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The Situation Room

Now: Secretary of State Rubio Testifies on U.S. Policy on Venezuela; Rubio Takes Questions from Lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Aired 10:30-11a ET

Aired January 28, 2026 - 10:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:30:00]

PAMELA BROWN, CNN ANCHOR:

WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: Welcome back. Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee are now asking Secretary of State Marco Rubio Important questions about U.S. policy in Venezuela. Right now. Jean Shaheen, the ranking Democrat, is asking questions. Let's listen to.

MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE: That's the process that I outlined to you. So, on the sanctioned oil, the oil that requires us permission to move, that oil, the proceeds of that oil, which by the way is being sold at market price, not at the discount Venezuela was being forced to sell, is being deposited into an account that ultimately will become a U.S. Treasury-blocked account here in the United States.

We will -- they will submit, we will at the front end say, this is what this money can be spent on, on these things. We will submit to them -- they will submit to us a budget request. We want to use this money for these things. And as part -- and part of the proceeds will go to fund, an audit process to make sure that's how the money is being spent.

SEN. JEANNE SHAHEEN (D-NH), RANKING MEMBER, FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE: So, there is --

RUBIO: And that's how we intend to handle those funds in the short- term.

SHAHEEN: There's an actual audit process that's been set up? Who is responsible it responsible?

RUBIO: It'll be set up. And we have a couple options. You know, I don't -- one option is the XM bank. They have expertise as bankers and being able to do some of that part -- option. There may be some others in place. We haven't finalized what that audit process would be. We've only made one payment, and that payment we did, and retrospectively will be audited. But it was important we made that payment because they had to meet payroll, they had to keep sanitation workers, police officers, government workers on staff. It was a $300 million payment.

SHAHEEN: Right. So, it's been reported that the oil sold for 500 million. That 300 million went to Venezuelan government. What happened to the other 200 million? RUBIO: It's still sitting in the account is my understanding at this time.

SHAHEEN: The account in Qatar?

RUBIO: Well, the account -- yes, but that will ultimately be -- that's a short-term account. Ultimately, it will be a U.S. Treasury- blocked account in the United States.

[10:35:00]

SHAHEEN: And will it also be audited?

RUBIO: Correct. Well, the audit will be on the expenditures. At the front end, we'll tell them, this is what the money can be spent on. Again, I'm not talking about all the other revenues the Venezuelan government may have. We're talking about the revenues from the sanctioned oil. At the front end, we will say, this is what the allowable expenses are.

And then they will agree to fund, as part of the overall cost, they will pay for and fund an audit system acceptable to us to ensure that that's how the money was spent.

SHAHEEN: And can you report to this committee once that audit system is set up?

RUBIO: Oh, absolutely, yes.

SHAHEEN: I'd like to change the topic in my short time that I have left, because when you were a member of this committee, you authored legislation to prevent President Trump from unilaterally leaving NATO, you and Senator Kaine. Do you still believe that the U.S. benefits from NATO?

RUBIO: We do. I mean, the problem -- but NATO needs to be reimagined as well in terms of the obligations. And this is not new to this president. Multiple presidents have complained about it.

SHAHEEN: I agree.

RUBIO: I think this president just complains about it louder than other presidents.

SHAHEEN: Well, I'm just trying to get a clear answer on where this administration stands relative to NATO, because it's been a very fuzzy message over the last year. And do you agree that we're stronger in confronting China when we do so with like-minded partners and that China is still the number one threat that we face in the United States?

RUBIO: Yes, but our like-minded partners have to have capability. And that's been part of the problem, is the erosion in European defense capabilities, because they've taken vast amount of the monies. These are rich countries. And because of the NATO umbrella, they gave them the flexibility to spend a tremendous amount of their revenues on social programs and not on defense. Now, maybe that trend line will begin to change --

SHAHEEN: Well, it's already begun to change, frankly. And thanks. And I think the president deserves credit for that, for the fact that there is now a commitment for 5 percent of GDP to be spent on defense. But part of that strength also comes not just from having the mechanism, the military might, but it also comes from the unity with our allies. And to the extent to which that unity is undermined, like the talk about Greenland and antagonizing Denmark, then it undermines NATO's ability. And the only people who are excited about that are Vladimir Putin and President Xi.

