAKARIA: Lloyd Blankfein, thank you. That really helped clarify the situation for us. Thank you.

BLANKFEIN: Well, thank you much, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, A.I. promises to transform our lives, but it will need a colossal amount of energy to do so. Do we have enough power to power the A.I. revolution? I'll explain next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:50:48]

ZAKARIA: And now for the last look. A couple of years ago, at least four multinationals, including Procter and Gamble and the pharma giant GSK, announced that they were exiting Nigeria amidst that country's currency crisis. As the Naira's value plunged companies struggle to repatriate profits. One key problem, the absence of reliable energy supply. Electricity access, a Nigerian born engineer told Bloomberg, is the main hindrance for economic growth in that country.

This sounds like a classic third world problem. As Bloomberg reports, lack of stable electricity supply is a persistent barrier to industrialization in poor countries, particularly in Africa. By contrast, in the rich world, electricity demand has been virtually unchanged or on the decline for the past 20 years. But that trend is now changing.

As Bloomberg Economics notes in a new analysis, electricity supply is emerging as a limiting factor in GDP growth in the first world, in rich countries. The electricity grid, the network of transmission lines taking electricity from power plants into our businesses and homes, has come under increased strain across almost all G20 nations.

Electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 40 percent in the U.S. and Europe over the next two decades, according to the analysis. Grids can't keep up and a growing share of businesses in Europe are saying that electricity access is their biggest obstacle.

What is driving this surging demand? New technologies, including electric vehicles and the phenomenon that is changing the way we live, artificial intelligence.

A.I. is incredibly energy intensive. Let's look at one of Meta's A.I. models. That is something like ChatGPT. Last spring, the MIT Technology Review estimated that its response to a single question used an average of nearly 7,000 joules of electricity, enough to travel 400 feet on an e-bike or run a microwave for eight seconds, one question.

What about using A.I. to generate a video? A model called CogVideoX was developed by Chinese startup and does just that. The review found using it to generate a five-second video would take an estimated 3.4 million joules, which is the same amount of energy to ride 38 miles on an e-bike or run a microwave for more than an hour.

Now think about how many people use A.I. and you can see the problem. To power the growth of A.I. data centers have been proliferating all over the country. The International Energy Agency projects that almost half the growth in energy demand in the U.S. from 2025 to 2030 will come from data centers alone.

Right now, we don't have the capacity to meet that demand. As the "Wall Street Journal" notes, old power plants are shutting down faster than new ones can take their place. New data centers in Ireland and Silicon Valley have stalled because of inadequate power supply. And bluntly, this skyrocketing electricity demand is incompatible with the transition to clean energy, at least in the short-term.

As the "WSJ" reports, environmental regulations have accounted for some of the closures of power plants. Some grids operate across more than a dozen states, with just as many different regulations governing any new supply.

Another difficult truth is that the growth of A.I. could significantly raise carbon emissions. These data centers operate around the clock. That means they can't rely solely on solar or wind power, which are intermittent sources of supply, meaning you have to build back up usually natural gas.

And many of these data centers are in states that rely on dirtier grids. Virginia has the most data centers of any state in the U.S., and it draws from the mid-Atlantic grid, which is more reliant on coal than others in the country.

[10:55:00]

Technology companies are trying to tackle both the supply problem and environmental concerns. Companies including Meta, Amazon, and Google have pledged to triple the world's nuclear power capacity by 2050. But any significant ramping up of nuclear capacity will take years. And for now, fossil fuels, chiefly natural gas, are keeping those data centers running.

While A.I. is part of the problem, I've described, it may also be part of the solution. Researchers believe that A.I. might be able to help humans more efficiently manage grid stress. A.I. model also helped design energy storage for renewables, transforming solar and wind into more reliable sources of supply.

Ever since the industrial revolution, humans have had a thirst for energy. In recent years, we've learned the dangers and the costs of that energy, but the reality is we still need energy. And maybe our newest technology, A.I., can finally fix a centuries-old problem, finding ways to get more energy that is clean and sustainable.

Thanks for being part of my program this week and I will see you next week.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)