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Trump's Former Top Russia Adviser Testifies at Impeachment Hearing; Hill: I Now Realize Sondland Was on a "Domestic Political Errand". Aired 1-2p ET
Aired November 21, 2019 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
JEFFREY TOOBIN, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Point out that it was difficult to hear the other side of the phone call in the restaurant. I mean, that is a perfectly legitimate form --
CHRIS CUOMO, CNN HOST: 100%.
TOOBIN: Of cross-examination --
CUOMO: He will not get full benefit of what he believes he heard.
TOOBIN: Right, and you know, he will say what he heard (ph), but I think it is just -- it is an odd thing to hear the -- hear the side of a phone call that you're not on --
CUOMO: Especially where the --
TOOBIN: If you're not on speaker phone.
CUOMO: But you have to remember, it doesn't exist in a vacuum, because then he has a conversation with the party to the phone call right after it who recounts what happened -- right, with fresh recollection --
TOOBIN: But not verbatim.
CUOMO: And then goes on.
TOOBIN: To be sure.
CUOMO: But to know what it was about. So Mr. Holmes has sat down, Dr. Hill has sat down -- questioning has not resumed which gives me an opportunity to get a little bit more perspective from what we understand of the GOP, which way do they go?
DANA BASH, CNN HOST: I think we've heard a preview all morning from our friend David over there --
DAVID URBAN, CNN ANALYST: Listen, they're following me, I didn't --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well then you've got trouble because you ripped up the piece. BASH: I mean, no -- and it's -- and it's in a preview (ph) all week
--
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: A little bit of theater.
BASH: All week this week and last week, which is not to say the president never asked for his -- the president never asked for an exchange. Just you can't prove it, which as Jeffrey said, as a good lawyer that is a classic cross-examination, it doesn't exonerate the president on the fundamental question that everybody who has testified -- pretty much everybody, not -- a couple people have not.
But -- and that is the president held up the aid and he did it for political gain.
CUOMO: This happened, get out of the denial mode and go in to the rationale and that it's not worthy of removal.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Right. I mean, that's the only clear course you can take because you cannot land a punch on the substance.
CUOMO: All right, here's the chairman bringing us back.
SCHIFF: -- or their counsel for the first round of their 45 minute questions.
NUNES: I thank the gentleman. I want to get a few basic facts on the table of individuals that were involved in the 2016 election, just to see who you know and who you've met with. So I'll start with you, Mr. Holmes. Have you met with or do you know Alexandra Chalupa?
SCHIFF: Mr. Holmes, could you put your microphone on?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Do you know Nellie Ohr? Have you met with Nellie Ohr?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Bruce Ohr?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Glenn Simpson?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Thank you. Same question for you, Dr. Hill. Do you know or have you met with Alexandra Chalupa?
HILL: No.
NUNES: Nellie Ohr?
HILL: No.
NUNES: Bruce Ohr?
HILL: Only in the course of my previous position as the National Intelligence Officer for Russia, where he attended some of the meetings I presided over.
NUNES: Years ago?
HILL: That's a long time ago, correct.
NUNES: Glenn Simpson?
HILL: No.
NUNES: OK. Dr. Hill, in your testimony, you said that - no, in your deposition, excuse me, that Christopher Steele was your counterpart at one time. Is this correct?
HILL: That's correct, yes.
NUNES: You testified that you met with Christopher Steele in 2016. I assume that's still correct?
HILL: That's correct, yes.
NUNES: And the only thing we didn't get on that is do you know about when that was in 2016 and how many times?
HILL: I'm afraid I don't. I actually met with him - well you asked me actually in a deposition when the most recent time that I had met with him in 2016 and he retired from the British Intelligence Services in 2009, which is the same time ...
NUNES: Right, I'm asking about 2016.
HILL: 2016, I don't recall, but I did meet with him some times before 2016.
NUNES: But you don't remember the date?
HILL: I don't, I'm afraid, no.
NUNES: OK. You stated in your deposition that a colleague had showed you the Steele dossier before it was published. Who was that colleague?
HILL: That was one of my colleagues at the Brookings Institution.
NUNES: And who - who was that?
HILL: That was the Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott, who had been sent a copy of this.
NUNES: And he shared it with you?
HILL: That was the day before it was published in Buzzfeed. NUNES: Thank you. You mentioned in your deposition also that you thought that it was a - let's get the exact quote - that the dossier was a rabbit hole. Is that still your testimony?
HILL: That's correct.
NUNES: Do you - do you know who paid Christopher Steele to do - to generate the Steele dossiers? There were several of them.
HILL: At the time, I did not know. I understand from the media that it was through GPS Fusion. If that's not correct ...
NUNES: Do you know who was - and there was a law firm involved do you know who the source of the money was?
[13:05:00]
HILL: I didn't at the time. No, I did not.
NUNES: But do you know ...
HILL: Well now I've read in reports and thanks to your colleagues, as well, that it was the - the DNC, as I'm led to believe.
NUNES: And the Clinton campaign?
HILL: I don't know that for sure.
NUNES: OK. Mr. Castor?
CASTOR: Good afternoon, welcome back from lunch, hope you had some sandwiches or something delicious.
HILL: Hope you did, too.
CASTOR: Dr. Hill, thank you for your service, also thank you for your participation in a deposition on October 14th, Columbus Day. We were - we were with you most of the day so I appreciate that.
Mr. Holmes, thank you as well. You're a - a late entrant into - into this situation and things sure did escalate quickly when we spoke with you last Friday night about a - a - what we thought was going to be a 30 second vignette about a two minute phone call and - and turns out you - you know, with your 40 minute opener today, you have a lot of information to share, so we appreciate you being here.
Dr. Hill, you - your last day at - at the National Security Council was on July 19th. Is that correct?
HILL: That's correct, yes.
CASTOR: So you weren't involved with the July 25th call and you - you weren't involved with any of the relevant activities related to the - the pause in the aid?
HILL: I was not, that's correct. CASTOR: And as of July 19th, did you believe that a call was going to be scheduled for the - the 25th?
HILL: I personally did not believe that it was going to be scheduled at that date, no.
CASTOR: And what was - what was the thinking at the NSC as of July 19th about such a call?
HILL: Well I've learned from other depositions, to be clear here, that perhaps there was some awareness that there might be a call. Ambassador Sondland, if you may recall, showed an exchange with the person who was taking over for my position, Tim Morrison, in which he indicated that there would be a call coming up. I was not aware of that.
