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Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Birthright Citizenship. Aired 11-11:30a ET

Aired May 15, 2025 - 11:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


[11:00:00]

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WOLF BLITZER, CNN HOST: Welcome back to our special edition of THE SITUATION ROOM, where we are listening to live audio from the U.S. Supreme Court.

Right now, justices are hearing arguments about presidential authority and the power of lower courts here in the United States to restrain that authority from a president. Can a federal judge halt President Trump's plan to end what's called birthright citizenship for babies born on U.S. soil?

There's a reminder -- this is a reminder -- here's a reminder of what the U.S. Constitution says and was enshrined in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.

It says this: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."

Let's listen in to more of these arguments coming in.

John Sauer, the U.S. solicitor general representing the Trump administration, is making the case for the president.

(JOINED IN PROGRESS)

BRETT KAVANAUGH, U.S. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: ... Congress, particularly with the filibuster rule, presidents want to get things done with good intentions. The executive branches that work for those presidents push hard to when they can't get new authority to stretch or use existing authority.

And they have been pushing, understandably, all with good intentions, all the presidents, both parties, right, with good intentions, pushing. Is that your understanding of why this has happened more, that there's less ability to get legislation?

Because I'm trying to figure out the why to your opening about the last four or five administrations. I agree with it. I think that might be the why, but I'm curious what you think.

D. JOHN SAUER, U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL: I'm speculating about the motivations of the individual district judges to grant these, but one explanation might be, this is an extraordinary power.

It's a very strong power for the reasons the questions have reflected for a district judge...

KAVANAUGH: Let me just pause you right there. The underlying point is that these district judges are not just doing universal injunctions. They're finding these actions illegal because they're exceeding existing authority, and, oftentimes, we are too when it gets to us, finding the actions of presidents of both parties unlawful because they exceed existing authority.

So is that coming up more often because of -- why is that coming up more often?

SAUER: It's hard to do an historical analysis, but I would draw an analogy to the New Deal.

And Professor Bray makes this point in his article that actually there were very, very passionate challenges to sort of nationwide policies during the Roosevelt administration, and they were not addressed by issuing universal injunctions. He cites an example for in one case a policy had been held illegal and there were like 1,600 injunctions against that policy all protecting the individual plaintiffs.

So, if you look at the history, it's not clear that what we have of disagreement, difficulty, gridlock, getting things through Congress and so forth, that's not necessarily new. What is new and is certainly unique to the last five presidential administrations is having these given on this widespread basis and the systematic basis, 40, again, in the last four months.

KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

JOHN ROBERTS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: Justice Barrett.

AMY CONEY BARRETT, U.S. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: General Sauer, I want to ask you about a potential tension -- well, no, not potential tension, an actual tension that I see in answers that you gave to Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Kagan.

You resisted Justice Kagan when she asked you whether the government would obey within the Second Circuit a precedent, distinguishing between opinions and judgments here. Did I understand you correctly to tell Justice Kagan that the government wanted to reserve its right to maybe not follow a Second Circuit precedent, say, in New York because you might disagree with the opinion?

SAUER: Our general practice is to respect those precedents, but there are circumstances when it is not a categorical practice. And that is not...

(CROSSTALK)

BARRETT: This administration's practice or the longstanding practice of the federal government? And I'm not talking about in the Fourth Circuit, are you going to respect a Second Circuit? I'm talking about within the Second Circuit.

And can you say, is that this administration's practice or a longstanding one?

SAUER: As I understand it, longstanding policy of the Department of Justice.

BARRETT: Really?

SAUER: Yes, that we generally -- as it was phrased to me, generally respect circuit precedent, but not necessarily in every case. And certain examples -- some examples might be a situation where we're litigating to try and get that circuit precedent overruled and so forth.

BARRETT: Well, OK, so I'm not talking about a situation in which the Second Circuit has a case from 1955 and you think it's time for it to be challenged. That's not what I'm talking about.

[11:05:02]

I'm talking about in this kind of situation. I'm talking about, this week, the Second Circuit holds that the executive order is unconstitutional, and then what do you do the next day or the next week?

SAUER: Generally, we follow that.