RUBIO: Yes. Well, I would say that I think our alliances in NATO ultimately are something that's going to work out. Our partners understand the importance of the U.S. presence in NATO. Without the U.S., there is no NATO. And we understand that in order for NATO to be stronger, our partners need to be stronger.

And one of the things we've explained to our allies in NATO is the United States is not simply focused on Europe. We also have defense needs in the Western Hemisphere. We have defense needs in the Indo- Pacific. And it will require us -- we may be the richest country in the world, but we don't have unlimited resources. And as we reassign --

SHAHEEN: Which is exactly why we want to have allies and partners to help us as we're looking at conflicts around the world. And when we antagonize our allies and partners, and when we send Canada to do a trade deal with China instead of coming to New Hampshire or the United States, it weakens our ability to confront our adversaries.

RUBIO: Yes. But our allies have to be two things. They have to be willing to step up, but they also have to be capable of stepping up. And frankly, many of them have not. I mean, Spain is still not doing the 5 percent. I mean, there are countries that are still not doing -- and in fact, Mark Rutte yesterday pointed out that without the United States, the countries of Europe would have to spend 10 percent of their GDP for the next 20 years to be able to make up the whole. So, I do think there needs to be a rebalancing and hopefully we'll have cooperation. I think we will. Rutte has done a great job of managing all that.

SHAHEEN: And I'm not arguing that point with you. As I said, I agree with what the president has asked of our European allies. What I'm arguing with you about is that his rhetoric is undermining NATO and our partnerships with our allies. And that's a problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. JAMES RISCH (R-ID): Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts.

SEN. PETE RICKETTS (R-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Rubio, for being here. So, some of the comments from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are difficult to square with the record. The goalpost didn't move, nor did Maduro change. The only thing that changed was President Trump acted on what members of both parties said needed to be happened and it needed to happen. And did so, by the way, with an operation that will go down in history as one of the most impressive and tactically proficient to be ever carried out.

So, Secretary Rubio, I'd like to get your response to a few yes or no questions. I know that's typically not your nature, but please bear with me here a moment, OK?

RUBIO: All right. Let's hear them first. I hate game shows. Go ahead.

RICKETTS: For years, the United States had a standing bounty on Nicolas Maduro, correct?

RUBIO: Have what, I'm sorry?

RICKETTS: A standing bounty on Nicolas Maduro.

RUBIO: Oh, yes.

RICKETTS: And this bounty was increased by both the Biden and Trump administrations, correct?

RUBIO: Correct.

RICKETTS: And despite that bounty, did Maduro remain in power?

RUBIO: Yes.

RICKETTS: Did he continue to support drug traffickers?

RUBIO: Oh, yes.

[10:40:00]

RICKETTS: Was the operation absolute resolve a law enforcement operation supported by the military?

RUBIO: It was.

RICKETTS: Did that operation successfully remove Maduro and his wife and they were taken into custody?

RUBIO: Yes. Great questions.

RICKETTS: Thanks. Were any service members, law enforcement officers killed in that operation?

RUBIO: No. Not any of ours.

RICKETTS: None of ours, right. Has there largely been a broad support across Latin America for Maduro's removal?

RUBIO: Yes.

RICKETTS: And is the United States better off with Nicolas Maduro in custody?

RUBIO: Yes, and Venezuela too.

RICKETTS: Right. I realize that you'll hear differing views during this hearing, but I want to at least offer my personal congratulations to you and everybody who helped carry this out because the world is better off without Nicolas Maduro.

A few weeks ago, you briefed the Senate on your three-phase plan. You've been talking about it here today on stabilization, recovery, and the transition in Venezuela. Is there anything this Congress can do to be helpful in executing on that plan?

RUBIO: There will be in time. There's no doubt about it. On the stabilization front, you know, in order to stabilize it, for example, we're going to have to begin to provide some licenses through OFAC. So, as an example, if a company wants to go down and explore the opportunity to do some economic activity in Venezuela, they will require a license from Treasury to be able to do that. And so, that doesn't require congressional action, but I wanted you to be aware of it when you start to see some of these things. Some of these are just exploratory.

The second is, I think in time, look, Venezuela is a very wealthy country. This is not a country that's going to require money from the United States to rebuild, to stabilize, to transition. It really isn't. It has the ability to be, and it has been historically, the wealthiest country in the Western Hemisphere -- in Latin -- in South America, in many cases. The problem is that the wealth of the country was being stolen.