CASTOR: OK. Were you in favor ...
HILL: So there were differences, let's just say, obviously an understanding about that call.
CASTOR: And were you in favor of - of such a call as of the 19th?
HILL: Actually, I was not and I did say something about that in the opening part of the sessions today.
CASTOR: OK and how about Ambassador Bolton, to your knowledge?
HILL: Well I know that Ambassador Sondland said in that e-mail that Bolton was in agreement. To my knowledge, Bolton was not in agreement at that particular juncture - to my knowledge.
CASTOR: And do you know what his opposition was?
HILL: It was based on the fact that he didn't feel the call had been properly prepared, and as I said earlier, that we wanted to make sure that there was going to be a fulsome bilateral U.S.-Ukraine agenda that was discussed, which is usual with these calls.
CASTOR: And you - were you surprised that a call (inaudible) was scheduled?
HILL: I was when I learned about it, that's right.
CASTOR: And did you have any communications with anyone back at your old staff, with - you know, about how that came to be?
HILL: I did not, no.
CASTOR: OK. You - you did learn about the - the pause in the security assistance aid ...
HILL: I learned about that on July 18th, so the day before I left. That's correct.
CASTOR: OK and there were several meetings about this, I believe you testified to?
HILL: I said that I knew there was going to be a meeting in that timeframe and there was one put under the schedule for the following week, but of course I had left and so I didn't attend that.
CASTOR: And is it fair to say that -- that stops and starts in -- in aid like this sometimes do happen?
HILL: That's correct.
CASTOR: And I believe you had testified there was a freeze put on all kinds of aid and assistance because it was in the process, at that time there were significant reviews of foreign assistance going on?
HILL: That's also correct, yes.
CASTOR: And what else can you tell us about that?
HILL: About the foreign assistance review?
CASTOR: Yeah.
HILL: As I understood, the -- there had been a directive for a whole- scale review of our foreign policy -- foreign policy assistance and the ties between our foreign policy objectives and the assistance. This had been going on actually for many months and in the period when I was wrapping up my time there, there had been more scrutiny than specific assistance to specific sets of countries as a result of that overall view -- review.
CASTOR: And at this time, as well, Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, they had -- they had become a little bit more involved with Ukraine policy?
HILL: Well Ambassador Volker was always involved in Ukraine policy, at least since the beginning of his appointment as the Special Envoy for Negotiations towards the war between Ukraine and Russia in Donbass.
CASTOR: What can you tell us about Ambassador Volker?
HILL: Ambassador Volker is an extraordinary, accomplished diplomat. I've worked with him in many capacities previously -- you know his bio, he's been the Ambassador to NATO, he's had a number of positions at the State Department and actually I know him personally. So, you know, the truth that we're trying to get at at who knows who and who's met, I know Ambassador Volker really well, on a personal level, as well.
CASTOR: OK and you said he's a man of integrity?
HILL: That's correct.
CASTOR: And always acted in the best interests of the United States?
[13:10:00] HILL: Absolutely, yes.
CASTOR: When did you first learn of Ambassador Sondland's involvement?
HILL: Well it came in different ways. Ambassador Sondland, as the Ambassador to the EU, had some perfectly logical involvement in the Ukraine portfolio. We worked very closely with the European Union and on matters related to Ukraine. The Ukrainian dialogue with Russia was in a format known as the Minsk process, which was led by the French and the Germans, and Ambassador Volker was trying to find out ways in which he could work closely with the French and Germans to move along the -- on the resolution of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
And obviously the European Union, as the umbrella organization for Europe in terms of funding and assistance, was heavily active in offering financial assistance to the Ukrainian government, as well as humanitarian assistance in the conflict.
So it was perfectly logical that Ambassador Sondland would play some kind of a role as our Ambassador to the European Union.
CASTOR: Did you have any concerns when -- when he presented himself to you as somebody with a major role?
HILL: I did at the time in which he presented it to -- to me. This was after Ambassador Yovanovitch had been pushed out of her position and it was at that juncture that Ambassador Sondland's role seemed to grow larger.
CASTOR: And did you express any concerns to him directly?
HILL: I did express concerns to him directly.
CASTOR: What were those concerns?
HILL: I asked him quite bluntly in a meeting that we had in June of -- of 2019 -- so this is after the presidential inauguration, when I'd seen that he had started to step up in much more of a proactive role on Ukraine, you know, what was his role here and he said that he was in charge of Ukraine. And I said well who put you in charge, Ambassador Sondland, and he said the President.
CASTOR: And did that surprise you when he told you that?
HILL: It did surprise me. We'd had no directive, we hadn't been told this. Ambassador Bolton had never indicated in any way that he thought that Ambassador Sondland was playing a leading role in Ukraine.
CASTOR: Right. I believe you used the term "a large remit," that he characterized he had been given "a large remit" from the President?
HILL: I can't remember whether I said remit but it was portfolio -- he was constantly -- you know, these are all synonyms -- he was talking to us about the fact that he'd been given a very broad portfolio by the President. He said his job was to go out and make deals in Europe, and as you know yourself, I listened to his testimony yesterday very carefully, as well, he said that anything that had to do with the EU itself and the European Union member states was within his portfolio. CASTOR: All right. We asked Ambassador Sondland about that at his deposition and he -- he conceded that he may have been spinning a little bit when he said that the President specifically gave him that role and he indicated that his authority was coming at least a little bit from -- more from the Secretary of State.
At any point in time was that related to you?
HILL: At different points, he mentioned talking directly to the Chief of Staff Mulvaney and he also talked about Secretary Pompeo, but he was very -- in fact, there were other people in the room in the meeting in which he asserted this to me, that it was the President who had put him in charge of this.
CASTOR: Were you encouraged as of your -- your last date -- day in the office that U.S. policy towards Ukraine was headed in the right direction?
HILL: I was not.
CASTOR: And why was that?
HILL: Well I was concerned about two things, in particular. One was, again, the removal of our Ambassador -- and again, I will say for the record that the President has a perfect right to remove any Ambassador at any time for any reason -- but I was very concerned about the circumstances in which her reputation had been maligned repeatedly on television and in all kinds of exchanges. I felt that that was completely unnecessary.