BARRETT: So you're still saying generally?

SAUER: Yes.

BARRETT: And you still think that it's generally the policy, longstanding policy, of the federal government to take that approach?

SAUER: That is my understanding.

BARRETT: OK. So -- but it sounds to me like you accept a Cooper v. Aaron kind of situation for the Supreme Court, but not for, say, the Second Circuit...

(CROSSTALK)

BARRETT: ... where you would respect the opinions and the judgments of the Supreme Court. And you're saying you would respect the judgment, but not necessarily the opinion of a lower court.

SAUER: And, again, and I think, in the vast majority of instances, our practice has been to respect the opinion as well, in the circuits as well. But my understanding is, that has not been a categorical practice in the way respect for the precedents and the judgments of the Supreme Court has been.

BARRETT: So you're not hedging it all with respect to the precedent of this court?

SAUER: That is correct. I believe the quotation from our application directly addresses that.

BARRETT: OK.

SAUER: And we stand by that completely.

BARRETT: OK.

Next question. So this is also a follow up to some of your -- the questions that others have asked you about the merits of the order not being before us. Did I understand your answer to be because you think percolation is really important for this one?

SAUER: We do think percolation is really important for this one. But the reason the merits are not before is because we have only submitted a stay application the scope of relief question. And as Labrador against Poe indicates, the scope of relief is a separate question for the...

BARRETT: Oh, I understand it's a separate question. But there are plenty of times that the government comes to us and asks for both.

SAUER: Absolutely. For example, recently in the Wilkins and Cox (ph) application, we did exactly that.

BARRETT: And the reason why you didn't ask for both here is because you think that the merits question needs percolation?

SAUER: Yes. But also, more fundamentally, it illustrates that the very problem with these nationwide injunctions is, they force this rushed, fast and furious decisions on the merits. So I think it'd be very inappropriate in this case to come to a stay application saying, please give us a rushed decision on the merits of something that's very, very complicated.

BARRETT: But the government's done that in other cases too, right?

SAUER: Those cases would be different. In this case, the example I gave earlier, we think it's very clear-cut on the merits.

This one is, we can see it a novel and sensitive question.

BARRETT: So this one isn't clear-cut on the merits?

(CROSSTALK)

SAUER: This one, in this case, we want the court to address the remedial issue. If we offered the merit first, that's a vehicle problem because the court has, in many cases, just addressed the merits and not the remedial issue.

And it's imperative, from the federal government's perspective, that the remedial question be addressed.

BARRETT: OK. So last question is about why that is. Justice Alito asked you, well, what's the point of this? If the same thing could happen, which is effectively the E.O. being enjoined everywhere via class action or because it's necessary to provide complete relief, say, to the states, is there any difference, in your view, between, say, a class is certified of all individual plaintiffs and they win and the executive order class-wide, there's a judgment saying that it can't be enforced?

Do you want to say, follow up, is there any practical distinction you see? Why does the government care? Is it just the rigors of the certification process or is it something more?

SAUER: The rigors of the certification process. Keep in mind that in many of these cases, we successfully oppose class action.

(CROSSTALK)

BARRETT: Let's assume, I think, you can't successfully oppose it here for individual plaintiffs.

SAUER: Well, I mean, that opportunity to have our day in court on that is very, very important.

BARRETT: I understand, but let's assume. Go with my assumption.

SAUER: Assuming that we were to lose...

(CROSSTALK)

BARRETT: Assume the class is certified. Is there any benefit? If a class is certified, and let's say, you were pointing out that the executive order targets two different kinds of people, let's assume that it's commonality because they only target one portion of the order, right?

In that circumstance, does the government get anything different? This is back to Justice Alito's question about, what's it to you? What's the practical difference to you? Do you want to say anything about whether there is a practical difference between a universal injunction and a loss in the class?

SAUER: Absolutely. Among many others, the represented class members are bound in the class action context. And that means that, if they lose, they're bound by that as well. So they're taking a grave risk, so to speak, by proceeding through a class action.

And it has this symmetry where the government is bound if we lose, they are bound if we don't lose. And that's a very, very important distinction.

BARRETT: And you would respect that judgment?