And so, part of both the recovery and the transition phase is ensuring that you leave in place a prosperous, you know, free, democratic, allied with the United States and friendly, but also prosperous Venezuela, where the resources of the country are being done responsibly -- are being utilized responsibly and to the benefit of the people and their economy.

So, in time, you know, I imagine we will be coming back to you with specific legislation that may be required to assist in that function. But we don't expect that this is going to require any spending on our part. On the contrary, unlike many of the other parts of the world we've gotten involved, Venezuela is, we're not spending any money in Venezuela right now, other than whatever it costs to stand up our embassy.

RICKETTS: Let me switch gears a little bit. One of the common criticisms after Maduro's capture was that this would incentivize communist China to take similar actions in Taiwan. My opinion, this couldn't be further from the truth. For starters, communist China doesn't care about international law or norms. They've demonstrated that repeatedly, just ask the Philippines. Nor does it believe in international law even applies to Taiwan. But most importantly, Xi Jinping's calculus on whether to take kinetic action against Taiwan rests solely on whether or not he believes he will be successful or not.

In this sense, the tactical proficiency displayed during Operation Absolute Resolve may have actually given Xi more pause to take action in Taiwan. Because despite its massive military buildup, the PLA continues to lack the experience so clearly on display that the United States demonstrated in Maduro's capture. And the PLA leaders that do have combat experience, like General Zhang, just got purged, or at least one of them did.

So, Secretary Rubio, do you believe that the operation to take Maduro into custody will have any impact on communist China's actions or intentions toward Taiwan?

RUBIO: No, look, the situation on Taiwan is a Xi legacy project that he's made very clear that that's what he intends to do. And that's going to be irrespective of anything that happens in the world. Your point, though, is well taken, and that is the U.S. in conducting this operation, I think, was certainly startling to China, to Russia, to Iran, to any adversary around the world, because the U.S. is the only country in the world, the only country in the world that could have done this operation.

RICKETTS: Mr. Chairman, if I could just real briefly, and I just mentioned General Zhang getting purged here. He was obviously a very important official in China. Can you share with us just your assessment on what that means, that Xi just purged one of these --

RUBIO: Well, this is, I think, part of a pattern we've seen over the last few years, which is a purge of leaders in their military. They're spending a lot of money on their military, and obviously, some of these guys are stealing that money, and they're trying to address that. So, it's an issue internally in their system. They're obviously not sharing with us or talking to us in depth about any of that, but it's certainly something we watch with interest.

RICKETTS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RISCH: Thank you, Senator Ricketts.

BLITZER: All right. Stay with us. We're going to continue our special live coverage of this important hearing right after a short break.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:45:00]

BLITZER: Welcome back. Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee are now asking the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, important questions about U.S. policy, not just involving Venezuela, but also the alliance with the NATO allies. Let's listen in. Senator Chris Coons of Delaware is asking some tough questions.

SEN. CHRIS COONS (D-DE): -- or in access, or in troops, or in service. It is allies that will keep us safe in the Indo-Pacific. Our treaty allies, Korea and Japan and Australia and the Philippines, are going to be critical to Indo-Pacific security against our principal threat, China, and in Europe.

I am worried that the very foundations of trust are being shaken. Our democracy depends on consultation with Congress that is truthful and timely. And the confidence of our allies depends on them knowing where we're going next. Today an armada is steaming towards Iran.

[10:50:00]

And I hope I can count on you, Mr. Secretary, to consult with us and inform us before our next actions, whether against Nigeria, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, or anywhere else. And I hope and believe that I can count on you to reinforce the sanctity of NATO. Not to reimagine it, but to reinforce it.

RUBIO: Thank you. Well, let me unpack the three points you touched upon. Consultation, NATO, Greenland. Alliances in Greenland. Let me tell them to consult. Look, this has been a point of tension, not just in this administration and Congress, but in multiple administrations. As you rightly pointed out, I was a big fan of consultation when I was sitting over there. Now, you know, it's a different job, different time. But that's not necessarily the point.

