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The Situation Room

Top Intel Officials Testify on War Plans Leak. Aired 10:30-11a ET

Aired March 25, 2025 - 10:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:30:00]

TULSI GABBARD, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: -- United States and our citizens abroad and within the homeland, to advance their ultimate objective of establishing a global Islamist caliphate. This includes heightened efforts to spread their ideology, to recruit and radicalize individuals in the U.S. and the West.

While the New Year's Day attacker New Orleans had no known direct contact with ISIS terrorists, he was influenced and radicalized by ISIS ideological propaganda as one example.

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to call for attacks against the United States as they conduct attacks overseas. These jihadist groups have shown their ability to adapt and evolve, including using new technologies and tactics to spread their ideology and recruit new followers.

A range of non-state cyber criminals are also targeting our economic interests, critical infrastructure, and advanced commercial capability for extortion, other coercive pursuits and financial gain. These actors use a variety of tactics including phishing, ransomware, and denial of service attacks to disrupt our systems and steal sensitive and lucrative information using available technologies and U.S. cyber vulnerabilities.

Ransomware actors last year, for example, attacked the largest payment processor for U.S. healthcare institutions, and another set of criminal actors conducted cyber-attacks against U.S. water utilities.

Some of these non-state cyber actors also operate as proxies for or emulate similar activities carried out by major state actors. While these non-state cyber actors often seek financial and intellectual property gains, they also carry out cyber operations for espionage purposes, targeting our critical infrastructure.

Turning to key state actors, the I.C. sees China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea engaging in activities that could challenge U.S. capabilities and interests, especially related to our security and economy. These actors are, in some cases, working together in different areas to target U.S. interests and to protect themselves from U.S. sanctions.

At this point, the I.C. assesses that China is our most capable strategic competitor. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, the People's Republic of China seeks to position itself as a leading power on the world stage, economically, technologically, and militarily. Beijing is driven in part by a belief that Washington is pursuing a broad effort to contain China's rise and undermine CCP rule.

China's most serious domestic challenge is probably China's slowing economy and potential instability if socioeconomic grievances lead to large scale unrest. Growing economic tensions with the United States and other countries could also weigh on China's plans for economic growth and domestic job creation. China's military is fielding advanced capabilities including hypersonic weapons, stealth aircraft, advanced submarines, stronger space and cyber warfare assets, and a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons.

While it would like to develop and maintain positive ties with the United States and the Trump administration to advance its interests and avoid conflict, China is building its military capability in part to gain advantage in the event of a military conflict with the United States around the issue of China's efforts toward unification with the Republic of China or Taiwan.

China's military is also expanding its presence in the Asia-Pacific region with a focus on disputed territorial claims in both the East China and South China seas. Beijing is advancing its cyber capabilities for sophisticated operations aimed at stealing sensitive U.S. government and private sector information, and pre-positioning additional asymmetric attack options that may be deployed in a conflict.

China's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including last year's massive compromise of U.S. telecom infrastructure, commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon. Beijing currently dominates global markets and strategically important supply chains, for example, with the mining and processing of several critical minerals.

In December, China imposed an export ban to the United States on gallium, germanium, and antimony, all of which are important to the production of semiconductors and our defense technologies. This was in direct response to U.S. export controls on chips designed to broadly limit PRC access to advanced chips and chip making equipment.

China also aims to compete in other critical global industries, including A.I., legacy, semiconductor chip production, biomanufacturing and genetic sequencing, and medical and pharmaceutical supply production. Leveraging often heavily state subsidized production at greater scale, lower costs and weaker regulatory standards than required in the West. Beijing's strategy has given it a leading position in many parts of these sectors and supply chains that support them. In 2023, for example, China had five first in class domestic drug approvals and three FDA approvals.

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Turning to Russia. Russia's nuclear and conventional military capabilities along with its demonstrated economic and military resilience make it a formidable competitor. Moscow has more nuclear weapons than any other nation that could inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and the world in the event of a major war that Russian leaders feared put them and their regime at serious risk.

In late 2024, Russia announced updates to its public nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Russia's building a more modern and survivable nuclear force designed to circumvent U.S. missile defense through reliable retaliatory strike potential. Russia intends to deter the U.S. by holding both the U.S. homeland at risk, and by having the capabilities to threaten nuclear war in a conflict.

Russia's developed advanced cyber capabilities and has attempted to pre-position access to U.S. critical infrastructure for asymmetric options and make it a persistent cyber threat. Russia's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including the 2023 hack of Microsoft. Russia's also fielding new capabilities and anti-satellite weapons meant to degrade U.S. and allied space infrastructure.

