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The Situation Room

Top U.S. Intel Officials Testify on War Plans Leak. Aired 11:30a-12p ET

Aired March 25, 2025 - 11:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[11:30:00]

SEN. MIKE ROUNDS (R-SD): Talk to us a little bit about how critical 2.0 is in terms of countering the cyber activity that's going on through nefarious actors.

GEN. TIMOTHY HAUGH, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: Senator, what we were asked to do by Congress was to look at what's the force generation model for the Department of Defense to be able to generate cyber forces.

Based off of that request, I produced a recommendation for the secretary that outlined three critical things, which is really how we manage the talent, how we develop the talent in the department, and also how we equip that talent underpinned by compute and A.I.

We have brought that plan initially back to Secretary Hegseth. He told us to go faster. We have delivered him that plan. And now, based off of his guidance, we will now begin to move forward with the rest of the department.

ROUNDS: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. TOM COTTON (R-AR): Senator Bennet.

SEN. MICHAEL BENNET (D-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for holding this hearing.

And thank you for being here.

Mr. -- Director Ratcliffe, it sounds to me like your testimony today and the secretary -- and the DNI's testimony is that there was nothing wrong at all with the Signal thread that you were on, that it didn't include any targeting information or battle sequence. That is your testimony. That's your testimony.

And I'm a little staggered that that is your view, Director Ratcliffe. Does the CIA have any rules about handling of classified information, yes or no?

JOHN RATCLIFFE, CIA DIRECTOR: Yes.

BENNET: Thank you, Director Ratcliffe.

Do you agree -- Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said this morning when asked by members of the press what had happened, he said this morning in Hawaii that "Atlantic" editor in chief Jeff Goldberg is a -- quote -- "deceitful and highly discredited so-called journalist who's made a profession of providing hoaxes time and time again."

Do you share that evaluation, the secretary of defense's evaluation, of Jeff Goldberg as a journalist?

RATCLIFFE: Senator, I didn't see those comments. I don't know Jeff Goldberg.

BENNET: So do you share that view of the secretary of defense?

RATCLIFFE: Well, I don't have a view on...

BENNET: OK. Do you -- do you -- assuming that he has that view, I'm curious about whether -- you are the CIA director, OK? This has happened. We know it's happened. Did Jeff Goldberg somehow -- was it a -- did he create a hoax that allowed him to become part of this Signal thread?

Please answer the question. You don't -- don't insult the intelligence of the American people. Did he invite himself to the Signal thread?

RATCLIFFE: I don't know how he was invited, but clearly he was added.

(CROSSTALK)

BENNET: Clearly, it was -- finish your sentence, please.

RATCLIFFE: Clearly he was added to the Signal group. Your question is...

BENNET: You don't know that the president's national security adviser invited him to join the Signal thread? Everybody in America knows that. Does the CIA director not know that?

RATCLIFFE: I have seen conflicting reports about who added the reporter to the Signal messaging group.

BENNET: Do you think that it's perfectly appropriate that there was a reporter added, especially one that the secretary of defense says is deceitful, highly discredited, a so-called journalist who's made a profession of peddling hoaxes over and over again?

RATCLIFFE: So...

BENNET: Do you -- is your testimony that it was appropriate that he was added to this Signal thread?

RATCLIFFE: No, of course not. But, Senator...

BENNET: And why did you not call...

RATCLIFFE: Well, hold on, Senator.

BENNET: You are the CIA -- no, you answered...

RATCLIFFE: You're mischaracterizing my testimony.

(CROSSTALK)

BENNET: You answered the question. Let me ask you. When he was added to the thread, you're the CIA director. Why didn't you call out that he was present on the Signal thread?

RATCLIFFE: I don't know if you use Signal messaging app.

BENNET: I do. I do, not for classified information, not for targeting, not for anything remote.

RATCLIFFE: Well, neither do I, Senator. Neither do I, Senator.

BENNET: Well, that's what your testimony is today.

RATCLIFFE: It absolutely is not, Senator. Were you not listening at the beginning...

BENNET: No, I'm saying your...

RATCLIFFE: ... when I said that I was using it as permitted? It is permissible to use.

BENNET: I agree that's your testimony.

RATCLIFFE: Yes.

BENNET: I agree that's your testimony. You asked me if I use it, and I said not for targeting, not for classified information.

RATCLIFFE: And I said I don't either.

(CROSSTALK)

BENNET: I also know Jeff Goldberg. I don't use it to communicate with him, but you thought it was appropriate.