If the President wanted to remove an Ambassador, which he did quite frequently, there was a number of ambassadors who were removed who were not political but career officials, that was done but without these kinds of interventions. I wondered what that message was being sent, so there was that.
And then on the second front, it was very clear at this point that there was let's just say a different channel in operation in relations to Ukraine, one that was domestic and political in nature, and that was very different from the channel or the loop, however you like it, that I and my colleagues were in, where we were focused on bilateral relations and U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine.
And these two things had diverged at this point.
CASTOR: In -- in the run up to Ambassador Yovanovitch's separation from post, did you have any communications with officials at the State Department about your concerns?
HILL: I did.
CASTOR: And who did you relate those concerns to?
[13:15:00] HILL: I related those concerns directly to my counterpart, who was Acting Assistant Secretary Phil Reeker, who I know you've spoken to. I also spoke to David Hale in the context of, you know, larger meetings about many other issues. I mean again, I covered a broad portfolio myself and we often would talk about individual items.
And I had private discussions with Deputy Secretary Sullivan and he, of course, has appeared before the committees here in the course of his nomination to be Ambassador to Russia, and has spoken about that himself.
CASTOR: OK and you -- you advocated to all of those officials about your concerns about the information being spread about Ambassador Yovanovitch?
HILL: I did, that's correct.
CASTOR: The Trump administration changed courses from its predecessor and provided lethal defensive assistance to the Ukraine. Were you in favor of arming the Ukrainians with the Javelins?
HILL: I was not initially in 2015, before I joined the government, and I'm sure that many people on the committee have seen that I wrote an opinion piece with a colleague at the Brookings Institution in that juncture, because I was very worried at that particular point in time that the Ukrainian military not in a fit state to really take onboard sophisticated weapons, be they defensive or offensive weapons. And I worried that there was not a long-term sustainable plan given the overwhelming force that the Russians could apply against the Ukrainians.
However, when I came into government in 2017 and started to interact with all of my colleagues in the Pentagon, and you had Laura Cooper here yesterday, I realized in fact that there had been an awful lot of work done on this and that there was a clear and consistent plan for the sustainability long-term of the Ukrainian military, so I changed my mind.
CASTOR: OK. And you're, in fact, one of the -- I believe the only witness that we've spoken to that has been able to articulate the opposition to providing the Javelins. And as we understand it, during the Obama administration, the inter-agency consensus was, in fact, to provide the Javelins, but they were not provided.
Were you aware of the decision back then?
HILL: I was. And I think it was very much made on a political basis about concerns that this would provoke the Russians, depending on how this was presented. And we were very mindful of that also when there were discussions internally about the lethal defensive weapons inside of the administration.
CASTOR: Mr. Holmes, you're on the ground and in Kyiv, and the Javelins have now been authorized, provided. What's the view from the fields, the U.S. embassy, as to the effectiveness of the Javelins?
HOLMES: They are an important strategic deterrent. They're not actively employed in combat operations right now. But the mere idea that were the Russians to advance substantially using certain kinds of armor, that the Ukrainians would have this capability, deters them from doing so. It also thereby sends a very important symbol -- symbolic message to the Ukrainian military that they have access to this high-end technology and we trust them to do it. I would only add also they have offered to buy some using their own funds. The initial tranche was provided through basically a program to do that, but they've now offered to spend their own money to buy more. So I think they think they're important.
CASTOR: And Ambassador Taylor has testified -- Mr. Kent has testified that this is, in fact, the consensus of the inter-agency, providing the Javelins. Is it the -- in your experience in working with Ambassador Taylor, was he also very -- very much an advocate for this?
HOLMES: Yes.
NUNES: Mr. Holmes, I want to go back to (INAUDIBLE) some Americans now want to talk a little bit about Ukrainians -- Ukrainian government officials?
HOLMES: Mm-hmm.
NUNES: Are you familiar with Sergii Leshchenko?
HOLMES: Yes.
NUNES: Have you met with him?
HOLMES: I have.
NUNES: OK. He was a journalist, then he was in the parliament, is he currently in the parliament?
HOLMES: Journalist again.
NUNES: Journalist again. Are you aware that when he was in the parliament that he had provided information to a Fusion GPS operative named Nellie Ohr?
HOLMES: I'm not aware of Nellie Ohr. I'm not aware of who he provided information to. I'm aware that as a journalist he has provided information.
NUNES: Well, this is -- he was in parliament at the time. This is in the 2016 campaign. He provided widely known as the "black ledger." Have you ever heard of the "black ledger"?
HOLMES: I have.
NUNES: And the "black ledger," is that seen as credible information?
HOLMES: Yes.
NUNES: The "black ledger" is credible?
HOLMES: Yes. NUNES: Bob Mueller did not find it credible. Do you dispute what Bob Mueller's findings were? They didn't use it in the prosecution or in the report.
[13:20:00] HOLMES: I'm not aware that Bob Mueller did not find it credible. I think it was evidence in other criminal proceedings. Its credibility was not questioned in those proceedings. But I'm not an expert in that matter.
NUNES: So the motivation for Leshchenko, as reported to -- was to go after a Trump campaign official and undermine Trump's candidacy. Are you aware that?
HOLMES: If you mean by the release of the "black ledger," I think Leshchenko's motivation was the same motivation he has always expressed, which is to expose corruption in Ukraine.
NUNES: Right. But he has admitted motivation was to partly at least undermine the Trump candidacy that he did not support.
HOLMES: He has not said that to me. If he said that to you, I will take your word for it.
NUNES: And you're aware that the -- you heard Dr. Hill's testimony about the Steele dossier that contained initially that initial information that was fed in the FBI. Were you aware that the Democrats had paid for that information?
HOLMES: Sir, I never had any involvement directly with it.
NUNES: I'm not accusing you of involvement, I'm just asking if you -- not even if you knew at the time, but you now know today that the Democrats had paid for that information.
HOLMES: So I do want to be clear that all that happened before I arrived in Ukraine. So I don't have a first-hand...
NUNES: I'm not accusing any involvement of you with the Steele dossier.
HOLMES: Understood. But I do want to be clear about that. And then in addition, I have read about those issues, but I'm not an expert on them.
NUNES: But you're not disputing that the Democrat -- Democrats and the Clinton campaign were the source of funds that funded the Steele dossier.
HOLMES: I wouldn't be in a position to dispute that, sir.