SAUER: If we're -- yes, if it were a judgment. Now, we may try to litigate another context to try and get a different judgment from a different district court.

BARRETT: Sure.

SAUER: But we would be bound by that judgment, as would they. And that's the crucial point.

ROBERTS: Justice Jackson?

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, U.S. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: So, as far as I can tell, your bottom line seems to be that what you call universal injunctions give relief to nonparties without going through the necessary steps, which you identify in Rule 23. Do I have that right?

I mean, is that sort of like, boiled to bare essence, what you're saying?

[11:10:02]

SAUER: I would say there's a lot more to it, but that's one very important point.

JACKSON: Yes. That's a key point that I want to focus in on for a moment.

I guess I don't understand why you are saying that these kinds of injunctions are giving relief to nonparties. First of all, I think they can be also easily characterized as focusing only on the defendant, pursuant to the court's jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over this person relative to the subject matter jurisdiction that the court has.

And the relief is telling the defendant, stop doing this thing that the court has found to be unlawful. So, rather than characterizing it as a -- quote, unquote -- "universal injunction," I think one could easily see that this is just about the extent to which the court can constrain a defendant over whom it has personal jurisdiction.

Can it do so completely or just partially with respect to -- just say stop with respect to this plaintiff? Am I mischaracter -- like, I just -- I don't understand where this idea of universal injunctions comes from in this context.

SAUER: I think the relevant distinction is an order that orders, in this case, the government defendant to cease allegedly unlawful activity as to the parties who have come into court and sued and one that says to the government defendant, cease the allegedly lawful activity against everyone in the entire world.

JACKSON: No, just cease it. Just stop. This thing, this executive order -- I mean, we do this in the APA context all the time, right? The statute says you hold that the -- you set aside the conduct, right, that it's unlawful.

And we don't really parse it out and say, OK, but it's unlawful only as it applies to the plaintiff or not. So it's a very common concept for the court to enjoin a defendant from doing particular unlawful behavior. And what you're now asking us to do is to require that the court have an additional limitation in its order that says you only have to stop doing this with respect to the plaintiff. And that's the part that I don't understand. I guess, I guess from

what I can read from your papers and what you have said here, that limitation you say comes from this principle that, if you don't do that, you would be somehow giving relief to nonparties.

But I wonder if that's right. I mean, it seems to me that the relief is the judgment that you provide to the plaintiff that says, stop doing this conduct. And you give it only to the plaintiff. That's where the limitation comes. The plaintiff is the only person who can go to court after you violate this order and enforce it.

Other people are incidental beneficiaries of a court ordering you to follow the law. I mean, that's like everyone in the world. When the court says follow the law, anybody who would have been hurt by your not following the law benefits. OK. I don't understand why that would limit the court in its ability to tell you, don't do this unlawful conduct.

SAUER: Two responses to that.

JACKSON: Yes. Yes.

SAUER: There's a lot there. Two responses to that.

One is that principle that your question referred to is the holding of the court in Warth v. Seldin, and it's reaffirmed in Gill v. Whitford, in Lewis v. Casey and similar cases that the authority of the federal court, whether it's viewed as arising at Article III or under its traditional scope of equitable authority, is to remediate the injuries to the complaining party.

And then to address your question about...

JACKSON: Can I just stop you there?

I'm, as the court, remediating the injury by telling the defendant to stop doing this behavior. The plaintiff has brought a claim that this executive order is unlawful. I look at it, I litigate it, and I say, you're right. Stop doing it. You cannot enforce this order.

So I don't understand why that's, like, outside the scope of Warth v. Seldin.

SAUER: If the court in that case is imposing what we have called an indivisible remedy, for example, vacatur under the Apalachee -- there's a debate about what set-aside means.

Assuming it means to vacate, then the remedy that Congress has provided as a condition of its delegation to the agency is if one part of the -- if the regulation is unlawful, then the remedy granted, which directly remediates the plaintiff's injury on that hypothetical, is an indivisible remedy that benefits others.

Here in this case, and in all the other 40 cases, we see something totally different.

JACKSON: Yes, I understand. Yes.

SAUER: It is not necessary to remediate the injuries of the plaintiff before them. That is the...