By the way, I think he's one of the more outstanding journalists in America. But I'm shocked to find him on a thread that he's reading in the parking lot of a grocery store in Washington, D.C.

[11:35:01]

And your testimony, as the director of the CIA, is that it's totally appropriate.

RATCLIFFE: No.

BENNET: Is it appropriate that the president...

RATCLIFFE: No, Senator, that is not what I... BENNET: OK. Go ahead, please.

RATCLIFFE: When did I say it was -- when did I use the word appropriate?

BENNET: Well, go ahead, please.

RATCLIFFE: Well, I didn't.

BENNET: That -- everybody in America -- that there's nothing to see here, is what your testimony is.

RATCLIFFE: So, clearly, Senator, no, I never said that.

BENNET: This is just a normal day at the CIA, where we chat about this kind of stuff over Signal. In fact, it's so normal that the last administration left it here for us.

That's your testimony today.

RATCLIFFE: That's your testimony, Senator.

BENNET: No, that's not my testimony. That's what you said.

RATCLIFFE: I didn't say any of those things that you just related, Senator.

BENNET: I heard you say it. We will let the American people decide.

Let me ask you one final point.

RATCLIFFE: I think you mischaracterized...

BENNET: I'm out of time.

RATCLIFFE: Well, are you going to give me a chance to...

BENNET: Is it appropriate -- did you know that the president's Middle East adviser was in Moscow on this thread while you were, as director of the CIA, participating in this thread? Were you aware of that? Are you aware of that today?

RATCLIFFE: I'm not aware of that today.

BENNET: This sloppiness, this incompetence, this disrespect for our intelligence agencies and the personnel who work for them is entirely unacceptable. It's an embarrassment.

RATCLIFFE: Senator...

BENNET: You need to do better. You need to do better.

Thank you. I'm being gaveled by the chairman. And I apologize for over -- going over my time.

COTTON: Senator Young. SEN. TODD YOUNG (R-IN): Thank you all for being here.

I will be asking some follow-up questions, clarifications about the Signal episode in a closed setting, and try and work with all of you to bring clarity to that situation. It appears to me there's some unanswered questions. It'll take some time, I think, to get there in a more dispassionate setting.

Director Gabbard, I'm going to begin today asking you some questions about emerging technologies. It's been a real point of emphasis, I know, of our broader national security community for a period of time. We know that PRC is making generational investments in certain emerging tech, A.I., biotech, and other areas of technology to reduce their vulnerability against any supply chain disruptions and to lead the world in some areas.

As the I.C. assesses, the PRC is seeking to -- quote -- "become a global S&T superpower, surpass the United States, promote self- reliance, and achieve further economic, political, and military gain."

So, Director Gabbard, can you describe the actions China is taking to operationalize that I.C. assessment in ways that directly target the security and prosperity of everyday Americans?

TULSI GABBARD, U.S. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Senator, what we know is that they are trying to use these capabilities as a means to continue to exploit vulnerabilities within our own critical infrastructure and our cyber technology.

The critical infrastructure is a key area of concern, given what we know has already been exploited, these asymmetric attacks that have been placed within our critical infrastructure that are of serious concern, given how they could be exploited especially during a time of conflict.

We know that they are experiencing a boom in their generative A.I. capability and are competing very heavily against our own A.I. capabilities. Obviously, A.I. can and will be used across a multitude of every sector of our society, both here as we are in our own country, and we expect China to be able to continue to do the same there.

YOUNG: So, two key areas of vulnerability to the United States conceivably, susceptibility to cyberattacks and China's leveraging of A.I. towards misinformation, increasingly into the physical realm, they compose threats to us as well.

As follow up, Director Ratcliffe, we have had Huawei. We have had TikTok. What do you believe will be the next point of technological friction and competition between the U.S. and China? What should members of Congress be looking for?

RATCLIFFE: Senator, I think I can answer this question more fully in the classified setting. What I would say is, it relates to the issue of emerging technologies and matters of quantum computing and quantum sensing and our ability to stay ahead of China on the technological curve with respect to those issues.

[11:40:21]

I'd be happy to get into that in further detail in the classified setting.

YOUNG: Excellent. We will dive into that.

Director Haugh, General, how do you see biotech playing into this broader competition?

HAUGH: I think it's an area that from our perspective has increasingly been a priority as we want to understand the approach that China has taken and also to ensure that, as we think about the president's priorities in terms of both economic and technology security, we are certainly as a community following DNI's guidance that we are increasingly putting our resources to be able to ensure that we understand where China is investing in those resources and how that will impact our economy and overall the overall health of our national security.

YOUNG: Thank you, General.