Among Russia's most concerning developments is a new satellite intended to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite weapon, violating, longstanding international law against such activity in putting the U.S. and global economy at risk.

Iran continues to seek expansion of its influence in the Middle East, despite the degradation to its proxies and defenses during the Gaza conflict. Iran has developed and maintains ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs, including systems capable of striking U.S. targets and allies in the region. Tehran has shown a willingness to use these weapons, including during a 2020 attack on U.S. forces in Iraq and in attacks against Israel in April and October 2024.

Iran's cyber operations and capabilities also present a serious threat to U.S. networks and data. The I.C. continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khomeini has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003. The I.C. continues to monitor closely if Tehran decides to reauthorize its nuclear weapons program.

In the past year, we've seen an erosion of a decades long taboo in Iran on discussing nuclear weapons in public, likely emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decision-making apparatus. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons.

Iran will likely continue efforts to counter Israel and press for U.S. military withdrawal from the region by aiding, arming, and helping to reconstitute its loose consortium of like-minded terrorists and militant actors, which it refers to as its Axis of Resistance. Although weakened, this collection of actors still presents a wide range of threats including to Israel's population, U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and Syria, and to U.S. and international military and commercial shipping and transit.

North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un is pursuing stronger strategic and conventional capabilities that can target U.S. forces and allies in the region, as well as the U.S. homeland to bolster North Korea's lever leverage and stature, defend its regime and achieve at least tacit recognition as a nuclear weapons power.

Kim's recently cemented strategic partnership with Russia supports these goals by providing him greater financial, military, and diplomatic support. Reduced reliance on China and providing North Korean forces and weapons systems authentic war fighting experience. Kim views his strategic weapons advances since 2019, its deepening ties with Russia and North Korea's economic durability as strengthening his negotiating position against Washington's demands for denuclearization and lessening his need for sanctions relief.

North Korea is probably prepared to conduct another nuclear test on short notice. And continues to flight test, its ICBMs to demonstrate their increasing capabilities as leverage in future negotiations.

Since 2022, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have grown closer. Removing the accelerant of the war in Ukraine is unlikely to revert these bilateral relationships to a pre-war 2021 baseline. Leaving room for new strategic priorities and world events to create new incentives or challenges to their currently high levels of cooperation.

[10:40:00]

Russia has been a catalyst for much of this expanded cooperation, driven heavily by the support it has needed for its war effort against Ukraine, including protection from U.S. and Western sanctions. In addition to its exchange of military and other resource capabilities with North Korea, Russia's relied more heavily on China's financial and defense industry backing and also has increased combined military exercises with China to signal shared fortitude against the United States and U.S. allies in the Asia Pacific region.

With Iran, Russia has also expanded financial ties to mitigate sanctions. Iran has become a critical military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs in exchange for Russian technical support for Iranian weapons intelligence and advanced cyber capabilities.

In conclusion, the threats that we see to U.S. national security are both complex and multifaceted, and put the lives, safety and wellbeing of the American people at serious risk. As the heads of the American People's Intelligence Community, we will continue to provide the president, Congress, and our war fighters with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to keep the United States secure, free, prosperous, and at peace.

To the American people, specifically, our Intelligence Community exists to serve you and to ensure your safety, security, and freedom. Thank you.

SEN. TOM COTTON (R-AR), CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Thank you, Director Gabbard. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the annual threat assessment for the first-time lists cartels and traffickers as the very first threat. Director Patel, I'm pleased to say that the FBI's Little Rock Field office has been doing its part in addressing this threat. The field office, along with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have arrested nearly 300 immigrants in my state in 2025 so far.

Could you provide some color about the nature of the threat these illegal immigrants have posed, not just to Arkansas but our nation, perhaps including some of the details of the horrific offenses they've committed against the American people.

KASH PATEL, FBI DIRECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Vice --

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It's a threat (INAUDIBLE)security --

COTTON: Witness will suspend.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The greatest threat to global security is (INAUDIBLE). Stop funding Israel. Stop funding Israel. Stop funding Israel. Stop funding Israel.

COTTIN: So, that protester was a code pink lunatic saying the greatest threat to world peace is funding Israel. I will observe for the benefit of the audience here on television that code pink is funded by Communist China as well, which simply illustrates -- speak up now if you want to be removed as well whoever is saying that

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: (INAUDIBLE).

COTTON: If anyone else would like to join them, speak now please. So, we don't have any more disruptions. As I was saying, the fact that Communist China funds code pink, which interrupts a hearing like this about Israel, simply illustrate Director Gabbard's point that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other American adversaries are working in concert to a greater degree than they ever have before.