This is a very unique situation that we faced here. The fact of the matter is that our mission and the one you were briefed on and talked about, that mission remains ongoing. And that is the counter-narcotic mission that we continue to carry out in the -- as controversial as it may be, you may not all be fans of it, obviously, but it is happening in the Eastern Pacific. And it is also happening in the Caribbean Basin. The problem is -- or the good news is, there aren't a lot of drug boats moving in the Caribbean Basin anymore. And that's what we had briefed Congress upon.

This specific mission that you've talked about, one of the reasons why you rehearsed it is to see if it's even feasible, to basically go to the president and say, is this something that's even an option on the table? The truth of the matter is that this mission could not have been briefed to Congress because it wasn't even in the realm of possible until very late in December when all of our efforts to negotiate with Maduro had failed and the president was finally presented these options and made these decisions. It was also a trigger-based operation. It may never have happened. It required a number of factors to all align at the right place at the right time in a very limited window. And it wasn't even clear if it was ever going to be possible.

There's also the aspect which I do not control, and that is deference to the Department of War on operational security. Despite the fact that we had kept us quite constrained, the truth of the matter is that this was leaked. We now know it was leaked by a contractor, the Department of War, that had it been published would have endangered the lives of people and or would have probably canceled the ability to carry out the mission.

So, this is a real tension and one that I'm doing the best I can to try to manage within the constraints of two things, operational security and also decisions being made. There are multiple contingencies for events all over the world, including some that none of us think we're ever going to come to fruition. And in this particular case, one of the reasons why you rehearse these things in advance is to know whether it's even possible, is this even doable? And what are the risks associated with doing so you can present options to the president who ultimately makes these decisions?

In the case of reimagining NATO, it most certainly has to be reimagined. And the reason why it has to be reimagined is not because its purpose is reimagined, its capabilities have to be reimagined. Let me give you as a point of example. There's a lot of talk about security guarantees. And it's something that there's general agreement about now with the case of Ukraine. Those security guarantees basically involve the deployment of a handful of European troops, primarily French in the U.K., and then a U.S. backstop.

But in fact, the security guarantee is the U.S. backstop. I'm not diminishing the fact that some countries in Europe are willing to place troops in a post-war Ukraine. What I'm pointing out is that is irrelevant without the U.S. backstop. And the reason why you need such a strong U.S. backstop is because our allies and our partners have not invested enough in their own defense capabilities over the last 20 or 30 years.

Now, hopefully, that's going to change. Hopefully, that is changing. And in some cases, and in some particular countries, it's already changed. But this is a fact that we cannot ignore. NATO is going to be stronger if our allies are more capable, especially, and here's the reality, whether we want to accept it or not, we have interests all over the world. We have interests in the Middle East. We have interests in the Western Hemisphere. And we most certainly have interests in the Indo-Pacific.

A number of you have already pointed out that China is the chief challenge. We can't have the same soldiers or the same ships in both Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. We have to pick. No matter how many ships we build, no matter how many capabilities we grow, we're going to have to make these adjustments. And the stronger our partners are in NATO, the more flexibility the United States will have to secure our interests in different parts of the world. That's not an abandonment in NATO. That is a reality of the 21st century and the world that's changing.

Now, in the case of Greenland, I'll say we're in a good place right now. We had excellent meetings with the secretary general of NATO. In fact, even as I speak to you now, there'll be some technical-level meetings between us and our partners in Greenland and Denmark on this issue. And I think we have in place a process that's going to bring us to a good outcome for everybody.

The president's interest on Greenland has been clear. It's a national security interest. It's a longstanding interest that predates this administration. It's one that our allies acknowledge is re I think we're going to get something positive done. We're going to begin that process in a very professional, straightforward way. It begins today, and it'll be a regular process.

We're going to try to do it in a way that isn't like a media circus every time these conversations happen, because we think that creates more flexibility on both sides to arrive at a positive outcome. But I think we're going to get there.

[10:55:00]

And I thought it was noteworthy and important that despite your concerns, the president, at his speech in Davos, made very clear that the United States was not going to use force or military force in Greenland.

So, I think we're going to wind up in a good place. We've got a little bit of work to do, but I think we're going to wind up in a good place. And I think you'll hear the same from our colleagues in Europe very shortly.

COONS: Mr. Secretary, the Gang of Eight has never leaked. It is critical that you consult with Congress. For us to be safe, our allies have to trust us. And for this committee to do our work, we have to trust you. Let's work together to restore that.