Director Gabbard, not a lot of time left on this end, but I do have a little crypto interest I wanted to communicate to you. Can you share with this committee how we're positioned to disrupt foreign cyber efforts to steal cryptocurrency, such as the North Koreans have successfully done?

If others would like to pull this thread and weigh in on this question very briefly, that would be great.

GABBARD: Senator, we're obviously aware of North Korea's revenue generating by stealing cryptocurrency has had a significant effect on North Korea's capabilities. I defer to our technical experts on the actions that are being taken.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Senator, I think this would be a great topic when we go to close.

YOUNG: It's going to be a busy closed session.

(CROSSTALK)

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

YOUNG: Director Patel?

KASH PATEL, FBI DIRECTOR: I agree with the general. In closed session, I can provide some details.

YOUNG: It's what you get when you visit with a bunch of spies.

All right, Chairman.

COTTON: Senator Kelly. SEN. MARK KELLY (D-AZ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to come back to the topic of the day here, the Signal chain, as reported by "The Atlantic."

Ms. Gabbard and Mr. Ratcliffe, you each testified that there was no information operational in nature, no classified information. So I want to ask each of you just a series. Just respond yes or no.

I will start with Ms. Gabbard.

In the Signal chain that we have been talking about, was there any mention of a target in Yemen?

GABBARD: I don't remember mention of specific targets.

KELLY: Any generic target?

GABBARD: I believe there was discussion around targets in general.

KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe?

RATCLIFFE: I think that's consistent with my recollection. Again, I don't have access to that.

KELLY: Was there any mention, Ms. Gabbard, of a weapon or weapons system?

GABBARD: I don't recall specific weapons systems being named.

KELLY: I'm not talking about specific. Any weapon or weapon system?

GABBARD: I don't recall specific names of systems or weapons being used or named within the time.

KELLY: Well, I'm not asking whether -- I don't want you to tell me what the specific weapon was, but any weapon at all. Mr. Ratcliffe, same question.

RATCLIFFE: I don't recall.

KELLY: How about anything about timing, Ms. Gabbard?

GABBARD: I don't recall specific timing.

KELLY: Was there any mention?

GABBARD: I won't get into the detail of the conversation, but obviously there was a significant amount of planning and internal discussions that had occurred prior to and outside of this Signal chat.

KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe, you're nodding your head. Any mention of any military unit whatsoever, Mr. Ratcliffe?

RATCLIFFE: Not that I recall. KELLY: Ms. Gabbard?

GABBARD: Not that I recall.

KELLY: OK, so I understand that DOD policy prohibits discussion of even what is called controlled unclassified information, or CUI, on unsecured devices. Are both of you aware of that DOD policy?

GABBARD: I haven't read that policy.

[11:45:00]

RATCLIFFE: Not familiar with the DOD policy, but I would say that the secretary of defense is the original classification authority for DOD in deciding what would be classified information.

KELLY: Ms. Gabbard, does the intelligence community have a policy that prohibits discussion of controlled unclassified information?

GABBARD: Yes.

KELLY: It does.

OK, controlled unclassified information, according to DOD, includes information that is information that has not been approved for public release. Would you -- of what's been disclosed publicly of the Signal chain, would either of you feel that that would be approved for public release?

Ms. Gabbard?

GABBARD: The discussion that took place in that Signal chat group was a conversation reflecting national security leaders and the vice president around the president's objectives.

KELLY: So, yes or no, would you approve that for public release?

GABBARD: I don't feel I can answer that question here.

KELLY: Because of the nature of this hearing?

GABBARD: Because of the nature of a private discussion that took place between individual leaders in our government.

KELLY: It would make sense that you would not approve it for public release, wouldn't it?

GABBARD: There are other factors that I that would go into that consideration.

KELLY: OK.

Mr. Ratcliffe, yes or no?

RATCLIFFE: I wouldn't approve the release of classified information. Again, as I have said, my understanding is... KELLY: I'm not talking about classified information, Mr. Ratcliffe I'm talking about information that has not been approved for public release. That is information that is considered controlled unclassified information.

RATCLIFFE: The principals that would have been on that would have been individuals capable of approving that for public release.

KELLY: Do you -- let me -- I got 20 seconds? The deliberation as to whether or not we should launch a strike on another country, would you consider that classified information, Ms. Gabbard?

GABBARD: Well, the information was not classified.

KELLY: This is -- a this is not -- I'm not talking about this. I'm just talking about deliberation from principals as to whether or not we should launch a strike on another country, would you consider that classified information? I'm not talking about what happened this week.