(CROSSTALK)

JACKSON: I understand.

Let me just turn your attention to one other thing, because the real concern, I think, is that your argument seems to turn our justice system, in my view at least, into a catch me if you can kind of regime from the standpoint of the executive, where everybody has to have a lawyer and file a lawsuit in order for the government to stop violating people's rights.

[11:15:06]

Justice Kagan says, let's assume, for the purpose of this, that you're wrong about the merits, that the government is not allowed to do this under the Constitution, and yet it seems to me that your argument says we get to keep on doing it until everyone who is potentially harmed by it figures out how to file a lawsuit, hire a lawyer, et cetera.

And I don't understand how that is remotely consistent with the rule of law, a system -- and I appreciate that you go back to English common law and the chancery court, but they had a different system. The fact that courts back in English chancery couldn't enjoin the king, I think, is not analogous or indicative of what courts can do in our system, where "the king" -- quote, unquote -- the executive, is supposed to be bound by the law.

And the court has the power to say what the law is. And so one would think that the court could say, this conduct is unlawful and you have to stop doing it.

SAUER: I think the catch me if you can problem operates in the opposite direction, where we have the government racing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, having to sort of clear the table in order to implement a new policy.

A great example of this is in the Shilling litigation, where the military had a military readiness policy. It was universally enjoined by the DDC. It went up to the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit stayed at a junction to allow that policy to go into effect.

And then one hour later, a district court on the other side of the country universally...

(CROSSTALK)

JACKSON: Can I just ask you one final thing? Because this relates to also something that Justice Kagan said? I would think we'd want the system to move as quickly as possible to reach the merits of the issue and maybe have this court decide whether or not the government is entitled to do this under the law. Wouldn't having universal injunctions actually facilitate that? It

seems to me that, when the government is completely enjoined from doing the thing it wants to do, it moves quickly to appeal that, to get it to the Supreme Court. And that's actually what we would want.

What I worry about is, similar to what Justice Kagan points out, is that if the government is saying no lower court can completely enjoin it, it actually means that the government just keeps on doing the purportedly unlawful thing, and it delays the ability for this court to reach the underlying issue.

SAUER: Percolation of novel, sensitive constitutional issues is a merit of our system. It is not a bad feature of the system.

JACKSON: Thank you.

ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Feigenbaum?

JEREMY FEIGENBAUM, NEW JERSEY SOLICITOR GENERAL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court.

This court should deny the emergency application, because this injunction was properly designed to ensure that the states would get relief for our own Article III injuries, as we suffer significant pocketbook and sovereign harms from implementation of this executive order, including from the application of this E.O. to the 6,000 babies born to New Jersey parents out of state every year.

The U.S. prefers alternative approaches for granting that relief, alternatives it never raised in the district court below, but its approach would require citizenship to vary based on the state in which you're born, or even turn on or off when someone crosses state lines, raising serious and unanswered administrability questions, not just for the federal government, but also for the states.

And it would offend the text in history of the Citizenship Clause itself. Since the 14th Amendment, our country has never allowed American citizenship to vary based on the state in which someone resides, because the post-Civil War nation wrote into our Constitution that citizens of the United States and of the states would be one and the same, without variation across state lines.

The U.S.' claim that Article III establishes a bright line rule barring such injunctions no matter the circumstance, even where the states do need it to meet their own harms, finds no support in this court's cases or in the history of equity.

Its argument that a single district court cannot decide birthright citizenship or that we need more percolation on that question for the nation overlooks that this court already settled this exact constitutional question 127 years ago, and that this E.O. is contrary to over a century of executive practice.

Finally, the U.S.' objection that nationwide P.I.s have simply become too common in the last few months, a complaint about other injunctions sought by other parties cannot undermine the extraordinary bases for this one. The states, who regularly come before this court as plaintiff and defendant alike, agree that nationwide relief can be reserved for narrow circumstances, but it was needed here.

I welcome this court's questions.

[11:20:01]

CLARENCE THOMAS, U.S. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: Putting the merits aside, what do you think is the origin of -- at least the pedigree of universal injunctions, particular the bill of peace, if you would discuss that?