Director Patel, back to my question, could you give us some color about the threat that illegal migrants have pose not only to my state, which has resulted in nearly 300 arrests in 2025, but also to the nation at large.

PATEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and members of the committee. I appreciate the time to address you all specifically to Arkansas, Senator.

The priorities at the FBI, which I identified during my confirmation hearing and since is attacking violent crime along with national security. And every single state in this country is a border state. Arkansas is no exception. Allow me to highlight the work of the men and women in the FBI and state and local law enforcement in the state of Arkansas.

Since February 5th alone we've had 220 illegal immigrants arrested on charges varying from violent offenses, weapons offenses, narcotics offenses, and serious violent felonies. 253 separate individuals have been charged related to those offenses.

And here's something I want the American people to hear about narcotics, encountering narcotics. Thousands of pounds of narcotics were seized in these three weeks in the State of Arkansas, thousands, worth tens of millions of dollars. Everything from fentanyl to meth to cocaine to heroin to marijuana and more, and also including manufactured drugs.

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The FBI does have the biggest footprint in Arkansas, but we could not achieve this mission without our state and local law enforcement partners, which has been one of the priorities since I took the helm at the FBI. They provide the greatest ground level intelligence to conduct these operations in Arkansas and every in single state across the union.

Since February 5th, we've assisted with the arrest of hundreds of criminals and illegals throughout your state, and that was just a three-week operation. Prior to that, Senator, there was a bust of 17 federal indictments relating to a meth lab in the State of Arkansas, in the southwest corner of your state. All of those individuals are now facing prosecution for hundreds of pounds of illegal opioids, guns, and other illicit material.

So, we will continue to do that work. We will work at six to seven days a week, 365 days a year, not just in your state, Mr. Chairman, but in every state.

COTTON: Thank you. Director Patel. As Director Gabbard highlighted from the Annual Threat Report, Director Ratcliffe, many if not most of the chemical precursors for deadly Fentanyl produced by Mexican drug cartels originates in China. China, of course, is a techno totalitarian police state. They have technology to monitor their own people that Soviet Russia could have only imagined. Is there any reason, Director Ratcliffe, to believe that China could not monitor and crack down on this flow of chemical precursors to Mexico if it chose to do so?

JOHN RATCLIFFE, CIA DIRECTOR: Thank you, Senator, for the question. No, there's nothing that prevent China -- the People's Republic of China from cracking down on fentanyl precursors. As you well know, Senator, one of the reasons that they don't is that there are more than 600 PRC related companies that produce those precursor chemicals in an industry that generates $1.5 trillion. That is one of the reasons that we see that Chinese efforts to affect the Fentanyl precursors are really limited in nature and intermittent in nature and not a dedicated effort to enforce their own laws and regulations to crack down on this.

COTTON: Thank you, Director Ratcliffe. I have many more questions I could ask, but I'm going to try to lead by example and stay within the five-minute limit for the benefit of senators. I remind everyone there is a vote scheduled at noon. I hope to finish the open portion of this hearing by -- before that vote closes, after which time we'll move to the close portion. The vice chairman.

SEN. MARK WARNER (D-VA), VICE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be happy to take your extra 13 seconds. But I want to go back to what I addressed at the outset. I mean, this was not only sloppy. It not only violated all procedures, but if this information had gotten out, American lives could have been lost. If Houthis had this information, could reposition their defensive systems.

So, I want to get a little more information about this. Director Gabbard, did you participate in the group chat with secretary of defense and other Trump senior officials discussing the Yemen war plans?

GABBARD: Senator I don't want to get into the specifics.

WARNER: Ma'am, did you -- were you on -- you're not going to be willing to address -- so, you're not -- are you denying -- will you answer my question, ma'am? You are not TG on this group chat?

GABBARD: I'm not going to get into the specifics --

WARNER: So, you refuse to acknowledge whether you were on this group chat?

GABBARD: Senator, I'm not going to get into the specifics --

WARNER: Why are you going to get into the specifics? Is this -- is it because it's all classified?

GABBARD: Because this is currently under review by the National Security Patrol.

WARNER: Because it's all classified? If it's not classified, share the text now.

GABBARD: As the White House previously --

WARNER: Is it classified or non-classified information on this text?

GABBARD: I can confirm.

WARNER: Director Ratcliffe, were you on the group chat?

RATCLIFFE: Senator, I was on a Signal messaging group.

WARNER: So, you were the John Ratcliffe on that chat?

RATCLIFFE: I was.

WARNER: Thank you. Thank you.

RATCLIFFE: Can I provide some context, Senator, to that?

WARNER: Yes. But I've got a series of questions.