NUNES: Do you think it's appropriate for political parties to run operatives in foreign countries to dig up dirt on their opponents?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Dr. Hill, do you think it's appropriate for political parties to pay operatives to dig up dirt on their opponents?
HILL: I do not.
NUNES: Mr. Castor.
CASTOR: I want to turn to the -- President Zelensky's inauguration. Ambassador Volker testified that he was very pleased with the size of the delegation, although the vice president was unable to make the trip, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland. And I understand, Dr. Hill, you were involved with some of the logistics in putting the delegation together.
HILL: That's correct.
CASTOR: What can you tell us about the vice president's role in attending or not attending?
HILL: Well, I know that you've heard the testimony of Jennifer Williams in the vice president's office, and I defer to her as being much closer to the decision-making about the vice president's attendance.
I will say that I and many others hoped that the vice president would be able to attend. What I know from my perspective, because I was not involved intimately in discussions with the vice president or his immediate staff, was that there was some questions about the schedule.
As you all know, the president and vice president cannot be out of the country at the same time. And there was some questions about presidential travel in the same time-frame. And, you know, there was quite a bit of back-and-forth as to whether it would be really feasible for the vice president in that time-frame to go.
So that was what I was aware of. I wasn't aware of the extent of the discussions that obviously Ms. Williams was involved in.
CASTOR: Right, the president was traveling in Japan and then he was headed to Europe for the D-Day anniversary. The vice president's office, according to Ms. Williams, provided four days at the end of May, the 29th, 30th, 31st, June 1st. And as it turned out, the Ukrainians decided, I believe it was on May 16th, to schedule the inauguration for four days later.
And by this point in time the vice president had been rerouted for a trip to Canada about the USMCA and I just want to ask you whether you don't have any evidence that the vice president was encouraged not to attend offer any other reason, do you?
HILL: I personally do not, but again I defer to Ms. Williams.
CASTOR: Ms. Williams' testimony was that she just -- she heard from those chief of staff's assistance that the vice president was not able to go the (inaudible). The reason for that was related to any of (ph) these investigations hasn't been fully established. I want to just note from the materials you provided for your deposition there was a discussion whether President Orban may have influenced President Trump's decision on that May 13th day, and the -- do you remember when the meeting was with President Orban?
[13:25:00]
HILL: I do.
CASTOR: When was that?
HILL: That was in May, that's correct.
CASTOR: Do you remember what time of day it was on the 13th?
HILL: To be honest, I -- usually these meetings are around lunchtime, sometime in that timeframe, in the kind of early to mid part of the day. I can't speak for sure, and I just want to be very clear that I cannot speak about head of State engagements.
CASTOR: OK. The -- Jennifer Williams testified that she learned about 11 or 11:15 and that the meeting with President Orban was -- was not scheduled until later in the afternoon, according your schedule, it was around 1:45 is that consistent with your recollection?
HILL: About the lunchtime timeframe, yes, depending on when one has lunch, I guess.
CASTER: But overall, given the four days notice, given Secretary Perry's involvement, do you think that delegation was a good-sized group?
HILL: I do, and let me also make a point that we don't try to make these delegations large, this is on the taxpayers dime and it's pretty expensive getting people there if you get military (ph) and we try to keep them small. If we had a longer lead time, perhaps we would have made other arrangements, but four days is not a lot of time to make an arrangement.
CASTOR: And Secretary Perry has become interested in some of the energy-related issues in the Ukraine?
HILL: I actually recommended that Secretary Perry be the lead, along with others.
CASTOR: And what can you tell us about his involvement in some of the Ukrainian policy?
HILL: Well, Secretary Perry's engagement in this made again, perfect sense given his as secretary of Energy, and also his deep knowledge of the energy industry, his former governorship, Secretary Perry himself is an extraordinary good advocates of U.S. interests, particularly in the energy sphere. One of (ph) Ukraine's Achilles' heel in addition to its military disadvantage with Russia is in fact energy. Ukraine remains for now the main transit point for Russian oil and gas pipelines to Europe, and this has been manipulated repeatedly, especially since 2006 by the Russian government. And in fact I know (ph) many of you here will remember, in the Reagan era, there was a huge dispute between United States and Europe about the -- about whether it made sense for Europe to build pipelines from the then- Soviet Union to bring gas to European markets.
CASTOR: Mr. Holmes, what was -- what was your view of the delegation? Do you think it was the right size group, right level of prestige to signal to the incoming Zelensky administration that the U.S. stands behind them?
HOLMES: I think it was fine in that regard.
CASTOR: OK.
NUNES: Since we're on the topic of Ukraine energy, I think it's a good way for us to segue into Burisma, which I assume both of you are familiar with, you've heard about it for many, many years. You're on the ground are now Mr. Holmes. I know you weren't there, but at the time, but in September 2015, then ambassador to Ukraine, Jeffrey Piatt, Obama appointed career ambassador. I'm sure you know him.
HOLMES: I do.
NUNES: Incredible.
HOLMES: Yes.
NUNES: Successful ambassador, I'm sure. He called for an investigation into Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma, president of Burisma. Are you familiar with that?
HOLMES: Yes.
NUNES: did you know about deputy assistant secretary of state tense (ph) concerns about the potential conflict of interest with Hunter Biden sitting on the board of Burisma?
HOLMES: I would defer to George Kent was involved at the time at his next (inaudible).
NUNES: Did you know that the financial records show that this Ukrainian natural gas company Burisma routed more than $3 million through the American accounts of Hunter Biden.
HOLMES: I've heard that.
NUNES: Did you -- are you familiar with that, Dr. Hill?
HILL: Only from newspaper reports.
NUNES: Did you know that Burisma -- and this is back to you, Mr. Holmes. Did you know that America's legal representatives met with Ukrainian officials just days after the vice president forced the firing of the country's chief prosecutor?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Did you know that Burisma's American lawyers try to secure a meeting with the new state prosecutor the same day the predecessor of Viktor Shokin's firing was announced? HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Did you know that Joe Biden called the Ukrainian President Poroshenko at least three times in February 2016, shortly after the president and owner of Burisma's home was raided on February 2 by the state prosecutor's office?
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Did you know that Devon Archer (ph) and Hunter Biden reached out to the Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken shortly after the raid on Burisma?
[13:30:00]
HOLMES: No.
NUNES: Dr. Hill, did you know about -- I don't want to go through and ask all those questions...