SAUER: Absolutely, Your Honor.

So there's two categories of these broad injunctions. So, first, although we use the term nationwide injunction, if the nationwide injunction is actually about meeting our harm and the alternatives are not legally or practically workable, then it isn't even a universal injunction, as I know this court's separate writings has used the term, because it's about meeting our own Article III injury, which is our basic submission about this case.

But we do agree that there's some space for universal relief. We trace it back through the history from the bill of peace through Equity Rule 48, which specifically clarified that, in the American equitable tradition, it was not always the case that universal relief would bind the nonparties, even as it might benefit the nonparties, continuing on to the tax collection injunctions in the 19th century, and then continuing on as recently as this court's order in AARP.

So I do think they have always been in narrow circumstances. They have never been the reflexive or norm of how relief should be granted in this country, but they have been available. I don't think I need that for my case, but I do think they're available in narrow circumstances.

ROBERTS: You say they should be available only in narrow circumstances. Why is that?

FEIGENBAUM: Yes, so I could offer the three that I think make the most sense, but we're mindful of some of the concerns that the United States raises.

We are states who have benefited from federal policies. We are states who have our own statutes and policies. So, sometimes, we are on the other side of the V in cases involving universal relief. So, we are sympathetic to some of the concerns the United States has about percolation, about running the table in particular cases.

We just don't think that that supports a bright line rule that says they're never available. And we have identified, I think, at least three circumstances where they would make sense to be available.

The first would be in cases where the alternative ways of remedying the harm for the parties are not practically or legally workable. That's this case. I will return to that in a second.

The second would be congressional authorization. So I took my friend on the other side to try to set aside vacatur, but I do think their Article III objections would raise serious questions for remedies like vacatur, for remedies like the Hobbs Act, even the Hobbs Act, which could set a nationwide P.I. after a multicircuit lottery, might ultimately have problems under their view of Article III.

And then the third thing I would say is, there may be cases in which the alternative forms of getting nonparty relief are not legally or practically available. So that might be a case like AARP, or even a case like this one, where district courts could consider the availability of the class action device, but if it couldn't move fast enough, because Rule 23 doesn't include TROs and P.I.s, if it couldn't move fast enough in those contexts, courts might need to step in anyway.

But I think we fit in the first bucket in this particular case, because the alternative ways of remedying our particular significant pocketbook harms, to the tunes of millions of dollars, can't be remedied, as the district court found below, without granting us this kind of relief.

ROBERTS: Well, I mean, you could benefit through percolation and a decision from this court with reasonable expedition.

FEIGENBAUM: So I have no objections to reasonable expedition. We would have no objection to this court even setting supplemental briefing on the merits and hearing the merits directly. I'm happy to talk about the ways in which I think the merits do bear on this emergency application.

But, more fundamentally to your question, Mr. Chief Justice, I would just note that I don't think the alternatives actually fully remedy our injuries in a couple of different respects. So I heard my friend on the other side specifically say today that maybe there can be an instruction to the federal government that, at least when you're dealing with the plaintiff states, you treat these individuals kind of as though they're citizens, even if they're not really citizens.

And that doesn't work not just for the federal government. I agree, Justice Gorsuch, it may well be that the federal government can decide when to take its own medicine, but I'm talking about administrability burdens on the states, and I'm talking about administrability burdens on third parties as well.

NEIL GORSUCH, U.S. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: Can I ask you a question about that, counsel? Your three buckets are very thoughtful.

The first one seems to me kind of consistent with traditional equity, which is, if it's required -- if -- you have got to remedy the plaintiff's harm. That's your point there, and you're saying we fall in that bucket. I get that argument.

The second bucket is possibly Article III, OK, that Congress could authorize, maybe has authorized circumstances, but that doesn't answer the equity point. So we come to bucket three, and I'm struggling to understand what the rule is there. You seem to suggest, well, if it's really important and if you have to act expeditiously, then go ahead.

But I think every district court who enters one of these thinks that's what they're doing. So what's the constraint there? If you share the government's concerns about the rise of these things in the last few decades, what teeth does any of that have?