GABBARD: There are other factors that would go into determining that classification.

KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe, the deliberation between principals in our national security apparatus about whether or not to strike another country, would you consider that to be classified information?

RATCLIFFE: Pre-decisional strike deliberation should be conducted through classified channels.

KELLY: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COTTON: If I may, I just want to return Mr. Ratcliffe to your answer there in part to Senator Kelly.

It's been raised several occasions now in this hearing about whether classified information was discussed in this chat. And you mentioned about the secretary of defense being what you called, I think, the original classification authority.

RATCLIFFE: Correct. Correct.

COTTON: I think it's important for the public to understand that, although you and Director Gabbard are original classification authorities on many matters, you're not that for all matters that might be classified in the government. Is that right?

RATCLIFFE: That's correct.

COTTON: So, if the secretary of state has classified sensitive diplomatic details, that's his authority. If the secretary of energy has classified -- sensitive classified information about our national laboratories, that's his authority.

And the two of you can't speak to other departments who have their own original classification authority, in which, of course, as Director Gabbard said, ultimately rest with one person, the president of the United States. Is that correct?

RATCLIFFE: That's correct.

COTTON: OK. I just wanted to clarify that. It looks like the vice chairman wants to weigh in as well.

SEN. MARK WARNER (D-VA): Just very briefly.

I mean, I think it strains the audience and the watching public's credibility if we're talking about timing, packages, that somehow this would be OK to put out, or just frankly, senior American officials trashing Europe.

I have been around this for a while. This is not information you generally put out. And the notion there's not even acknowledgement of, hey, gosh, we screwed up, is stunning to me. And the idea, somehow, well, none of this was classified, but we can't talk about it here, you can't have it both ways.

COTTON: I think the witnesses' point is, they can't speak for every official in the government who has original classification authority.

[11:50:04]

WARNER: Mr. Chairman, I don't -- that's not what we're -- I'm not trying to litigate that. I'm trying to litigate on the face unless, as Senator Bennet said, this reporter is somehow making this all up -- and I think the White House has acknowledged that the text chain that he submitted was authentic.

It strains my mind to think -- it strains my mind if, if the shoe had been on the other foot, what my colleagues would be saying about this. And, again, we're going to get to the bottom of it. I appreciate your comments, but you guys have both testified under law there's nothing classified in that information, there's nothing -- in a sense, I have not heard any -- either one of you say, gosh, we screwed up.

So we will find out. This is too important to our national security. And, again, I know we have got more members to...

(CROSSTALK)

COTTON: They testified, is my understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, that there's no intelligence community classified information. Is that correct, Director Ratcliffe?

RATCLIFFE: That's correct.

COTTON: Is that correct, Director Gabbard?

GABBARD: Yes, Chairman.

WARNER: Well, again.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's not correct. She said repeatedly there was nothing classified, period. WARNER: Period. You can't have it both -- and, again, we will see. I

cannot believe this is not going to come out. And if it's not classified, again, we'd ask you to make it -- give it to the public today.

I'm sure some -- one of your aides back there probably got it on paper. If you got it here, it's not classified, stand by your position. Or is this just one more example of a careless approach to how we keep our secrets in this administration?

COTTON: With apologies to Senator Moran.

SEN. JERRY MORAN (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for being here.

I want to explore a little bit about Ukraine, and I will direct this to Director Ratcliffe or Director Kruse. The ATA assesses that -- quote -- "the grinding war of attrition in Ukraine" -- quote -- "will lead to a gradual but steady erosion of Kyiv's positions on the battlefield."

Are Ukrainian forces at any significant risk of collapse this year?

RATCLIFFE: Go ahead.

LT. GEN. JEFFREY KRUSE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: Before I turn it over to Director Ratcliffe, I think both sides are working through the equipment that they need, the industrial base they need to support that, and the personnel that are required to man all of that equipment and man the front lines.

And as we see the battle space in the various portions, whether it's in Kursk, whether it's in any of the four oblasts. We see areas where Kyiv will struggle to prevent the slow attritional grind. We do not see an imminent collapse in any of the line of control battle spaces at this point.

MORAN: And then vice versa -- that answers my question, unless you want to add something, Director.

Whatever advantages in manpower and material they have, can Russia maintain its operational tempo without significant changes to how it's conducting the war?

KRUSE: I think our assessment from a military perspective is that Russia has the ability to sustain its campaign longer than Kyiv would.

Now, when that timeline hits, we do not have an assessment of, but I believe that, if this were to go on for more than the remainder of this year, both sides would have a significant challenge maintaining their defense industrial base, as well as their operational ops tempo.