HILL: I also did not know, if that's what...
NUNES: You did not know about any of this?
HILL: I did not know, no.
NUNES: OK. So you obviously know that the president had concerns about Burisma, had concerns about the 2016 election, meddling by the Ukrainians. When you were -- you were in there as -- as the head of the Ukraine desk, did you ever raise any of these -- did you ever brief the president or raise it up to ambassador Bolten, have any concerns through 2017 and 18 that -- concern 2016 election meddling or -- or Burisma concerns?
HILL: The whole briefing process didn't really work in the way that you're suggesting there, so if the president had asked about any of this information, it would have been provided for him. Just to be very clear, Ukraine was not a top foreign policy priority in this period in the same way that many other issues that we could talk about from Syria to Turkey, and others are. So there weren't that frequent brieifings on Ukraine. The briefings would take place when there was a scheduled meeting with Ukrainian head of state; and as we know, there havent been too many of those.
NUNES: So just to -- as far as you know, you did no -- no who briefings, no papers, answered no questions as it relates to the 2016 election or burisma during your time there?
HILL: I did not, no. Mr. Castor.
NUNES: OK, thank you.
Mr. Castor?
CASTOR: Dr. Hill, you told us during your deposition that, indeed, that there -- there are perceived conflict-of-interest troubles when the child of a government official is involved with -- with something that that government official has a official policy role in, correct?
HILL: I think any family member of any member of the U.S. government, Congress or the Senate is open to all kinds of questions about optics and of perhaps, undue outside influence if they take part in any kind of activity that could be misconstrued as being related to the parent or the family member's work. So there's a much -- of course, yes, I do think that's the case.
CASTOR: Getting back to Ambassador Sondland, you -- you testified that every now and then he made a habit of -- of name-dropping his interactions with the president.
HILL: That's correct, yes.
CASTOR: And I believe you also told us there -- there were instances where you would run into him on the campus and he would say, "Oh, I'm -- I'm here to see the president," or "I'm -- I've been in to see the president," and you had an occasion to circle back and found that that wasn't the case.
HILL: That's correct.
CASTOR: And I just want to give you an opportunity. He -- he testified about some sort of coffee he had with you on -- on your last day, and I -- I think when the deposition transcript was released, your -- your counsel indicated that that was completely fabricated on Ambassador Sondland's part, and I just want to give you an opportunity to -- to address that.
HILL: Yes, I mean, unfortunately, this is the federal government. We don't have coffee machines, you know, readily in our office. If you'd come to my office in that time, the best I could have offered you was a cup of water from the water fountain outside of my office. So you know, the coffee that Ambassador Sondland and I shared was actually, we run into each other, or rather, he found out I was going to be there and then asked me to meet him for coffee in Jackson Hole, Wyoming in 2018, in August, so this is a full year before I left. That was a very nice coffee, so perhaps he, you know, conflated those two meetings together.
The meeting that he was referring to -- he had come in to meet with our director for the European Union. This was in my last week in the office, and as I was in the office the -- at the same time for a brief period before going into another meeting, and it was my last week in the office, we agreed to sit down with the director for European Union, with, actually, Colonel Vindman and the assistant that Ambassador Sondland had brought with him from the State Department. So there were actually four of us in that meeting and unfortunately, it wasn't over coffee.
CASTOR: And, you know, he -- he went on to indicate that you were upset, and you were upset with Ambassador...
HILL: Actually, there were five of us, really, in that meeting. Obviously, I can't do math. Sorry. CASTOR: Fair enough. He indicated you were upset, and you were upset with Ambassador Bolton and upset with the way things were going, and I believe your -- your counsel said that was an outright fabrication.
[13:35:00]
HILL: Well, I think you might recall in my deposition on October 14th that I said that very unfortunately, I had a bit of a blowup with Ambassador Sondland, and I had a couple of testy encounters with him. One of those was in June '18, when I actually said to him, "Who put you in charge of Ukraine?" And you know, I'll admit I was a bit rude, and that's when he told, "The president," which shut me up.
And this other meeting, it was about 15, 20 minutes, exactly as he depicted it was. I was actually, to be honest, angry with him, and you know, I hate to say it, but often when women show anger it's not fully appreciated. It's often, you know, pushed onto emotional issues perhaps, or deflected onto other people.
And what I was angry about was that he wasn't coordinating with us. Now, I've actually realized, having listened to his deposition, that he was absolutely right; that he wasn't coordinating with us because we weren't doing the same thing that he was doing. So I was upset with him that he wasn't fully telling us about all of the meetings that he was having, and he said to me, "But I'm briefing the president. I'm briefing Chief of Staff Mulvaney. I'm briefing Secretary Pompeo, and I've talked to Ambassador Bolton. Who else do I have to deal with?" And the point is we have a robust interagency process that deals with Ukraine. It includes Mr. Holmes. It includes Ambassador Taylor as the charge in Ukraine. It includes a whole load of other people.
But it struck me when yesterday, when you put up on the screen Ambassador Sondland's emails and who was on these emails, and he said, "These are the people who need to know," that he was absolutely right, because he was being involved in a domestic political errand, and we were being involved in national security foreign policy, and those two things had just diverged. So he was correct, and I had not put my finger on the -- at that -- at the moment, but I was irritated with him and angry with him that he wasn't fully coordinating. And I did say to him, Ambassador Sondland, "Gordon, I think this is all going to blow up." And here we are.
And after I left to my next meeting, our director for the European Union talked to him much further for a full half hour or more later trying to ask him about how we could coordinate better, or how others could coordinate better after I had left the office, and his feeling was that the National Security Council was always trying to block him. What we were trying to do was block us from straying into domestic or personal politics, and that was precisely what I was trying to do.
But Ambassador Sondland is not wrong that he had been given a different remit than we had been. And it was at that moment that I started to realize how those things had diverged, and I realized, in fact, that I wasn't really being fair to Ambassador Sondland because he was carrying out what he thought he been instructed to carry out, and we were doing something that we thought was just as, or perhaps even more important, but it wasn't in the same channel.
CASTOR: Yeah, I'm...
NUNES: Dr. Hill, I -- to my answer. Sorry. Dr. Hill, I just want to drill down on this a little bit. The -- the president of the United States, commander-in-chief, was concerned about the 2016 elections and Burisma. He had his personal attorney working these issues because he was under investigation by Robert Moeller as special counsel, partly beginning with an investigation that started with the Steele dossier that we've already established that the Democrats had paid for, and then fed into the FBI.