FEIGENBAUM: So I do feel like something of an amicus to this question, because nothing in my injunction rises or falls on this third bucket.

[11:25:04]

GORSUCH: Exactly. So...

FEIGENBAUM: But -- so I'm happy to answer questions on this.

GORSUCH: I need all the amici I can get.

(LAUGHTER)

FEIGENBAUM: Fair enough, Your Honor.

So I would say two things about that. The first is, it does require reading the history in a way more like I do, which does not create a single bright line rule that this is never available. Obviously, if someone reads the history as saying...

GORSUCH: I'm spotting you that for the purposes of my question.

FEIGENBAUM: Great. Great.

GORSUCH: I'm not granting the premise.

FEIGENBAUM: I thought you might not, Justice Gorsuch.

GORSUCH: But I'm spotting it to you. And I'm just saying, well, OK, what would that look like and how would that be any different from what we have experienced over the last few decades?

FEIGENBAUM: So this is a way in which my first bucket and my third bucket are actually going to relate for a moment. So, I think this is...

GORSUCH: No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

FEIGENBAUM: No, no, it's helpful, I promise.

GORSUCH: You don't get to squiggle out into the first bucket, OK? We're in the third bucket.

FEIGENBAUM: I will answer for the third bucket...

GORSUCH: Thank you. FEIGENBAUM: ... which is, I think it requires having district courts

consider the availability of the alternative and explaining why it's not workable in the case.

GORSUCH: I think we have told them to do that. And, gosh, how many times do we have to tell them to do that? And I think, in fairness to them, that's -- they think they have.

So let's -- again, would any case of the last 30 years come out differently under your view of the rule in the third bucket than has?

FEIGENBAUM: Yes, so there's a couple of examples where we don't think universal relief was appropriate. I'm most familiar with the state litigation, so most of my examples will probably come from there, but I heard my friend on the other side mention the DACA litigation, where Texas sought the termination of DACA and ultimately the Fifth Circuit terminated DACA specific to Texas alone.

And we thought that that decision was exactly right because of the nature of the harms in that case meant that Texas could get full relief for its harms.

GORSUCH: Well, that -- now we're back to the first bucket. We're just satisfying the...

FEIGENBAUM: Well, I take the point. I'm so sorry, Your Honor.

GORSUCH: You see what I'm saying?

FEIGENBAUM: I take the point. Yes. So, I think...

GORSUCH: I mean, I get that we're going to always revert back to the first bucket, but that means the third bucket's empty. And...

FEIGENBAUM: I totally take the point. I think AARP is a good illustration of the third bucket that this court confronted recently, where it was the case that there was this rush just a few hours, not possible to go through class certification. You heard my friend on the other side talk about the rigors of class certification.

And I don't think my friend on the other side would agree it could be done in three hours through the night. And so there were a necessity to step in on it.

KAVANAUGH: Do you agree about the rigors of class certification? It seems to me that Rule 23(b)(2) classes and you probably, if you have to, are going to be arguing that they're not so rigorous to meet for injunctive relief for national policies that are uniform.

FEIGENBAUM: So the most important thing that hasn't come up in the discussion this morning yet is that they're not available for state litigation. It talks about persons. It talks about appointment of class council. It talks about going through the certification process.

States -- I mean, this court's precedents are really clear about (INAUDIBLE) lawsuits. States can't represent those individuals in class actions, nor would we try to. They can't represent us, and you don't have classes of states.

So the whole framework doesn't apply to state litigation. So I understood how it might come up as an alternative for some other cases you might see in the future, but for the injunction you have in front of you from the states, the whole class device doesn't even work as an alternative. So I don't see how it can be the answer for us.

BARRETT: But why should you care if the class device doesn't work as an alternative if you have bucket one?

Like you...

BLITZER: All right, we have been listening to Jeremy Feigenbaum, the solicitor general of New Jersey, make the case against President Trump's decision to ban birthright citizenship here in the United States.

He's going to continue answering the questions from the nine Supreme Court justices.

We will continue to monitor that, of course, a lot more coming up. This is truly a historic moment for the United States Supreme Court. Will birthright citizenship be allowed to continue or not?

We will continue our special coverage right after this.

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