MORAN: Longer than this year?

KRUSE: That is correct. And they will each have difficulty at various points throughout the spring, summer and fall as well.

MORAN: Thank you.

Director Ratcliffe, ATA says continuing the Russia-Ukraine war perpetuates strategic risks to the United States of unintended escalation to large-scale war and heightened insecurity among NATO allies. What are the strategic risks to the United States if Russia were to achieve its maximalist objectives via peace agreement?

RATCLIFFE: Achieve via peace agreement?

MORAN: Yes.

RATCLIFFE: Well, I think that clearly the negotiations that are going on reflect that President Trump is seeking a cessation of the war on terms that will end the war permanently.

From an intelligence community standpoint and specifically with regard to CIA assets, we have taken steps to support that, the president's goal of an enduring peace. To General Kruse's comments, I agree with his assessment and generally the public assessment that Russia has the battlefield advantage, is grinding forward slowly.

I want to comment on that, however, to say that with regard to the Ukrainian resistance, the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian military have been underestimated for a period of several years now. And, ultimately, I'm convinced from my reflections in observing from an intelligence standpoint that they will fight with their bare hands if they have to, if they don't have terms that are acceptable to an enduring peace.

[11:55:27]

Obviously, to the point of maximalist goals, President Trump has communicated that he is aware of the dangers of that, of Russia getting what they want. And I think that the peace talks that are taking place would reflect, if successful, and they are making progress, that both sides would not get everything that they want and no one's maximalist goals would be achieved.

MORAN: Thank you both.

In the short time I have, I'm going to skip a question and ask the -- that I intended to ask, but ask the director of the FBI.

Director, I chair the subcommittee that appropriates money for the Department of Justice, including the FBI. It has been our practice that the FBI director, as well as the attorney general, appear before our committee each year. And I would want to make certain that you do not foresee any challenges that I will have in your presence when you come to speak to -- when we invite you to come speak about your budget.

I think, when we visited in the office, you made yourself often available, pleased to talk to Congress. We're getting ready for the appropriations process to begin. The budget that the president intends to submit is seemingly months away, weeks away, long weeks away.

And we may ask you to come testify about your priorities now or sooner than that. Is that a challenge for you that I'd have to be aware of?

PATEL: From the FBI, no, as long as the Department of Justice and the attorney general are good with it.

MORAN: Thank you.

COTTON: Senator Reed.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Director Ratcliffe, if you have repeatedly made the point that there was no classified information contained in any of these discussions that were reported in "The Atlantic Monthly." Is that correct?

RATCLIFFE: No, that's not correct.

So, Senator, what I have related is that any information that was related from my perspective or that I observed from the intelligence perspective was not classified information. With respect to the assertions and the allegations that there was strike packages or targeting information or things that relate to DOD, as I have pointed out, the secretary of defense is the original classification authority for determining whether something's classified or not.

And as I have understood from media reports, the secretary of defense has said the information was not classified.

REED: Are you aware that the secretary of defense declassified this information prior to the discussion?

RATCLIFFE: I'm not.

REED: Director Gabbard, same question. You have said it. You have indicated, at least the impression I got, whether there was no classified information discussed. Is that correct?

GABBARD: Senator, my answer is the same as the director of the CIA's.

REED: So, the question has to be posed to Secretary Hegseth whether he declassified the information and at what point he did declassify. Do you agree?

GABBARD: Yes, I defer questions to the secretary of defense.

REED: OK.

Director Patel, are you conducting an investigation of this, these discussions and activities?

PATEL: Thank you, Senator. As I informed the chairman -- the vice chairman on the same question, I found out about this late last night, early this morning, so I don't have an update for you on that.

REED: Well, thank you. When you get an update, we'd appreciate it very much.

PATEL: Yes, sir.

REED: Director Gabbard, were you overseas during any parts of these discussions?

GABBARD: Yes, Senator, I was.

REED: Were you using your private phone or public phone for the Signal discussions?

GABBARD: I won't speak to this, because it's under review by the National Security Council. Once that review is complete, I'm sure we will share the results with the committee.

REED: What is under review? It's a very simple question. Are you -- your private phone or officially issued phone? What could be under review?

GABBARD: National Security Council is reviewing all aspects of how this came to be, how the journalist was inadvertently added to the group chat, and what occurred within that chat across the board.

REED: But -- so you are not going to disclose anything about whether you used the phone?

Director Ratcliffe, there's been indication that the CIA has warned recently retired personnel about the vulnerabilities of Signal and other encrypted messaging applications.