RATCLIFFE: But I think it's important because at the outset you made a couple of comments about Signal messaging using encrypted apps. So that we're clear, one of the first things that happened when I was confirmed as CIA director was Signal was loaded onto my computer at the CIA, as it is for most CIA officers. One of the things that I was briefed on very early, Senator, was by the CIA records management folks about the use of Signal as a permissible work use.

It is. That is a practice that preceded the current administration to the Biden administration --

WARNER: Director Ratcliffe, I've got a series of questions. You know, do you -- if you're making the statement that Signal is a secure channel --

[10:50:00]

RATCLIFFE: No. Can I answer that? It is --

WARNER: I've got a series of more --

RATCLIFFE: -- an end-to-end decryption. So --

WARNER: It's from my understanding --

RATCLIFFE: It is permissible to use to communicate and coordinate for work purposes, provided, provided, Senator, that any decisions that are made are also recorded through formal channels.

WARNER: All right.

RATCLIFFE: So, those were procedures that were implemented --

WARNER: Director Ratcliffe --

RATCLIFFE: My staff implemented those processes, followed those processes, complied with those processes and finally --

WARNER: So, are you saying that --

RATCLIFFE: Just please. So, my communications, to be clear, in a Signal message group were entirely permissible and lawful and did not include classified information. To be clear.

WARNER: Well, we will make that determination because if it's not classified, share the text with the Committee. You know, let me go on. Director Gabbard, you are the security executive and set access guidelines for classified information. Did you contact the defense secretary or others after this specific military planning was put out and say, hey, we should be doing this in a skiff?

GABBARD: There was no classified material that was shared in that.

WARNER: So, then if there were no classified in material, share it with the committee. You can't have it both ways. These are important jobs. This is our national security. Bobbing and weaving and trying to, you know, filibuster your answer. So, please answer the question.

If this was -- Director Gabbard, if this was a rank-and-file intelligence officer who did this kind of careless behavior, what would you do with them?

GABBARD: Senator, I'll reiterate that there was no classified material that was shared in that --

WARNER: Ma'am, if there's no classified materials, share. And then, if there's no classified materials, then answer the -- you can't even answer the question whether you are on the chat. This is strangely familiar and I think my colleagues remember when you couldn't answer the question, is Edward Snowden a traitor? Ma'am, I have serious doubts about your -- anyway.

Director Gabbard, I'm going to give you this, tweeted just 11 days ago, and I'm quoting you, "Any unauthorized release of classified information is a violation of the law and will be treated as such." So, if this information is classified, what are you going to do?

GABBARD: Senator, two points here. First of all, there's a difference between inadvertent release versus --

WARNER: Careless and sloppy.

GABBARD: -- malicious leaks of classified information. The second point is there was no classified information that was on --

WARNER: Then the Information Committee should get that information. Director Patel --

GABBARD: And the National Security --

WARNER: Director Patel, my time's about out, and I'm going to use my 12 seconds at the chairman. Director Patel, has the FBI launched any investigation of this?

PATEL: Senator, I was just briefed about it late last night and this morning. I don't have an update.

WARNER: I would like to get an answer by the end of the day.

COTTON: At this point in the ordinary course of affairs, I would recognize Senator Collins. She asked me to express to you that she is under the weather this morning. She regrets her absence, but anticipate submitting written questions to which I would request your prompt replies for the senator.

Senator Cornyn.

SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Director Gabbard, I applaud President Trump's efforts to try to bring an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine. I want to read a statement out of the annual threat assessment, and just to confirm that you agree with this. It says, Russia views its ongoing war with Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West, and its objective to restore Russian strength and security and it's near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment has increased the risks of unintended escalation between Russia and NATO. Do you do you agree with that statement? And that is in the annual threat assessment, correct?

GABBARD: Correct. CORNYN: I'd like to refer to an A.P. story, Associated Press, dated March 21, 2025. The title of the article is "Western Officials Say Russia is Behind a Campaign of Sabotage Across Europe." This A.P. map shows it.

WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: All right. We're going to continue to monitor this very important hearing, the Senate Intelligence Committee reviewing threats to the United States that are up and coming and they're watching it very, very closely.

We've heard from Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, specifically outlining the threats, the major threats to the U.S. from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

[10:55:00]

The Democratic vice chairman of this committee, Mark Warner, making a major issue of the group chat that was released overnight, over the past 24 hours or so in The Atlantic Magazine. Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic Magazine, releasing details of that group chat. Tulsi Gabbard repeatedly insisting there was no classified information that was included in that chat, but she refused it to even say whether she participated. She did participate in that group chat.

We're going to continue to monitor all of these late breaking developments. This was a committee hearing scheduled before the group chat controversy erupted. We'll watch this. We'll continue our special coverage right after a quick break.

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