So the end of the day, the commander-in-chief, concerned about 2016 election meddling by Ukraine, does it -- sounds like you just -- had just earlier testified that you weren't aware of that. But if that was the concern of the president to try to get to the bottom of it, and it's the concern of -- of Ambassador Sondland, who was trying to set up meetings on behalf of -- to make -- to ensure, really, that meetings occurred and phone calls occurred to strengthen the relationship, I'm a little -- I mean, I understand the people at the NSC, people at State Department had issues with that, but at then end of the day, isn't it the commander-in-chief that makes those decisions?
HILL: My point, Mr. Nunes, is that we at the National Security Council were not told either by the president directly or through Ambassador Bolton that we were to be focused on these issues as a matter of U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine. So when you're talking about Ukraine in 2016, I never personally heard the president say anything specific about 2016 and Ukraine. I've seen him saying thing -- plenty of things publicly, but I was not given a directive.
NUNES: (inaudible)
HILL: In fact, I was given a directive on July 10th by Ambassador Bolton very clearly to stay out of domestic politics.
NUNES: (inaudible)
CASTOR: And just for the sake of the timeline, I think as of July 19th they hadn't even engaged with Rudy Giuliani yet. I -- I don't believe that happened until a little bit later. So you believe by July 19th they were already engaged in those types of activities?
[13:40:00]
HILL: We'd already had a discussion with Kurt Volker in which it was in the depositions of his assistant Chris Anderson that indicated that he had met with Rudy Giuliani at this point. And Ambassador Sondland made comments about meeting with Giuliani. And as we know in the May 23rd meeting, they had been instructed to meet with Giuliani.
CASTOR: Right.
HILL: They gave us every impression that they were meeting with Rudy Giuliani at this point and Rudy Giuliani was also saying on the television and indeed has said subsequently that he was closely coordinating with the State Department.
So it was my belief that they meeting with him.
CASTOR: OK. And there's some -- I mean, there's some ambiguity in the -- the direction to work with Rudy Giuliani. Ambassador Volker said the President dismissed Ukraine and said oh, if you want to work on it, just go talk to Rudy and Ambassador Sondland took that a little bit differently.
And I believe that Ambassador Volker was primarily the interlocutor with Mr. Giuliani and that was happening, didn't -- didn't start until the end of July.
HILL: I only learned that subsequently from Ambassador Volker's depositions so I just want to tell you in that particular timeframe, I was not aware of that and in fact Gordon Sondland did refer to Rudy Giuliani, and again Ambassador Bolton had warned Ambassador Volker not to meet with Rudy Giuliani in a meeting.
CASTOR: Mr. Morrison told us both in his deposition and at his public hearing that you had related concerns about Colonel Vindman's judgment?
HILL: I did not relate any concerns in general terms about Colonel Vindman's judgment, so I was somewhat surprised when I heard Mr. Morrison make that assertion and when I read his deposition.
There was a very specific point that was made -- and again, these are personnel issues and I'm sure that nobody here would like to have their private personnel issues put before a committee, but you've asked me about this -- so I had a couple of very short transition meetings with Mr. Morrison -- and again, Mr. Morrison did not work in our directorate, he was taking over the position which he held for three months.
I had worked on the -- as the Director -- the Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia, it was at the time, for more than two years at this point and I'd been working for a year with Colonel Vindman -- with Mr. Vindman. And in the course of one of the meetings sometime in the June timeframe, I sat down with Mr. Morrison and with a deputy -- he referred to him in his deposition -- John Erath, who was also working, and we went through our organizational chart. We went through who was staying, who was rotating out and leaving in the summer and we talked about everybody's strengths and weaknesses.
And I always asked my staff to do upward (ph) feedback, as well, to talk about what I wasn't doing right, either, I'd like to learn, too. And I said that I was concerned about the way things were trending in Ukraine policy.
So Colonel Vindman is a highly distinguished, decorated military officer -- he came over to us from the Chairman's Office in the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- and we were evaluating and looking at him in the context of what his future positions would be in the context of the U.S. Army. And I was concerned that if, for example, Colonel Vindman might decide to leave the military, that perhaps he wasn't as well suited for something that would be much more political, I did not feel that he had the political antenna to deal with something that was straying into domestic politics. Not everyone is suited for that.
That does not mean in any way that I was questioning his overall judgment nor was I questioning in any way his substantive expertise. He is excellent on issues related to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, on Russian defense issues, he'd be in charge of the Russia campaign, thinking through at the -- at the Chairman's Office and in the Pentagon. This was a very specific issue because by June, we saw that things were diverging and he needed a completely different sensitivity.
Some people in my office have worked at the highest levels of advisory positions and Mr. Morrison had come from Capitol Hill. He knew politics inside out and that we said that Colonel Vindman did not and we were concerned about how he would manage what was becoming a highly charged and potentially (inaudible) issue which had not been before.
CASTOR: And Colonel Vindman, you related to us during his deposition, that he subsequently was sort of cut out of a lot of the -- the decision-making and involvements with the -- with the embassy in Ukraine. Was that something you recommended?
HILL: Not with the embassy in Ukraine. I mean, we did pull him back from the meeting in May in the Oval Office and subsequently we were very concerned about these political aspects to this and we did not feel -- when July 10th -- Colonel Vindman was justifiably alarmed when he realized that there was this highly political aspect of the meeting that we were looking for eventually with President Zelensky.
[13:45:00]
CASTOR: And Mr. Holmes, I want to -- at the end of August, we understand that Ambassador Taylor was engaged in obtaining some information for the President about European allies burden sharing in the region, as the decision about aid was being debated.
HOLMES: So sir, after the hold was placed on the security assistance, many people I think were scrambling to try to understand why. I believe it was Senator Johnson who had said that the President was concerned about burden sharing, perhaps others as well, and so in trying to interpret why this might have happened, we were looking into the facts of what the Europeans have provided and what we have provided. It's very illuminating, what we learned.
The United States has provided combined civilian and military assistance to Ukraine since 2014 of about $3 billion, plus two $1 billion -- three $1 billion loan guarantees. That's not -- those get paid back largely. So just over $3 billion. The Europeans, at the level of the European Union plus the member states combined since 2014, my understanding, have provided a combined $12 billion to Ukraine.