RISCH: Thank you, Senator Coons. Senator McCormick.

SEN. DAVE MCCORMICK, (R-PA): Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. Defending American interests in the face of Russian, Iranian, and Chinese encroachment in the Western hemispheres is a key to the Trump corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. But Venezuela's new interim leader, in her public commentary, at least, defends their ties to Russia, Iran, and the PRC, and had said this week had enough of U.S. interference.

So, beyond the oil leverage, which you talked about in your testimony, what steps is the administration taking to demand from the interim government to put incentives in place to ensure that they prevent malign actors, foreign terror organizations, and so forth, from continuing to have influence and safe haven in Venezuela?

RUBIO: Yes, it's -- I mean, yes, there's leverage. And I wouldn't just say oil, I think anything that's sanctioned in Venezuela, in order for them to normalize it, will require cooperation with the United States. But it's not just leverage, it's also their national interest. It's an alignment of their interest. The truth of the matter is that the United States will be a far better partner for a future Venezuelan government that's free and democratic, and even for the current authorities, than some of the partners they've signed up with now.

Frankly, we think it's not in Venezuela's interest to have an Iranian presence or the sale of Iranian weaponry or anything like that into their country. So, I think there's alignment there. We think and can argue that some of these criminal elements, which they've allowed to act with impunity in parts of their country, is a deal with the devil. In the short-term, it provided revenues to some corrupt regime officials. But in the long-term, it's created real destabilization, not for just them, by the way, but also for Colombia.

Just understand something. The FARC dissidents and the ELN operate with impunity from Venezuelan territory. They control Venezuelan territory. And some of that was through deals with individuals aligned with the regime because they made money off of that. But we don't think that's in the long-term interest. And what's been expressed to us by leaders of the interim authorities is that they agree. And now, we're going to test it.

MCCORMICK: And despite the public commentary, there's a recognition, you think, in progress?

RUBIO: Look, we all have politics.

MCCORMICK: Yes.

RUBIO: Even in places like that. Suffice it to say what I've said from the very beginning, and that is we are going to judge based on actions, not words. And that's going both ways. You can tell us you're going to do all these great things. If you don't do them, you didn't do them. Or you can say, I'm not going to do these great things. But if you do them, you did them.

MCCORMICK: Good.

RUBIO: And I think we've made -- I think we can point to some things now that show you, just as an example. Think about it. Within two and a half weeks of Maduro's removal, they passed reforms to the hydrocarbon laws, which basically roll back many of the Chavez era restrictions on private ownership and investment in their country.

It doesn't go far enough. It probably needs to do more. But that's extraordinary. That never would have happened two or three weeks ago. It certainly wouldn't have happened if Maduro was still there. So, I think these are signs of progress.

Do they still have political prisoners? They do. But many are increasingly being released every single day, and some are actually being released and beginning to speak out again. And we're going to watch very closely how they're treated and how that happens, because that'll be part of how we judge them and their actions.

MCCORMICK: You touched on my second question, which is this long history of a very sordid history for outside investors coming into Venezuela. And the president and you had a meeting with our energy leaders in the Oval Office to talk about the opportunity to invest. And there was worries about the safety of investing.

What steps beyond what you just described in terms of the hydrocarbon law, security guarantees for workers, any sorts of certainty that investors are gaining, which is going to allow them to have the confidence to move on the opportunities in Venezuela?

RUBIO: Yes. I mean, the first step is some of these investors or potential investors need to get a license from OFAC to be able to even explore this. Then they need to be able to go down there and meet with people and see what's happening and make that determination.

Here's what I would say. Venezuela has a lot of oil. They do. But there's a lot of oil in other places, too. Companies are only going to invest somewhere if they know we're going to invest. We're going to make our money back with a profit and our land isn't going to be taken from us. And if you try to, there's a court we can go to and contracts we can enforce. That's the level of certainty that we're talking in terms of security. And that's what -- that's part of this transition process. That's part of this recovery process is to normalize their industry, because if not, they'll just invest the money in Guyana or they'll just invest the money in some other part of the world that has oil. They're not going to risk it.

So, it's to their benefit to have set up a normal, transparent process that encourages foreign investment, not just in oil, by the way, and other --

[11:00:00]