CASTOR: And you were able to communicate that information back at the end of August?
HOLMES: I believe so. Yeah, we were -- this is done in collaboration with other missions, the EU to NATO and others. Yes.
CASTOR: And do you think that was the information the White House was looking for?
HOLMES: I -- we don't know. If the concern was that we weren't -- that others weren't -- weren't spending as much as we were to support Ukraine, then that information showed a different story.
CASTOR: OK. And the aid was subsequently lifted -- the pause in the aid was lifted shortly thereafter?
HOLMES: It was in -- yes, in Early September -- in mid September.
CASTOR: I yield back.
SCHIFF: That concludes the 45 minute rounds. We'll now go to member questioning. I'll recognize myself for five minutes. First, as a -- a threshold matter, I want to say to the witnesses to be a bit cautious when members represent are you aware of this fact, are you aware of that fact, do you know that so and so testified to this or testified to that? If you have personal knowledge of it, that's fine, but -- and it -- I'm not saying it's deliberate, sometimes members get it wrong.
So let me just clear the record on one of the things that was suggested to you that the Vice President canceled his trip because of a conflict with a trip to Canada. That was not Ms. Williams' testimony. Her testimony was "I asked my colleague why we should stop trip planning and why the Vice President would not be attending and I was informed that the President had decided the Vice President would not attend the inauguration." So, just offer that caution.
Dr. Hill, I want to ask you -- you may be aware of some of the attacks on Colonel Vindman, suggesting that he has a dual loyalty, that he's not really loyal to America; he's loyal to Ukraine.
I wanted to ask you, as a fellow immigrant, what you think of those kind of accusations when they're leveled against Colonel Vindman or other Americans.
HILL: I think it's very unfortunate. I mean, this is a country of immigrants, you know, with the exception, you know, perhaps of very few people still here, everyone immigrated to the United States at some point in their family history. And this is what, for me, really does make America great.
I mean, I'm sure that every single person here -- some people perhaps came reluctantly, others came by choice, as I did, but this is -- for me, this is the essence of America. It's why I wanted to be here, and why I wanted to stay here, and I think it's unfair to castigate anyone -- everyone has some kind of appellate to them. I'm -- I'm Anglo- American, perhaps, and -- or I'm a British American, I'm a naturalized citizen. I do not believe that my loyalty is to the United Kingdom. My loyalty is here, to the United States. This is my country and the country that I serve.
And I know for a fact that every single one of my colleagues -- and there were many naturalized citizens in my office and across the national security council -- felt exactly the same way. I think it's deeply unfair.
SCHIFF: Thank you. You mentioned something in your testimony -- I may not (ph) have this exactly right, that I think Ambassador Sondland at one point told you his role was to make deals; is that right?
HILL: That's correct.
SCHIFF: I want to ask you...
HILL: He told other people that as well, to be -- to be clear.
SCHIFF: I want to ask you about one of those deals, the one that Ambassador Bolton described as a drug deal. I had (ph) the suggestion, or the indication rather, when Mr. Goldman was asking questions about the July 10th meeting and in fact there were two meetings, one in Ambassador Bolton's presence and then another in the Ward Room, that there was more you had to say about that. Do you want to walk us through that in a little more detail?
HILL: Well the reference that Ambassador Bolton made was after I returned from the Ward Room and related to him what I had heard. Because as -- so there was a -- those (ph) sequencing of meetings, which I know that there's been some concern about the sequencing here and discrepancies between various depositions.
[13:50:00]
So what happened immediately after the meeting that Ambassador Bolton called (ph) a little short was that he told me to hold back in the room. And he was escorting out the Ukrainian visitors, along with Secretary Perry and Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, and I guess they wanted to take a -- a quick photograph outside of his office, and I know that Secretary Perry and others have tweeted out that photograph, beautiful sunny day, and there's a picture of all of them standing just outside of Ambassador Bolton's office.
This was very quick, he came back in, and at that point I guess they were already moving down to the Ward Room, because on the way out of his -- of Ambassador Bolton's office, Ambassador Sondland had said let's regroup in the Ward Room for, you know, a quick huddle on next steps, which to be honest was quite unusual. You don't usually huddle in a room in the White House to discuss next steps with foreign delegations. Because we took it being (ph) next steps on setting up the meeting, which already, as I'd said, Ambassador Bolton wasn't prepared to do.
When Ambassador Bolton came back into the office, that's when he gave me the very strong instruction to go downstairs, find out what was being discussed, and to come right back up and report it to -- to him. And as I came into the Ward Room, Alex Vindman -- Colonel Vindman and Ambassador Sondland were in an exchange, and that's when I noticed that Colonel Vindman looked quite alarmed.
Now I know that Ambassador Sondland was asked yesterday -- because again, I watched all of his testimony and I watched it very carefully -- that there were some questions about yelling and shouting. I certainly never said that, and there was no yelling and shouting. That's some (ph) embellishment that's crept in, perhaps in media depictions or how people like to retell these stories and add things to them.
When I came in, Ambassador Sondland was in an exchange with Colonel Vindman along the lines of, well we have an agreement to have this meeting. And I came in and I -- and I asked what's -- what's going on here, and he said -- and this is again the Ukrainians are there, Ambassador Volker was there, but at this point, I also want to stress, Secretary Perry had left. He was not in the Ward Room when I came. As I was coming in, Secretary Perry and his colleagues were leaving, so Secretary Perry has no recollection of this meeting because he was not in it.
And so when I came in, Gordon Sondland was basically saying, well look, we have a deal here that there will be a meeting -- I have a deal here with -- with Chief of Staff Mulvaney there will be a meeting if the Ukrainians open up or announce these investigations in -- into 2016 and Burisma.
And I cut it off immediately there, because by this point having heard Mr. Giuliani over and over again on the television and all of the issues that he was asserting, by this point it was clear that Burisma was code for the Bidens, because Giuliani was laying it out there. I could see why Colonel Vindman was alarmed, and he said this is inappropriate, we're the National Security Council, we can't be involved in this.
And I've learned, you know, since from Mr. Holmes' rendition here today that Colonel Vindman had (ph) already warned the Ukrainians, or, in fact, President Zelensky no less, to stay out of American politics -- domestic politics.
So I cut off this line (ph), and I said to Ambassador Sondland, look, we -- the -- we need procedures for here, Ambassador Bolton just made it clear we can't set up the meeting right now, we have to properly prepare this through the proper process -- I know this sounds all very boring, but you know, we have national security procedures to do this. And I said we really shouldn't be litigating this or talking about this in front of our colleagues from Ukraine. It was completely inappropriate for us to be thrashing this out in front of them.
And he agreed, and we asked our Ukrainian colleagues to move into the corridor outside the Ward Room, and I explained where this is in the deposition, which was also extraordinarily (ph) awkward because they shouldn't have been standing around in a corridor in the -- you know, basically (ph) in the West Wing at this particular juncture.
[13:55:00]
And that's when I pushed back on Ambassador Sondland and said, look, you know, there's differences about whether, one, we should have this meeting, we're trying to figure out whether we should have it after the Ukrainian democratic -- sorry, parliamentary elections, the Rada elections, which by that point I think had been set for July 21st -- it must have been, because this is July 10th at this point -- and Ambassador Bolton would like to wait until after that to basically see whether President Zelensky gets the majority in the parliament, which would enable him to form a cabinet and then we can -- then we can move forward.
And Ambassador Sondland then said, OK, fair enough, he realized he wasn't going to, you know, be able to push this further. Ambassador Volker didn't say anything at this particular juncture, and then he said he had another meeting and -- and they all left.
And I went back up and relayed this Ambassador Bolton, which is when he gave me the very specific instruction that we've already been through to go to talk to Mr. Eisenberg -- John Eisenberg -- in the NSC Council's (ph) office.
SCHIFF: Thank you. Mr. Nunes?
NUNES: I assume we're given eight minutes there (ph)?
SCHIFF: Mr. Nunes, I don't cut off a witness in the middle of their answer. You may proceed.
HILL: Sorry, that was a long answer.
NUNES: Mr. Jordan.
JORDAN: Mr. Holmes, why didn't your boss talk about it?
HOLMES: What's that, sir?
JORDAN: Why didn't your boss bring up the call that you overheard? The reason you're here today? I mean, you're their closing witness. Yet their star witness, their first witness, Ambassador Taylor, didn't even bring it up. And when we deposed you, you said this was an (ph) extremely distinctive experience, one of the most remarkable events of my life. You described it like this. You said after the call happens, I immediately told Deputy Chief of Mission and others at the embassy about the call.
Then you said you went on vacation, you told several friends and family about the call. Then you come back on August 6th and you tell Ambassador Taylor about the call.
And then in your deposition statement -- you said in your statement today as well -- I repeatedly referred to the call in meetings and conversations where the issue of the president's interest in Ukraine was relevant. I repeatedly referred to the call in meetings and conversations where the issue of the president's interest in Ukraine was relevant.
That sounds like government speak for, you told everybody. Yet their star witness, their first witness, Ambassador Taylor, when he came here, he related 13 different conversations he had between July 18th when the aid was frozen, September 11th when it's released, 13 different conversations, never once mentioning this call.
July 19th, Dr. Hill and Colonel Vindman told Taylor what Sondland told them. July 19th, Sondland told Taylor about the upcoming Trump- Zelensky call. July 20th, Sondland told Taylor what Sondland told Zelensky to tell Trump. July 20th, Danyluk (ph) tells Taylor what Zelensky told Danyluk. July 28th, Morrison tells Taylor what happened on the Trump-Zelensky call.
August 16th, Volker tells Taylor what Yermak told Volker. August 21st, Brechbuhl talks to Taylor. August 22nd, Morrison talks to Taylor. August 29th, Yermak talks to Taylor. September 1st, Morrison tells Taylor what Sondland told Morrison about what Yermak told Sondland. September 2nd, Morrison tells Taylor what Danyluk told Morrison. September 7th, Morrison tells Taylor what Sondland told Trump. And September 8th, Sondland tells Taylor what Trump told Sondland.
Nowhere, nowhere is there -- is there a Holmes tells Taylor what the president of the United States told Sondland.
HOLMES: May I answer that question...
(CROSSTALK)
JORDAN: Thirteen conversations -- yeah, I'll get to you, I'll give you a chance here in a second.
HOLMES: Thank you.
JORDAN: But 13 conversations, 13 conversations from their star witness. You're their closing witness, and he can't remember a call from a guy he works with every single day? Why?
HOLMES: Yes, sir. So immediately when I went back to the embassy, after this -- this lunch on the 26th, I told my direct supervisor, the deputy chief of mission. I would have told Ambassador Taylor immediately except he was on the front lines that afternoon.
I then went on -- as I have testified -- my vacation on Saturday, came back the following Monday. And on Tuesday, I was back in the ambassador's office where I referred to the call. In that week-plus that I was away, it was my assumption that the deputy chief of mission would have informed other people about the call as well.
So my recollection is when I did refer to the call in that meeting, that Ambassador Taylor nodded knowingly as though he had been briefed on it. So I referred to the call and I mentioned some of my takeaways from the call.
And at the time, the main takeaway from the call was, the president doesn't care about Ukraine. So we're going to have a tough road ahead to convince him that it's important enough for him to schedule an Oval Office meeting for President Zelensky and ultimately to release this hold on security assistance. That was the takeaway. And that's what I referred to repeatedly in the coming weeks, whenever it became -- became relevant. And I'll remind you, sir...
JORDAN: Maybe...
HOLMES: ... that -- that -- one more important point. Throughout this time, as I have testified, we were trying to find a formula, things we could do with Ukrainians that would convince the president that they were worth talking to.
JORDAN: Maybe -- maybe, Mr. Holmes, the takeaway was he thought it was no big deal because he already knew. He didn't remember it because we already had the transcript.
HOLMES: No, I (ph) actually (ph)...
(CROSSTALK)
JORDAN: He didn't remember the -- he didn't remember the -- we had the -- the Trump-Zelensky transcript had been out for two months.
HOLMES: Sir, I believe that when I...
JORDAN: Even though you're repeatedly bringing this conversation up, as you said, to everybody when it's -- when they're -- any time there's a talk about Ukraine, you -- you recall this conversation. Maybe it was the transcript -- the call happened on the July 25th, that's four months ago. The transcript's been out for two months. Maybe the ambassador thought this is -- this is nothing new here.
But shazam (ph), last week, you come forward with supposedly this new information? There is nothing different in there than what we had on the transcript. Maybe that's the reason --
[14:00:00]
